Sovereignty’s Gray Area: The Delimitation of Air and Space in the Context of Aerospace Vehicles and the Use of Force by King, Matthew T.
Journal of Air Law and Commerce
Volume 81 | Issue 3 Article 3
2016
Sovereignty’s Gray Area: The Delimitation of Air
and Space in the Context of Aerospace Vehicles and
the Use of Force
Matthew T. King
U.S. Air Force
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.smu.edu/jalc
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Air Law and
Commerce by an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Matthew T. King, Sovereignty’s Gray Area: The Delimitation of Air and Space in the Context of Aerospace Vehicles and the Use of Force, 81 J.
Air L. & Com. 377 (2016)
https://scholar.smu.edu/jalc/vol81/iss3/3
SOVEREIGNTY’S GRAY AREA: THE DELIMITATION OF
AIR AND SPACE IN THE CONTEXT OF AEROSPACE
VEHICLES AND THE USE OF FORCE
MATTHEW T. KING*
ABSTRACT
Debate over the delimitation of airspace and outer space has
persisted since the dawn of the space age, without resolution.
With the development of hybrid aerospace vehicles that can op-
erate in and transition between the two zones, the line between
their disparate legal regimes will be tested. And this test may not
come with an after-the-fact courtroom debate over applicable li-
ability regimes, but rather it may come with a real-time decision
made in a military operations center as to whether an aerospace
vehicle has violated sovereign airspace and should be shot down.
The recent shoot-down of a Russian bomber by Turkish fighters
is just one example of the sensitivity over violations of territorial
integrity.
This article explores the controlling law, in the absence of a
clear resolution from states, as to the legal regime governing the
transition from air to space. While others have examined delimi-
tation from the standpoint of liability, air and space traffic man-
agement, or other perspectives, this work addresses delimitation
through the lens of the potential use of force and state security
interests. It first breaks down air and space into their core, or
black-and-white, elements, with particular attention to their
* Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Air Force, Headquarters U.S. Air Force Operations
and International Law Directorate. LL.M., McGill University, Institute of Air and
Space Law; J.D., University of Pittsburgh; B.A., University of Virginia. The author
wishes to thank Professor Rene´ Provost, Professor Steven Freeland, and Lt. Col.
Brian Bengs for their invaluable inputs, comments, and critiques.
The views expressed in this article represent the personal views and
conclusions of the author writing in his personal capacity and are not necessarily
the views, ideas, or attitudes of the U.S. Air Force, the Department of Defense, or
the U.S. government. The author has used only information available to the
public in the researching and presentation of this work.
377
378 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE [81
rules of sovereignty and the distinction of state and civilian vehi-
cles. It then examines the gray area in between the regimes in
two ways, using a conservative (or positivist) approach and a
commensurability analysis. These modes of analysis reveal that
under the current legal construct, the lowest satellite orbit
should be regarded as the cap on state assertions of sovereignty,
and therefore, the legal line between the airspace and outer
space regimes from a use of force and security perspective.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 380
II. AEROSPACE VEHICLES AND THE USE OF
FORCE: A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS . . . . . . . . . 382
A. AEROSPACE VEHICLES AND THEIR POTENTIAL
APPLICATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 382
B. THE USE OF FORCE AS AN ANALYTICAL LENS . . . . 389
1. The Law of War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 389
2. A Broad Notion of Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 392
3. Why Territorial Sovereignty Matters . . . . . . . . . . . 395
4. Why State Versus Civilian Vehicles Matters . . . . 398
C. THE ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 399
D. METHODOLOGY, TERMINOLOGY, ASSUMPTIONS,
AND DISCLAIMERS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 401
1. Legal Methodology—A Doctrinal Approach with
Historical Perspective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 401
2. Aerospace, Aerospace Vehicles, and Gray Space . 402
3. International Consensus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 404
4. A Note on Technology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 405
5. A Note on Measurements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 405
III. THE BLACK AND WHITE: LEGAL
FRAMEWORKS IN AIRSPACE AND OUTER
SPACE—SOVERIEIGNTY AND STATE
VEHICLES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 405
A. AIRSPACE: SOVEREIGN TERRITORY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 407
1. The Physical Nature of Airspace: The Domain of
Aircraft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 408
2. The Legal Nature of Airspace: Sovereign
Territory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 412
3. The Legal Nature of Airspace: Civil and State
Aircraft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 417
4. Airspace: Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 418
B. OUTER SPACE: FREE USE AND EXPLORATION
(THE PROVINCE OF ALL HUMANKIND) . . . . . . . . . . . 418
2016] SOVEREIGNTY’S GRAY AREA 379
1. The Physical Nature of Outer Space: The
Domain of Space Objects in Orbit and Beyond . 419
2. The Legal Nature of Outer Space: Res
Communis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 423
3. The Legal Nature of Outer Space: Civil and
State Vehicles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 427
4. Outer Space: Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 430
C. THE LEGAL GRAY AREA BETWEEN AIRSPACE AND
OUTER SPACE: GRAY SPACE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 431
D. CONCLUSION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 433
IV. ADDRESSING THE GRAY SPACE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 433
A. WHAT IS AND WHAT OUGHT TO BE . . . . . . . . . . . . . 435
B. THE IMPORTANCE OF CONTEXT: HISTORY OF
SOVEREIGNTY IN AIRSPACE AND OUTER SPACE . . . 437
1. Sovereignty Before Space Applications . . . . . . . . . . 437
2. Sovereignty at the Dawn of the Space Age . . . . . . 441
a. State Positions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 441
b. Effective Control Theories . . . . . . . . . . . . . 442
c. The 1956 “Weather” Balloon Incident:
Sovereignty Above Effective Control . . . 445
d. Overall View: Broad Assertions of
Upward Sovereignty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 446
3. Sovereignty, the Satellite (Sputnik), and Beyond:
The Innocent Passage Exception . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 447
4. Conclusions: The Disposition is Sovereignty; the
Exception is Res Communis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 449
C. A CONSERVATIVE (POSITIVIST) APPROACH . . . . . . . 450
1. In Defense of a Positivist Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . 450
a. The Approach is Consistent with State
Behavior and International Law
Norms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 451
b. The Approach is Consistent with Other
Examinations of International Law . . . . 453
c. Addressing the Lotus Issue . . . . . . . . . . . . . 455
2. Analysis: Sovereignty is the Rule; Free Movement
the Exception . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 458
3. Orbit as the Line . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 460
a. Affirmative Evidence of Orbit as the
Line . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 460
b. The Lack of Contrary Evidence . . . . . . . 464
4. Conclusion: Orbit is the Division Point . . . . . . . . 470
D. COMMENSURABILITY AND THE SECURITY
SPECTRUM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 471
380 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE [81
1. Commensurability as an Analytical Method . . . . 472
2. The Intersection of Politics and Law: Deriving
Order from Chaos . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 474
3. A Unified Metric . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 476
4. The Common Metric: Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 480
a. The Security Interest in Airspace Law . 480
b. The Security Interest in Outer Space
Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 482
5. Application of the Security Metric: Orbit is the
Division Point . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 487
a. Peaceful Uses and De-Weaponization . . 488
b. Transparency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 490
c. Practical Use of Force Considerations . 491
6. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 493
E. DRAWING CONCLUSIONS FROM THESE MODES OF
ANALYSIS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 493
V. CONCLUSION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 495
I. INTRODUCTION
IMAGINE A FLYING VEHICLE that can operate in a con-trolled, intentional manner in both airspace and outer space.
It has the capacity to take off, fully maneuver, and safely land
again—all while maintaining the capacity to conduct operations
(of varying nature) both in the air and in space. Hopefully, of-
fensive territorial incursions by, and attacks against, such craft
are among the last thoughts to cross one’s mind when consider-
ing the incredible potential benefits of these vehicles.1 Nonethe-
less, their ability to test the limits of what states consider airspace
and outer space begs a much debated question in air and space
law—where, exactly, is the line between air and space?
This article examines the implications of these vehicles under
the rules of law governing air and outer space, with specific at-
tention to the repercussions for the possible use of force by
states against such vehicles (particularly jus ad bellum). From this
context, the author argues that, despite the numerous theories
on the delimitation of air and space that have been articulated
since the beginning of the space age, the presently existing legal
structure applicable to such vehicles should be viewed as an air-
space (as opposed to outer space) regime for any operations be-
1 Perhaps encouragingly, the bulk of academic discussion of these vehicles and
their domain of operation focuses on other matters, leaving somewhat of a
dearth of literature on the use of force against such vehicles.
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low orbit. The practical effect of this finding is that the rules of
state territorial sovereignty then apply. This makes overflight by
such vehicles (while operating below clearly established outer
space) a violation of territorial integrity, which—depending on
the circumstances—may trigger various actions under interna-
tional law, including the use of force. The potential for the use
of force is even greater for overflight by state or military vehi-
cles, which enjoy far more limited rights of passage under an
airspace regime and are more likely to be construed as threaten-
ing by the states whose sovereignty is being violated.
The assertion that airspace is the appropriate regime is princi-
pally one by default. This work examines the two potentially rel-
evant legal regimes governing the flight of these vehicles—air
law and outer space law—and argues that notwithstanding their
fundamental differences in matters related to the use of force,
they essentially exist on one continuum defined by state sover-
eignty and security. Viewed in this context, the author argues
that outer space law is a specific and limited deviation from the
baseline position that states can (and do) assert rights of territo-
rial sovereignty as high as possible. That is, outer space law is a
defined cap on sovereignty—an exception to the default rule.
Thus, if an area cannot be considered “outer space” (in physical,
geographic, or functional terms) then it must be considered
part of the default, or baseline: sovereign airspace. The delimita-
tion debate among publicists and among states demonstrates
the lack of clarity in a line between air and space. In the absence
of clarity, we yield to the default legal position; that is, follow the
rule and not the exception. Under this approach, airspace
should be the going regime unless and until states agree to a
change in the law (as they did for the outer space regime).
This work is divided into three substantive chapters. The first
further develops the argument and its analytical framework and
discusses some of the factual and legal premises underlying the
analysis. The second chapter examines the airspace and outer
space regimes as they exist presently and advances the idea of
“gray space,” or the legally unclear zone existing at the edges of
the more black-and-white aspects of airspace and outer space.
The third chapter then addresses how the gray area should be
addressed; that is, it explains why the default positon should be
toward sovereignty, with orbit as the dividing line between the
two zones.
In all, this work is not intended as a prescription for what the
law should be for the division of airspace and outer space legal
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regimes. In the legal literature, there exist many good ideas on
delimitation, based on many different concerns such as airspace
and outer space traffic control, insurance, commercial develop-
ment (in particular space tourism and hypersonic transporta-
tion), pure science, and a host of other notions. Any one of
these concerns may be a firm basis on which a regime of delimi-
tation can be founded (with the remaining concerns adjusting
their regulations and practices to whatever line—assuming the
consensus is for a line—is determined). But, as yet, there is no
clear state consensus as to a line or the primary foundation
upon which any such delimitation should be based. In the ab-
sence of a clear custom or convention under international law,
which would trump any analysis here, this work attempts to ex-
plore the baselines and defaults that should guide state actions,
with focus on a known, primary concern for states: their sover-
eignty and national security.
II. AEROSPACE VEHICLES AND THE USE OF FORCE:
A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS
This chapter further develops the matters introduced above.
It describes the nature of the vehicles in question throughout
this work, addresses the use of force as used in this work, and
establishes the general analytical framework set out to demon-
strate the central thesis: that the zone encompassing the unclear
upper edge of airspace and the unclear lower edge of outer
space should be regarded as falling under an airspace regime, at
least with regard to the use of force against vehicles operating in
this zone.
A. AEROSPACE VEHICLES AND THEIR POTENTIAL APPLICATIONS
An aerospace vehicle,2 as described above, is nothing new or
shocking to even the most peripheral viewer of science fiction.
But the vision of such vehicles is not like suggestions of time
travel, highways full of flying cars, or other only theoretically
possible or distant advances in technology, divorced from cur-
rent reality and research pursuits. Such craft have been consid-
ered, technologically, as a potential reality since at least the
1950s.3 And extant technology confirms the imminence of their
2 See Section II.D.2 infra for more discussion of this term.
3 See, e.g., ROY HOUCHIN, US HYPERSONIC RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT: THE
RISE AND FALL OF DYNA-SOAR, 1944-1963 (2006) (describing the Boeing X-20, or
Dyna-Soar, which was designed to take off like a plane but operate in high-alti-
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existence and use.4 For instance, the U.S. Space Shuttle, first
taking flight in 1981, was launched into space where it could
orbit Earth and maneuver through space and then return to
Earth as an aircraft (albeit a glider without powered flight).5
Spaceplanes that can execute single-stage take-offs more like a
traditional airplane are also being pursued, though with far less
success to date.6
tude airspace or in outer space); MARTIN CAIDIN, WINGS INTO SPACE: THE HISTORY
AND FUTURE OF WINGED SPACE FLIGHT 128 (1964) (looking toward the future and
discussing the aerospace plane, “the winged vehicle that will leave [E]arth under
its own power, perform its space mission, and return under its own power and
piloted guidance.”); see also Roger Launius, The Strange Career of the American
Spaceplane: The Long History of Wings and Wheels in Human Space Operations, in 55
CENTAURUS 412, 412–32 (2013) (outlining the entire history of the spaceplane
concept, from the 1920s through its expected continuation into the future).
4 See Joseph Pelton, Regulatory Issues for New Global Aerospace Systems, in REGULA-
TION OF EMERGING MODES OF AEROSPACE TRANSPORTATION 77, 81–88 (Ram Jakhu
& Kuan-Wei Chen eds., 2014) (highlighting various emerging space systems, their
applications, and the companies developing them); SPACE SECURITY INDEX 2014,
at 56 (Cesar Jaramillo ed., 2014) (describing new suborbital and space tourism
technologies); see also Dean Reinhardt, The Vertical Limit of State Sovereignty, 72 J.
AIR L. & COM. 65, 88–99 (2007); Susan Trepczynski, Edge of Space: Emerging
Technologies, The “New” Space Industry, and the Continuing Debate on the De-
limitation of Outer Space (2006) (unpublished LL.M. thesis, McGill University
Institute of Air and Space Law) (on file with McGill University Law Library) (de-
tailing numerous emerging technologies, which though amassed in 2006, still
represents the general setting today).
5 See The Shuttle, NASA, http://www.nasa.gov/externalflash/the_shuttle/
[https://perma.cc/74WZ-T7L7]. The Soviet Union also planned for a similar
craft, the Buran, but it only executed one mission in 1988. MARIETTA BENKO¨ &
ENGELBERT PLESCHER, SPACE LAW: RECONSIDERING THE DEFINITION/DELIMITATION
QUESTION AND THE PASSAGE OF SPACECRAFT THROUGH FOREIGN AIRSPACE 21–22
(2013). Though it could transit the airspace, the Space Shuttle was exclusively
intended for use in outer space. Id. According to Zanghi, it was considered an
outer space object for two primary reasons: first, the definition of “space object”
in the relevant space conventions is broad; and second, it fell to Earth much like
a capsule (not like a plane) due to the steep inclination and “scarce maneuvera-
bility,” so it was more a space vehicle. Claudio Zanghi, Aerospace Object, in OUT-
LOOK ON SPACE LAW OVER THE NEXT 30 YEARS: ESSAYS PUBLISHED FOR THE 30TH
ANNIVERSARY OF THE OUTER SPACE TREATY 115, 117 (Gabriel Lafferranderie &
Daphne Crowther eds., 1997). This second, and more important, prong would
not apply to an aerospace vehicle that can engage in controlled flight at all alti-
tudes. Id.
6 See Kenneth Chang, 25 Years Ago, NASA Envisioned Its Own “Orient Express”,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 20, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/21/science/25-
years-ago-nasa-envisioned-its-own-orient-express.html (last visited Nov. 7, 2016);
Marshall Space Flight Center: Fact Sheet Number: FS-2003-05-64-MSFC, NASA, http://
www.nasa.gov/centers/marshall/news/background/facts/ospfacts.html [https:/
/perma.cc/73B8-MTD4] (anticipating such a spaceplane by 2012); Spaceplane,
WIKIPEDIA (Aug.4, 2016, 4:07 AM), https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title
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The current U.S. Air Force X-37B, presently a remotely
piloted vehicle, operates in a similar fashion to the Space Shut-
tle, with an initial rocket launch, independent operation, and
then glide return to Earth.7 However, if such a vehicle was com-
bined with a propulsion system such as the SABRE (Synergetic
Air-Breathing Rocket Engine), currently being designed and
tested by Reaction Engines, Ltd., the stage could be set for a
truly full-functional hybrid aerospace vehicle—transcending the
traditional definitions of airplane and space-rocket.8 This work
posits the eventual (and near-term) existence of such
technologies.
The potential applications of this new technology are nearly
limitless. Presently, the focus seems to be on suborbital tourism
and adventure. But the opportunities for travel,9 scientific re-
search, telecommunications,10 or a host of other applications
abound.
=Spaceplane&oldid=668177939 [https://perma.cc/WX42-SZNL] (noting that of
the five successful spaceplanes, all have glider-only space (and return) segments);
but see Sharon Weinberger, Return of the SpacePlane, WIRED (Aug. 13, 2007), https:/
/www.wired.com/2007/08/blackswift-retu/ [https://perma.cc/GS3U-5AGD].
7 See X-37B Orbital Test Vehicle, U.S.A.F. (Apr. 17, 2015), http://www.af.mil/
AboutUs/FactSheets/Display/tabid/224/Article/104539/x-37b-orbital-test-vehi-
cle.aspx [https://perma.cc/BN2B-W9CC].
8 The SABRE Engine, REACTION ENGINES, http://www.reactionengines.co.uk/sa-
bre.html [https://perma.cc/8QQZ-YUHP] (the SABRE has integrated air
breathing and conventional rocket modes into one engine); see Alan Tovey, Con-
corde Mark 2: Airbus Files Plans for New Supersonic Jet, TELEGRAPH (Aug. 6, 2015, 8:45
AM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/industry/engineer
ing/11782446/Concorde-Mark-2-Airbus-files-plans-for-new-supersonic-jet.html
[https://perma.cc/RAA4-DEKK] (describing the proposed Concorde 2, which
plans to integrate three engine types into one craft to achieve an upright rocket
stage and cruising altitudes of 100,000 feet (over 30 kilometers)).
9 This includes travel to outer space, for instance to the International Space
Station, as well as high-speed (hypersonic) point-to-point terrestrial destination
travel, during which a specialized plane ascends to nearly 100 kilometers (62
miles or 329,000 feet) before rapidly descending to its destination. See Maria
Fischer, New York to Tokyo by Way of Outer Space, SPACE SAFETY MAG. (Nov. 5, 2012),
http://www.spacesafetymagazine.com/aerospace-engineering/spacecraft-
design/york-tokyo-outer-space/ [https://perma.cc/97WJ-GMYX] (discussing the
XCOR Lynx program, which projects the New York to Tokyo trip taking ninety
minutes).
10 See Joseph Pelton, Ph.D., Geosynchronous Satellites at 14 Miles Altitude?, 2Q95
NEW TELECOM Q. 11, 11 (1995) (describing the potential for communications
platforms that linger in suborbital “proto-space” to provide cost-effective and con-
sistent telecommunications coverage); What is Project Loon, PROJECT LOON, https:/
/www.solveforx.com/loon/ [https://perma.cc/3WF9-ZG77] (a network of high-
altitude balloons that can provide regional internet coverage).
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But this potential is not without concerns—particularly when
governments (and frequently the military departments of gov-
ernments) are executing the operations. Distrust of other states
is simply a part of world affairs. One contemporary example of
this is the X-37B experimental spaceplane discussed above. It is
not technology that is unique to the United States or to military
research—Virgin Galactic, Swiss Space Systems (S3), and a host
of others are working on similar vehicles that can operate in
both air and space for civilian (or government) purposes. Still,
in October 2014, when the X-37B returned to Earth from a 675-
day mission—during which it launched from Earth, operated in
outer space, and returned to base intact and ready for re-use—
the mission garnered a great deal of attention.11 Abundant me-
dia coverage of the flight focused not just on the technological
advances it represented, but also the mysteries and theories
about its “secret” mission or possible uses.12 The “mysterious”
nature of the craft and its mission persisted in coverage of its
more recent May 2015 launch.13 The technology is only likely to
11 See Mike Wall, X-37B Military Space Plane Lands After Record-Shattering Secret
Mission, SPACE (Oct. 17, 2014), http://www.space.com/27427-x37b-space-plane-
air-force-landing.html [https://perma.cc/V64T-XF8E]; Rob Crilly, Top-Secret US
Space Drone Returns to Earth After Two-Year Orbit, TELEGRAPH (Oct. 18, 2014), http:/
/www.telegraph.co.uk/news/science/space/11171389/Top-secret-US-space-
drone-returns-to-Earth-after-two-year-orbit.html (last visited Nov. 7, 2016).
12 See Elizabeth Howell, X-37B Space Plane Returns: 5 Theories About Its Secret Mis-
sion, LIVE SCIENCE (Oct. 17, 2014), http://www.livescience.com/48338-x37b-
space-plane-conspiracy-theories.html [https://perma.cc/88G5-V53] (“The top-
secret nature of the X-37B missions has sparked a number of conspiracy theo-
ries,” including purposes of surveillance of Earth or space objects, orbital bom-
bardment, disruption or destruction of satellites, and deploying other spy
satellites).
13 See, e.g., Mike Wall, US Air Force Launches X-37b Space Plane on 4th Mystery
Mission, SPACE (May 20, 2015), http://www.space.com/29448-x37b-space-plane-
launches-fourth-mission.html [https://perma.cc/CW55-5PGA]. Potentially ad-
ding fuel to the fire for those concerned with the potential malevolent uses of
such a vehicle, the then-head of the U.S. Air Force Space Command, General
John Hyten, was asked on a major news program about the X-37B, and he could
not deny its potential as a weapons system. See David Martin, 60 Minutes: The Battle
Above, Part One, CBS NEWS (Apr. 26, 2015, 12:24 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/
videos/the-battle-above-part-one/ [https://perma.cc/UJ3Y-KZDF]. The interview
and news story overall focused on self-defense and anti-attack technology (as op-
posed to U.S. attack capabilities), with the Secretary of the U.S. Air Force even
stating that the United States presently has no weapons in space. However the Air
Force does not deny the X-37B’s potential use as an offensive weapon:
Q (David Martin): “So, here’s your chance to end all the specula-
tion about what this space plane [the X-37B] is really for . . . . Can
you tell me whether or not someday the spaceplane is going to be-
come a weapons system?”
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advance further, eventually allowing for both civilian and mili-
tary vehicles that can fully operate at will in both airspace and
outer space, at virtually any altitude, but with the advanced tech-
nology there is likely to be commensurate mistrust and concern.
And this mistrust and concern is not limited to individuals
and news organizations. States and policymakers are wary of the
aerospace capabilities of foreign governments because they
could directly threaten their national security or territorial in-
tegrity.14 Two scenarios demonstrate the potential points of con-
tention for actions conducted in aerospace based on emerging
technologies.
First, there may be intentionally provocative territorial incur-
sions by armed military aerospace vehicles. Such activities would
not be simple high-altitude overflight for access to outer space,
or matters of distress or other recognized exigency. Instead,
they would constitute deliberate, provocative acts, presumably as
an extension of state foreign policy goals. Such actions occur in
the current state of international affairs. For instance, the Rus-
sian military has frequently tested the boundaries of North At-
lantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member-nation airspace,
seemingly to gauge the response (both tactical and political)
and to make a political statement.15 China also has a program to
A (General Hyten): “The intent is . . . I cannot answer that ques-
tion. . . . I’m not going to say what it’s going to become because
we’re experimenting.”
Id.; cf. HOUCHIN, supra note 3, at 104–05 (discussing the U.S. Dyna-Soar
spaceplane, which was intended for use as an orbital weapons system and hyper-
sonic bomber in its second and third phases, but it was presented initially only as
a suborbital (non-space) jet platform to avoid scrutiny from the Eisenhower ad-
ministration as a space weapon).
14 See Brian Weeden, The End of Sanctuary in Space: Why America is Considering
Getting More Aggressive in Orbit, WAR IS BORING (Jan. 7, 2015), https://medium
.com/war-is-boring/the-end-of-sanctuary-in-space-2d58fba741a [https://perma
.cc/GV2A-E6QP] (discussing both the U.S. concerns and reactions to Chinese
and Russian space activities, as well as concern created for China, Russia, and
other states by the United States (particularly the X-37B, the articulation of a
potentially aggressive space control policy and assets, and rejection of the U.N.-
based attempts at a resolution on the placement of weapons in outer space)); see
also Tim Schwarz, North Korean Space Scientist to U.S. People: ‘Trust Us’, CNN (July 3,
2015), http://www.cnn.com/2015/07/03/asia/north-korean-space-program/
[https://perma.cc/8W6N-Y286] (examining U.S. concerns over North Korea’s
non-military space program and agency, the National Aerospace Development
Administration (NADA)).
15 See Kevin Bohn & Steve Almasy, U.S. to File Complaint Over ‘Unsafe’ Intercept by
Russian Fighter Jet, CNN (Apr. 12, 2015, 3:48 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/
04/11/europe/russia-u-s-plane-intercept/index.html [https://perma.cc/BN5C-
2016] SOVEREIGNTY’S GRAY AREA 387
broaden its territorial sea (and thereby airspace) through assert-
ing control over various regional islands.16 Counter to this, the
United States has a policy to test (that is, not respect through
asserting passage rights) claims of territory beyond the per-
ceived limits of international law.17 The tension between asser-
tions of sovereignty and those eager to test it can have
dangerous results.18 As it is occurring today with ships and air-
PYLK]; Lindsay Isaac & Greg Botelho, Dutch Fighter Jets Intercept 2 Russian Bombers
in Their Airspace, CNN (Apr. 23, 2014, 6:33 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/04/
23/world/europe/russian-bombers-intercepted/index.html [https://perma.cc/
6P52-SH76]; Brad Lendon, NATO Jets Scrambled More Than 400 Times This Year for
Russian Intercepts, CNN (Nov. 21, 2014, 11:53 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/
11/21/world/europe/nato-russia-intercepts/index.html [https://perma.cc/
9WMC-ZLRP]; Laura Perez Maestro & Jason Hanna, UK Jets Intercept Russian Air-
craft Near British Airspace, CNN (Feb. 19, 2015, 5:08 PM), http://www.cnn.com/
2015/02/19/world/uk-russia-aircraft-intercepted/index.html [https://perma
.cc/3QK5-TLDU]; Jamie Crawford, ‘Unusual’ Russian Flights Concern NATO, CNN
(Oct. 30, 2014, 12:53 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/10/29/world/russian-air-
craft-european-airspace/index.html [https://perma.cc/ZC99-K26Y]; Steve Brusk
& Ralph Ellis, Russian Planes Intercepted Near U.S., Canadian Airspace, CNN (Nov.
13, 2014, 10:23 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/09/19/us/russian-plane-inci-
dents/index.html [https://perma.cc/6HBS-UJQK]. Of course, Russia is not the
only state to have used aerial incursions as a form of boundary testing. See, e.g.,
ARTHUR W. ROVINE, DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
1973, at 302 (1974) (describing a March 1973 incident between the United States
and Libya, arising over a U.S. C-130’s flight over a claimed “restricted area”
within 100 nautical miles of Tripoli).
16 See Simon Denyer, See China’s Rapid Island-Building Strategy in Action, WASH.
POST (July 1, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/
2015/07/01/new-images-show-china-building-military-facilities-in-south-china-
sea/ [https://perma.cc/SW7P-JVBX].
17 See David S. Cloud, U.S. Publicly Challenges China’s Moves in Disputed Islands,
L.A. TIMES (May 21, 2015, 6:00 PM), http://www.latimes.com/world/asia/la-fg-
us-china-20150522-story.html [https://perma.cc/VRJ6-9REC]; Ronald Reagan,
President of the United States, Statement on United States Oceans Policy (Mar.
10, 1983), in 1 PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES: RONALD
REAGAN, 1983, at 303, 303 (1984), http://www.state.gov/documents/organiza-
tion/143224.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZT85-VMD2] (“[t]he United States will ex-
ercise and assert its navigation and overflight rights and freedoms on a worldwide
basis in a manner that is consistent with the balance of interests reflected in the
[U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea]. The United States will not, however,
acquiesce in unilateral acts of other states designed to restrict the rights and free-
doms of the international community in navigation and overflight and other re-
lated high seas uses.”).
18 See, e.g., SHIRLEY A. KAN ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30946, CHINA-U.S.
AIRCRAFT COLLISION INCIDENT OF APRIL 2001: ASSESSMENTS AND POLICY IMPLICA-
TIONS 1–6 (2001) (analyzing the April 2001 incident where a Chinese F-8II
fighter jet collided with a U.S. Navy EP-3E during an aerial intercept off the coast
of China); John King, U.S.: N. Korea Plane Intercept ‘Reckless’, CNN (Mar. 4, 2003,
4:44 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2003/US/03/04/nkorea.intercept/index.html
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craft, there is little reason to doubt the potential for such incur-
sions being employed as a policy tool in the future with
aerospace vehicles as another tool for states.
Second, quasi-satellite systems may loiter in the aerospace re-
gion, such as the nascent Project Loon system.19 If unwanted,
such a telecommunication or remote sensing capacity could be
construed as highly offensive by a state receiving the transmis-
sions (be it simple internet access or media broadcasts), eliciting
an adverse reaction. For instance, in recent history, Iran was be-
lieved to be the source of jamming that targeted the French
EUTELSAT (a traditional orbital satellite) and its media signals
in response to the broadcast of unwanted television program-
ming (such as BBC Persian) into Iran.20 An intelligence, surveil-
lance, and reconnaissance (ISR) asset operating in aerospace
could provoke an equally, or even more, hostile response than
just jamming.
In the above scenarios, if the aerospace vehicles are state—
and particularly military—craft, the key factors in determining
whether the use of force may be acceptable are the questions of
where the vehicals are operating and whether the vehicles are
encroaching on sovereign territory. States may dislike that orbi-
tal satellites overfly their territory, but that is no violation of ter-
ritorial integrity, so no actions employing force would be
appropriate. However, if aerospace vehicles are operating in a
state’s sovereign territory, force may be an option to remedy the
violation. Thus, it is the determination of whether the area of
operation (aerospace) can legitimately be claimed as sovereign
that will often drive the determination of the propriety of the
use of force. Second to this, whether the craft in question is a
civilian or state vehicle will also affect the use of force analysis.
[https://perma.cc/D8YX-B7KB]; John Rolph, Freedom of Navigation and the Black
Sea Bumping Incident: How “Innocent” Must Innocent Passage Be?, 135 MIL. L. REV.
137, 138–76 (1992) (describing a 1988 sea collision between the United States
and the USSR while the United States tested and the USSR asserted sovereignty
in the Black Sea).
19 See What is Project Loon, supra note 10.
20 See SPACE SECURITY INDEX 2011, at 151 (Cesar Jaramillo ed., 2011); Press Re-
lease, Int’l Telecomm. Union, ITU Radio Regulations Board Urges Iran to End
Interference Hampering EUTELSAT Satellite Operations (Mar. 26, 2010), http:/
/www.itu.int/newsroom/press_releases/2010/14.html [https://perma.cc/TT4B-
WJL6].
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B. THE USE OF FORCE AS AN ANALYTICAL LENS
As noted above, the potential for the use of force is a rubric
through which this argument’s analysis is performed. This work
is not intended as a study of the law of war or the law of armed
conflict, per se; instead, this study uses existing understanding
of law of war principles as a tool to develop the delimitation
issue. At the outset, though, a few comments on the use of force
under international law are important.
1. The Law of War
The law of war can be subdivided into two disciplines, jus ad
bellum, the law of going to war, and jus in bello, the law applied
during the conflict.21 Each are relevant to the present analysis of
the potential application of force by states.22 These subfields are
21 See U.S. DEP’T. OF DEF., DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE LAW OF WAR MANUAL 7
(2015) [hereinafter DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL] (“For the purposes of this man-
ual, the law of war is that part of international law that regulates the resort to
armed force; the conduct of hostilities and the protection of war victims in both
international and non-international armed conflict; belligerent occupation; and
the relationships between belligerent, neutral, and non-belligerent States.”). The
term “Law of War” is used here for clarity in reference to both jus ad bellum and
jus in bello and not to suggest a view the scope of prohibitions governing the use
of force is limited only to declared “wars.” In some circles, the term Law of
Armed Conflict (LOAC) is used in this broad manner as a substitute for law of
war. See id. at 8. (“The law of war is often called the law of armed conflict. Both
terms can be found in DoD directives and training materials.”). However, in
other circles, LOAC refers exclusively to jus in bello. For clarity, as both jus ad
bellum and jus in bello are discussed herein, they will be referred to as such and the
term LOAC will generally be avoided.
22 Others provide much more thorough analyses of the law of war and the
application of force. See generally Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions
of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International
Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force
Dec. 7, 1978) [hereinafter Additional Protocol I] (jus in bello); GARY D. SOLIS,
THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT: INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW IN WAR (1st
ed. 2010) (jus in bello); THE HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW,
(Dieter Fleck ed., 2d ed. 2008) (jus in bello); Brian Bengs, Legal Constraints Upon
the Use of a Tactical Nuclear Weapon Against the Natanz Nuclear Facility in Iran, 40
GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 323 (2008) (jus in bello); Sean Murphy, The Doctrine of
Preemptive Self-Defense, 50 VILL. L. REV. 699 (2005) (jus ad bellum); Michael Schmitt,
Cyber Operations and the Jus ad Bellum Revisited, 56 VILL. L. REV. 569 (2011) (jus ad
bellum).
There are also outer space-oriented analyses. See generally Duncan Blake, The
Law Applicable to Military Strategic Use of Outer Space, in NEW TECHNOLOGIES AND
THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 115, 129 (Hitoshi Nasu & Robert McLaughlin eds.,
2014); Michel Bourbonnie`re & Ricky J. Lee, Jus ad Bellum and Jus in Bello Consider-
ations on the Targeting of Satellites: The Targeting of Post-Modern Military Space Assets,
44 ISRAEL YEARBOOK ON HUMAN RIGHTS 167 (2014); Michel Bourbonnie`re &
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distinct and independent—the existence of legality under one
does not presume the other. That is, even if in an armed conflict
permissible under jus ad bellum, a state must still adhere to jus in
bello restrictions on the application of force; even if a prospective
target would meet all jus in bello criteria, that does not justify the
use of force absent an existing conflict or a recognized jus ad
bellum mechanism.
The primary legal triggers for conflict under jus ad bellum are
self-defense and collective action through the United Nations
(U.N.) Security Council, under Chapter VII of the U.N. Char-
ter.23 Self-defense is the most likely jus ad bellum issue, and can
be invoked either in the event of an “armed attack” pursuant to
Article 51 of the U.N. Charter,24 or as a matter of customary
international law where a “‘necessity of self-defense is instant,
overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment for
deliberation.’”25 The scope of a state’s right to self-defense in
response to an attack (or, potentially, a threat thereof) varies in
the assertions of legal scholars and state practitioners. Murphy
identifies three main self-defense constructs:
“[S]elf-defense” refers to the use of armed coercion by a state
against another state in response to a prior use of armed coer-
cion by the other state or by a non-state actor operating from
that other state. “Anticipatory self-defense” refers to the use of
armed coercion by a state to halt an imminent act of armed coer-
Ricky J. Lee, Legality of the Deployment of Conventional Weapons in Earth Orbit: Balanc-
ing Space Law and the Law of Armed Conflict, 18 EUR J. INT. L. 873 (2008); Robert
Ramey, Armed Conflict on the Final Frontier: The Law of War in Space, 48 A.F.L. REV. 1
(2000). But see also Steven Freeland, The Laws of War in Outer Space, in HANDBOOK
OF SPACE SECURITY 81, 102 (Kai-Uwe Schrogl et al. eds., 2015) (“Overall, given the
unique nature of outer space, the fundamental principles of the laws of war –
developed to regulate terrestrial warfare and armed conflict – are probably
neither sufficiently specific nor entirely appropriate for military action in outer
space.”).
23 U.N. Charter arts. 41–42 (allowing the Security Council to act, with force if
necessary, to maintain or secure international peace and security).
24 Id. art. 51. (“Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right
of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Mem-
ber of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures neces-
sary to maintain international peace and security.”).
25 Hunter Miller, British-American Diplomacy: The Caroline Case, THE AVALON
PROJECT: YALE LAW SCHOOL, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/br-1842d
.asp [https://perma.cc/8QGX-6NQK] (quoting the exchanges between the U.S.
Secretary of State, Daniel Webster, and Great Britain’s Lord Ashburton); see also
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.),
Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14 (June 27); Murphy, supra note 22, at 711 (discuss-
ing the Caroline incident in the context of anticipatory self-defense).
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cion by another state (or non-state actor operating from that
other state). Thus, anticipatory self-defense contemplates a situa-
tion where a state has not yet been the victim of such a coercive
act, but perceives that such an act is about to occur in the imme-
diate future[.] . . . “[P]reemptive self-defense” is used to refer to
the use of armed coercion by a state to prevent another state (or
non-state actor) from pursuing a particular course of action that
is not yet directly threatening, but which, if permitted to con-
tinue, could result at some future point in an act of armed coer-
cion against the first state.26
While this work does not advocate any particular view of the
scope of self-defense, it generally contemplates a preemptive
self-defense model for its analysis. This is because, for planning
purposes, aerospace-faring states should anticipate that their
provocative overflights may encounter the most forward-leaning
(from the likelihood of the use of force perspective) subjacent
state. Also, as technology develops for both vehicles and weap-
ons, states may become much more sensitive to the potential
gravity of a territorial incursion, making the preemptive school
of thought more common in state assertions.27
26 Murphy, supra note 22, at 704 (further noting that “preemptive self-defense
is, of course, ‘anticipatory’ and might even be called ‘preventive’ self-defense, but
for purposes of this Article, such terminology is not used to describe this form of
self-defense.”). Murphy goes on to assess four schools of thought on the right of
self-defense and their main proponents. Id. at 706–19 (developing the “strict-
constructionist,” “imminent threat,” “qualitative threat,” and “Charter-is-dead”
schools of thought); see also John Yoo, Using Force, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 729 (2004)
(arguing, essentially, for a preemptive self-defense model).
27 Yoo addresses how modern considerations affect the imminence analysis of
a potential attack, noting “the probability of an attack would be a function of two
factors: capability and intention.” Yoo, supra note 26, at 757–58. He finds that
“[t]his calculus explains why nineteenth-century uses of force of the type in the
Caroline case would not justify a broad right of preemptive self-defense, as the
harm from border incursions in an age before mechanized warfare was not that
great.” Id. at 758. See THE WHITE HOUSE (GEORGE W. BUSH), THE NATIONAL SE-
CURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 15 (2002), http://www.state
.gov/documents/organization/63562.pdf [https://perma.cc/NLG9-NA2Q] (re-
garding the threats of weapons of mass destruction and terrorism, noting that
“[t]o forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States
will, if necessary, act preemptively.”). However, the 2010 and 2015 National Se-
curity Strategy documents retained a focus on weapons of mass destruction but
removed the “preemptive” language. See THE WHITE HOUSE (BARACK H. OBAMA),
THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 4 (2010),
http://nssarchive.us/NSSR/2010.pdf [https://perma.cc/XZ2K-WC9E]; see also
THE WHITE HOUSE (BARACK H. OBAMA, THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE
UNITED STATES 11 (2015), http://nssarchive.us/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/
2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/TMC4-QXPJ].
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The core aspects of jus in bello—also often called international
humanitarian law (IHL)—relevant to this study are the princi-
ples of distinction, military necessity, proportionality, and hu-
manity. Distinction compels belligerents to distinguish between
military and civilian objects and targets and not to target purely
civilian objects or engage in indiscriminate attacks.28 Military ne-
cessity similarly ensures that any potential target has a military-
based purpose for its destruction or neutralization.29 Propor-
tionality requires that belligerents ensure that any collateral ci-
vilian damage caused by an otherwise legal attack (having
passed the distinction and necessity analyses) not be excessive
relative to the anticipated military gain.30 Finally, humanity dic-
tates that force not be employed for the purpose of causing “su-
perfluous injury or unnecessary suffering” of otherwise lawful
targets.31 This section is obviously not an exhaustive study of the
law of war, but it provides the framework from which discussions
of the use of force below emerge.
2. A Broad Notion of Force
This work takes a broad view of the use of force, both as the
impetus to action and in response to an offensive overflight. In
essence, force here lies at the intersection of politics and bellig-
erent actions. Clausewitz famously described war as an extension
of politics by other means.32 On this spectrum between political
acts and outright war or open hostilities are varying degrees of
action, to include force or the threat thereof. And as politics
change, non-lethal technologies emerge, and state practice de-
velops, the spectrum is ever-changing.33 Certainly, force can
28 See Additional Protocol I, supra note 22, art. 51.
29 See id. art. 52 (generally defining military objects, and limiting the destruc-
tion of specific types of targets such as cultural and religious objects, those indis-
pensable for survival of the civilian population, those which would cause severe
environmental damage, and those which contain dangerous forces (like dams,
dykes, and nuclear power facilities)).
30 See id. art. 57.
31 Id. art. 35(2).
32 CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ, ON WAR ch. 1, para. 24 (J.J. Graham trans., 1873)
(1832), http://www.clausewitz.com/readings/OnWar1873/BK1ch01.html
[https://perma.cc/2WX7-MQ5D] (“We see, therefore, that war is not merely a
political act, but also a real political instrument, a continuation of political com-
merce, a carrying out of the same by other means.”); see also LC Green, Cicero And
Clausewitz Or Quincy Wright: The Interplay Of Law And War, 47 CHITTY’S L.J. & FAM.
L. REV. 37 (1999).
33 As a matter of illustration, U.S. policy has changed to make less clear
whether the “use of force” is appropriate to defend access to and use of outer
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mean kinetic actions with missiles, bombs, or sophisticated anti-
satellite weapons (ASATs). However, in the modern technologi-
cal era, responsive actions may also include cyber attacks (or
other non-“attack” cyber activities),34 jamming and other harm-
ful signal interference,35 or other acts designed to counteract an
offensive incursion or overflight that may or may not amount to
“uses of force” under the prevailing law (or the positions of
states).36 When force is referred to here, it may be any such ac-
space. The 1999 Space Policy asserted that “interference with U.S. space systems
will be viewed as an infringement on our sovereign rights. The [United States]
may take all appropriate self-defense measures, including . . . the use of force
. . . .” U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., DIRECTIVE NO. 3100.10, SPACE POLICY para. 4.2.1 (1999).
However, the 2012 iteration removes the explicit mention of force, stating
“[s]uch interference, or interference with other space systems upon which the
United States relies, is irresponsible in peacetime and may be escalatory during a
crisis. The United States will retain the capabilities to respond at the time and
place of our choosing.” U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., DIRECTIVE NO. 3100.10, SPACE POLICY
para. 4.b (2012). So while the term “force” has been removed, the policy and
operative considerations remain the same.
34 See Schmitt, Cyber Operations, supra note 22, at 570 (discussing cyber
activities).
35 See Sarah Mountin, The Legality and Implications of Intentional Interference with
Commercial Communication Satellite Signals, 90 INT’L L. STUD. 101, 104–105 (2014)
(discussing harmful interference).
36 For an in-depth discussion of whether all “force” constitutes a “use of force”
under the prohibition of U.N. Charter Article 2(4), see Tom Ruys, The Meaning of
“Force” and the Boundaries of the Jus Ad Bellum: Are “Minimal” Uses of Force Excluded
from UN Charter Article 2(4)?, 108 A.J.I.L. 159 (2014). Ruys also notes the differ-
ences in positon among some states as to whether all force constitutes an “armed
attack” triggering Article 51 of the U.N. Charter:
[I]f the characterization of certain acts as the use of force removes
the possibility of invoking grounds precluding wrongfulness, the in-
verse qualification—that is, a finding that certain acts do not consti-
tute the use of force—in principle rules out the possibility of
exercising or invoking the right of self-defense in reaction thereto.
It is widely accepted that every armed attack automatically consti-
tutes a use of force, but views differ in legal doctrine on the extent
of the gap between the two notions. Those who limit armed attacks
to large-scale attacks construe the gap widely, whereas others, who
accept that more small-scale attacks may equally trigger the right of
self-defense, construe the gap more narrowly (and some essentially
regard the two notions as materially identical). . . . The implication
is that, absent a use of force, there can be no armed attack—and,
accordingly, no recourse to self-defense. Conversely, it is safe to as-
sume that, whenever a state invokes the right of self-defense in re-
sponse to a certain act, it views the latter act as constituting an
armed attack and, by definition, a use of force.
Id. at 162–63. (footnotes omitted). See also Military and Paramilitary Activities in
and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, ¶ 195
(June 27). (describing actions less than full attacks by armed bands, such as “assis-
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tion along this spectrum, directed at aerospace vehicles. It need
not necessarily amount to an “armed attack” to warrant consid-
eration in this work—though, kinetic actions, such as shooting
down an aerospace vehicle, are the focus.
Writing in the early 1930s, Brierly noted:
War, however, is only the most extreme form that an appeal to
force may take; and certain measures of coercion by violent
means, but not amounting to war and regarded as consistent with
the continuance of a state of peace between the parties, have also
to be fitted into the international system.37
This is even truer today when formal “war” is no longer de-
clared; there are debatable applications of the regimes for coun-
termeasures and reprisals, and provocative actions and implicit
threats of force seem almost to be another means of expression
in international discourse.38 So, while jus ad bellum-appropriate
tance to rebels in the form of the provision of weapons or logistical or other
support” as uses of force); Matthew C. Waxman, Cyber-Attacks and the Use of Force:
Back to the Future of Article 2(4), 36 YALE J. INT’L L. 421, 426–40 (2013) (discussing
the meaning of “force” in a cyber context); DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra
note 21, at 998, para. 16.3.1 (“Cyber operations may in certain circumstances
constitute uses of force within the meaning of Article 2(4) of the Charter of the
United Nations and customary international law. For example, if cyber opera-
tions cause effects that, if caused by traditional physical means, would be re-
garded as a use of force under jus ad bellum, then such cyber operations would
likely also be regarded as a use of force.”).
37 J. L. Brierly, International Law and the Resort to Armed Force, 4 CAMBRIDGE L.J.
308 (1932).
38 See Nicar. v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J. ¶ 191 (distinguishing “the most grave forms of
the use of force (those constituting an armed attack) from other less grave
forms.”); Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), Judgment, 2003 I.C.J. Rep. 161 (Nov. 6)
(addressing hostile acts and uses of force lesser than “armed attacks,” and further
analyzing the Paramilitary Activities ruling); Iran v. U.S., 2003 I.C.J. at 333 (sepa-
rate opinion by Simma, J.) (admonishing the Court for inadequately addressing
defense and countermeasures against aggression not amounting to “armed at-
tack”); see generally Ruys, supra note 36. This is not to argue that the law of coun-
termeasures is unclear. To the contrary, it is broadly accepted that
countermeasures are non-force actions available only in response to internation-
ally wrongful acts (directly attributable to a derelict state) to compel the derelict
state back into compliance with its obligations. Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the
Work of Its Fifty-Third Session, U.N. Doc A/56/10, at 328–55 (2001) (in particu-
lar, Article 50 notes that the assertion of countermeasures does not remove “the
obligation to refrain from the threat or use of force as embodied in the Charter
of the United Nations”); Michael N. Schmitt, “Below the Threshold” Cyber Operations:
The Countermeasures Response Option and International Law, 54 VA. J. INT’L L. 697,
700–01 (2014) (“[C]ountermeasures are State actions, or omissions, directed at
another State that would otherwise violate an obligation owed to that State and
that are conducted by the former in order to compel or convince the latter to
desist in its own internationally wrongful acts or omissions. They constitute a
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uses of force are the general guiding principles herein, the
threat of force broadly—and contemplation of what may trigger,
legally or not, a forceful response from one state even though
others may find it inappropriate—should also be considered.39
3. Why Territorial Sovereignty Matters
Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter states: “All Members shall re-
frain in their international relations from the threat or use of
force against the territorial integrity or political independence
of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Pur-
poses of the United Nations.” Territory is an existential matter
for states, and threats to it are not taken lightly.
Gone are the days where a nomadic tribe, regarded as a sover-
eign body, can cross through and among lands only “casually
attached to one territory as it passes through it[,] deserts it
again[,] and is never permanently attached to any single terri-
tory.”40 States have borders; sovereignty and territory are perma-
nently linked in the modern world.41 For instance, in addition to
Article 2(4), the U.N. Charter notes that sovereign equality is a
cornerstone of international relations.42 Similarly, in the Corfu
Channel case, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) noted,
“[b]etween independent States, respect for territorial sover-
eignty is an essential foundation of international relations.”43
The degree to which states are inclined to protect territory
also demonstrates its importance to them. Of the nine conten-
tious cases that culminated at the ICJ in 2013 and 2014, more
means of self-help in an international system generally devoid of compulsory dis-
pute resolution mechanisms.”). However, as discussed above, the factual predi-
cates for what constitutes “force” (or even an internationally wrongful act)
warranting countermeasures is not settled.
39 For instance, Yoo notes a perspective that “rejects the notion that interna-
tional law can govern the use of force because security is too dear an interest to
states.” Yoo, supra note 26, at 731. For such states, internal concerns, not external
legal limitations, will be stronger drivers of a response to an unwanted overflight
of sovereign territory.
40 SHELDON AMOS, LECTURES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW: DELIVERED IN THE MID-
DLE TEMPLE HALL TO THE STUDENTS OF THE INNS OF COURT 36 (2008) (originally
published in 1874).
41 See id. at 37 (“To so great an extent is this true that the idea of an indepen-
dent State, as distinguished from the territory of the State, is almost
inconceivable.”).
42 U.N. Charter art. 2(1) (“The Organization is based on the principle of the
sovereign equality of all its Members.”).
43 Corfu Channel Case (U.K. v. Alb.), Judgment, 1949 I.C.J. Rep. 4, 35 (Apr.
9).
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than half involved delimitation of boundaries (maritime) and
access to the sea.44 States also protect sovereign territory in the
overflight context through the shoot-down of encroaching
craft.45 The November 2015 incident in which Turkish F-16
fighters shot down a Russian Su-24 bomber while briefly transit-
ing over a narrow extension of Turkish airspace is but a recent
example.46 While future information about this incident may
make it a notable data point in the evolution of self-defense and
jus ad bellum, the issues are presently too cloudy to draw any such
definitive conclusions.47 However, even at this point, it serves as
44 List of Contentious Cases by Date of Introduction, INT’L CT. OF JUST., http://www
.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=3 [https://perma.cc/49DW-3Q5C].
Three more cases involve nuclear disarmament (a topic generally applicable to
air and space force as well).
45 See generally Bernard Donahue, Attacks on Foreign Civil Aircraft Trespassing in
National Airspace, 30 A.F.L. REV. 49, 54 (1989). Donahue found:
In the post-World War II era [to 1988], four notorious incidents
have occurred involving the downing or destruction of civil passen-
ger aircraft that violated the sovereign airspace of another nation.
In 1955 an Israel Airlines (El Al) Constellation flying from London
to Tel Aviv with an enroute stop in Vienna strayed into Bulgarian
airspace and was destroyed without warning. The second event also
involved Israel. In 1973 the Israeli Air Force destroyed a Libyan pas-
senger aircraft over the Israeli-occupied Sinai Desert. The third epi-
sode involved Korean Air (KAL) Flight 902 that was downed over
Soviet territory in 1978, and the fourth incident likewise involved a
Korean aircraft over the Soviet Union—the destruction of KAL
Flight 007 in 1983.
Id. (citations omitted); see also Brian Foont, Shooting Down Civilian Aircraft: Is There
an International Law?, 72 J. AIR L. & COM. 695, 711–16 (2007) (recounting the
1988 U.S.S. Vincennes destruction of Iran Air Flight 655 and four other inci-
dents); Int’l Law Comm’n, supra note 38, at 78 (Commentary to Article 24)
(describing United States incursions over Yugoslavia under distress); Foont, supra
note 45, at 700–01 (addressing the United States-Yugoslavia incident); MH17
Ukraine Plane Crash: What We Know, BBC NEWS (Sept. 28, 2016), http://www.bbc
.com/news/world-europe-28357880 (last visited Nov. 8, 2016) (outlining the lim-
ited facts surrounding the 2014 shoot-down of Malaysian Airlines MH17 over an
embattled portion of Ukraine).
46 See Turkey’s Downing of Russian Warplane—What We Know, BBC NEWS (Dec. 1,
2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-34912581 (last visited Nov.
8, 2016). Though less reported, it is also believed that Turkey downed a Russian
unmanned aircraft in the prior month for a similar incursion. Phil Stewart, U.S.
Suspects Turkey Shot Down Russian Drone Aircraft, Official Says, REUTERS (Oct. 16,
2015, 7:42 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-shoot-
down-idUSKCN0SA1CU20151016 [https://perma.cc/HBW9-56XD].
47 For instance, the short window (in both distance and time) of the airspace
violation, the justification asserted by Turkey, and support from Turkey’s allies
suggest a strong potential right to defend territory. See Turkey’s Downing of Russian
Warplane—What We Know, supra note 46; Steve Rosenberg, Putin: Turkey ‘Knew
Downed Fighter Jet Was Russian’, BBC NEWS (Nov. 26, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/
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a powerful, cautionary example of what states might do in re-
sponse to unwanted overflight, even an arguably de minimis
one.
Article 2(4) does not provide a clear remedy for violation of
territorial integrity. Certainly, any responsive use of force would
have to be judged on a case-by-case basis, but a violation of sov-
ereignty may open the door to force. The violation of territorial
sovereignty is a potential indicator of a threat tantamount to an
armed attack, thereby warranting the use of force in self-de-
news/world-europe-34940109 (last visited Nov. 8, 2016) (Turkey asserted it did
not know the jet was Russian, and “Erdogan has rejected calls by Russia to apo-
logi[z]e, saying Turkey does not need to say sorry for the violation of its air-
space.”); Press Release, White House Press Office, Remarks by President Obama
and President Erdogan of the Republic of Turkey After Bilateral Meeting (Dec. 1,
2015), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/12/01/remarks-presi-
dent-obama-and-president-erdogan-republic-turkey-after [https://perma.cc/
F4NS-GMGL] (U.S. President Obama stating, “Along with our allies, the United
States supports Turkey’s right to defend itself and its airspace and its territory.
And we’re very much committed to Turkey’s security and its sovereignty.”). How-
ever, repeated prior airspace violations and the assertion that Turkey actually
knew it was a Russian jet (which had a history of offensive overflights) suggest
that one incursion may not trigger a self-defense right. See Letter from Y. Halit
Cevik, Representative, Permanent Mission of Turkey, to Matthew Rycroft, Presi-
dent of the Security Council, United Nations, and Ban Ki-moon, Secretary Gen-
eral, United Nations (Nov. 24, 2015), http://live.aljazeera.com/Event/
Turkey_downs_Russian_jet/207503335 [https://perma.cc/R54X-LSMR] (Tur-
key asserting prior airspace incursions); Rosenberg, supra. Further confusing the
basis of this use of force, Turkey also made statements that “it had acted simply to
defend its own security and the ‘rights of our brothers’ in Syria.” Humeyra
Pamuk & Nick Tattersall, Turkey’s Erdogan Says Does Not Want Escalation After Rus-
sian Jet Downed, REUTERS (Nov. 25, 2015), http://www.reuters.com/article/
mideast-crisis-syria-turkey-erdogan-idUSL8N13K19N20151125 [https://perma
.cc/EBP5-9MDE] (emphasis added); see Press Release, White House Press Office,
supra (Turkish President Erdogan noting, “we focused on the Turkomans, which
are the Turkish descendants in Syria. We know that where the Turkomans are
present, there’s no Daesh presence or ISIS presence. As I’ve said before, they are
the Turkish descendants; they are the relatives of the Republic of Turkey. And
that area is continuously bombed. In the last few weeks, more than 500 civilians
were killed, so we would like to see the resolution of that problem as soon as
possible as well.”). This raises the possibility of a collective self-defense (or, even
less clear, possibly a humanitarian support) theory of force. Further confusing
the lessons from this incident, in June 2016, President Erdogan apologized to
Russia for the incident. Andrew Roth & Erin Cunningham, Turkish President Apolo-
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fense, in some states’ analyses.48 In assessing the propriety of use
of force, or the likelihood of the use of force in the event of the
overflight by an aircraft or space craft, whether the craft is in
sovereign territory is an essential factor.
4. Why State Versus Civilian Vehicles Matters
The civilian or state (particularly military) status of a craft can
also be a determining factor in the use of force. Article 3bis of
the Protocol amending the Convention on International Civil
Aviation of 1944 (Chicago Convention) precludes the use of
force against civilian aircraft for territorial incursions.49 But this
applies only in times of peace and does not prejudice states in
the exercise of self-defense.50 More broadly, three of the four
core principles of LOAC interrelate to ensure protection of civil-
ians and civilian objects, to include civilian aircraft or spacecraft.
Basically, if an object is civilian, it should not be targeted absent
very unique circumstances. Military (and generally state) ob-
jects, however, enjoy no such protections; their destruction is
entirely permissible once the legal analysis reaches the jus in
bello stage (save the few limitations imposed by humanity consid-
erations, and considerations of collateral effects on civilians).
Also, whether a craft can be distinguished as a state vehicle or
civilian one can play a role in how it is perceived as a potential
threat under jus ad bellum.51 This would especially be the case for
48 See Section II.B.4 infra for discussion of how mere incursions by a state vehi-
cle can be perceived as particularly threatening. Moreover, even if an incursion
does not amount to an “armed attack” triggering formal self-defense, states may
still elect to employ force or other actions against such an encroaching craft as a
lesser form of self-help as described above.
49 Protocol Relating to an Amendment to the Convention on International
Civil Aviation art. 3bis, May 10, 1984, ICAO Doc. 9436 (“States recognize that
every State must refrain from resorting to the use of weapons against civil aircraft
in flight and that, in case of interception, the lives of person on board and the
safety of aircraft must not be endangered.”); see Convention on International
Civil Aviation, Dec. 7, 1944, 61 Stat. 1180, 15 U.N.T.S. 295.
50 Convention on International Civil Aviation, supra note 49, art. 89 (“In case
of war, the provisions of this Convention shall not affect the freedom of action of
any of the contracting States affected, whether as belligerents or as neutrals.”); see
Protocol Relating to an Amendment to the Convention on Internation Civil Avia-
tion, supra note 49, art. 3bis; see also Michael Schmitt, Air Law and Military Opera-
tions, in HANDBOOK OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF MILITARY OPERATIONS 303, 318
(Terry Gill & Dieter Fleck eds., 2010) (though the Chicago Convention applies
only in peacetime, civilian airliners are already protected under laws of war).
51 For example, for some vehicles, particularly state ones (the focus here),
there can be a presumption of aggression in noncompliance with transit norms.
See George Walker, Anticipatory Collective Self-Defense in the Charter Era: What the
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states subscribing to a preemptive construction of self-defense.52
In general, a civilian craft operating on its own behalf and for
private interests would typically be less threatening than a state
vehicle (particularly military), which is possibly armed and exe-
cuting the will of another state.53 Thus, a vehicle’s status alters
the self-defense analysis—the lower the threat, the less likely
(prudentially) and appropriate (legally) the use of force would
be. Conversely, the greater the perceived threat, the more likely
that force may be employed against a craft.
Therefore, it makes a significant difference from a use of
force perspective, both in terms of jus ad bellum and jus in bello,
whether a craft is a civilian or state craft.
C. THE ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
This article suggests that a sovereignty-based airspace legal re-
gime should apply to both of the above scenarios, as well as any
other activities or operations below orbit. Beyond this chapter,
the analysis is divided into two primary parts.
First, this work examines the physical, geographic, and legal
distinctions between airspace and outer space, drawing atten-
tion to the area in between the two. Though air law does not
define the upper limits of airspace, outer space law does not
Treaties Have Said, 31 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 321, 346–347 (1998) (discussing the
presumption that submarines not surfacing and following innocent passage
norms have hostile intentions); see also John Astley & Michael Schmitt, The Law of
the Sea and Naval Operations, 42 A.F.L. REV. 119, 131 (1997) (“If a warship engages
in non-innocent passage, the coastal State may request that it take appropriate
corrective actions. Failure to do so justifies a demand that the naval vessel depart
the territorial seas. Should it not, the coastal State may use minimum force to
compel its departure.”); Ruys, supra note 36, at 174.
52 See Section II.B.1 supra.
53 Compounding this distinction is the prevalence of “dual-use” craft. SOLIS,
supra note 22, at 534 (“A dual-use target is one with both military and civilian
functions, such as an airfield from which both civilian and military aircraft fly.
Examples also include electric power grids, oil-refining facilities, and radio and
television broadcasting sites.”).
This topic is beyond the scope of this work, but others have addressed the use
of force implications for dual use satellites and space objects. See, e.g., Bourbon-
nie`re & Lee, Jus ad Bellum, supra note 22, at 205–06 (discussing dual use satellites,
and breaking their classification into three categories: “(1) military hosted pay-
loads; (2) long-term leased capacity; and (3) commercial suppliers on de-
mand.”); Ramey, supra note 22, at 144. (noting that the dual use analysis for
space assets may be more complex due to the normal military versus civilian as-
pect, but also the frequent multi-state ownership or interest of space assets);
Mountin, supra note 35, at 113 (“Almost all satellites in orbit are dual-use, that is,
they can perform missions supporting both military and civilian applications.”).
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define its lower boundaries, and debate abounds about how to
draw a line between the two regions, the author argues that
there are indeed settled minimum standards for each of these
domains. As the two key factors for the use of force are sover-
eignty and state versus civil craft, these criteria are the primary
focus for the discussion of the respective legal regimes. Then, as
a matter of contrast and to focus the discussion of aerospace
(both the area, and the vehicles that operate therein), the arti-
cle introduces the less settled zone between the two domains. In
juxtaposition to the black-and-white nature of the settled aspects
of airspace and outer space, this area is termed “gray space” to
reflect the perceived murkiness of its borders, both physically
and legally.
Then the last chapter addresses how the delimitation problem
should be resolved in the context of this lack of consensus.
There is a saying that one should look to the 30,000 feet view to
assess a problem. But here a mere 30,000 feet are inadequate for
proper perspective; instead the argument attempts to take a
30,000 kilometer view to look at both the settled zones of air-
space and outer space in their entirety to examine how (and
where) they transition. It takes two approaches to reach one
conclusion: that orbit should be regarded as the division be-
tween the airspace and outer space regimes.
First, taking a positivist approach, the argument builds upon
the discussions of the origins and history of, and the interactions
between, the airspace and outer space regimes and argues that
the default position for states is an assertion of sovereignty to its
greatest limits of reason. Outer space is an exception to the
rule—a cap on the extent of sovereignty. But it is an exception
that must be narrowly construed.54 Second, this section will ad-
54 The narrow construction of exceptions to a rule is a common canon of inter-
pretation. See Natasha Balendra, Defining Armed Conflict, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 2461,
2490 (2008). Though frequently cited by common law courts, the canon applies
to analyses of international law as well as assessments of how lex specialis interfaces
with general rules. See id. at 2491. (“[B]ecause a special law that derogates from a
general one operates identically to an exception, in the absence of indications to
the contrary, a special law too (a) must be triggered only in a narrow set of cir-
cumstances; and (b) once activated, must be interpreted to minimize the devia-
tion from the rule.”); see also William Bradford, The Changing Laws of War: Do We
Need a New Legal Regime after September 11?: “The Duty to Defend Them”: A Natural
Law Justification for the Bush Doctrine of Preventive War, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1365, 1378 (2004) (demonstrating the narrow construction with the “restrictivist
camp” for the use of force, which narrowly reads Article 51 of the U.N. Charter as
a deviation from Article 2(4), the general rule). Narrow construction is particu-
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dress the potential commensurability of the airspace and outer
space regimes. They seem diametrically opposed, but when
viewed in the proper context—sovereignty and security—they
actually fall on a consistent continuum designed to maximize
state power and avoid a third world war. This further supports
the finding that airspace (and sovereignty) is the baseline or de-
fault regime and should be applied to emerging activities that
do not clearly fall under an outer space regime.
D. METHODOLOGY, TERMINOLOGY, ASSUMPTIONS,
AND DISCLAIMERS
1. Legal Methodology—A Doctrinal Approach with Historical
Perspective
Discussions of history, policy, and politics are inherent and
appropriate in a work focused on international law, but this
work is written with a legal focus. Thus, the legal methodology is
best described as doctrinal, focusing on primary and secondary
legal sources. To the degree that history and political science
are implicated, the focus is on reporting and incorporating the
works of others and not creating a new study under the frame-
work of those independent disciplines; it is not intended as an
exhaustive history of the positions on delimitation of air and
space, either from legal publicists or states.
That said, central to the thesis of this work is the notion that
there is existing legal (and policy) precedent for the new devel-
opments in aerospace technology. The factual context for the
application of law may change, but the law does not automati-
cally or necessarily have to change. If there is change, such as
after Sputnik, it is affirmatively done by authorities competent
to alter the law (states); it does not occur due to the mere exis-
tence of a new technology. To accentuate that the specifics of
technology may change but that the thinking does not necessa-
rily need to, instead of using only the most recent articulations
of the law or legal thinking, the author incorporated historical
(or simply older) articulations when available, appropriate, and
instructive for the discussion of the current state of airspace and
outer space. Also, in divining the legal status of the gray area,
the author relied on historical accounts of the development of
outer space law as a regime distinct from airspace law. This his-
torical perspective will demonstrate the baseline of thinking
larly important to a positivist approach, as taken here, which defers to states as
the ultimate authorities in international law. See Section IV.C.1 infra.
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from which new issues are to be tackled, as well as provide the
context for the formation of the laws that this work argues re-
main applicable today. That is, the differences between the two,
and how outer space law grew from—and in opposition to—the
dispositions of air law then guide the analysis of where aero-
space stands.
2. Aerospace, Aerospace Vehicles, and Gray Space
The term aerospace should be addressed.55 Herein, it is
meant to encompass both the geographic, or spatial, area and
functional capacity of vehicles, generally referring to opera-
tional areas and operations beyond that of normal aircraft, like
higher altitudes than airplanes but generally below orbital outer
space. As will be developed further below, this area is also
termed “gray space” throughout this work, as it represents a le-
gal gray area in between the more settled—or black-and-white—
aspects of airspace and outer space.
For the physical or geographic zone (aerospace), the term
will be applied specifically to draw focus on the area that is not
clearly airspace (with full oxygen and atmosphere needed for
traditional engine combustion and aerodynamic lift) but not
clearly orbital outer space and beyond. While in many con-
texts—legal, commercial, and otherwise—the term aerospace is
intended broadly to encompass both air and space applica-
55 With the above note in mind, there is little improvement to be made on a
definition of aerospace introduced in a security context in 1962:
The reader might be interested to know the meaning and deriva-
tion of the term aerospace. The following definitions apply to the
present study:
AERONAUTICS: the science and technology of locomotion in the
atmosphere.
ASTRONAUTICS: the science and technology of locomotion
outside the terrestrial atmosphere.
The definitions are simple and clear, but they do not cover the in-
termediate types of vehicles and devices circulating on the outer
fringes of the atmosphere. Even at heights of several hundred miles
traces of air are still present and the word astronautics is not strictly
applicable; therefore, the term aerospace will be used to indicate
the region where aerodynamics and ballistics interact or closely suc-
ceed each other as parts of a combined pattern.
MICHAEL GOLOVINE, CONFLICT IN SPACE: A PATTERN OF WAR IN A NEW DIMENSION
xiii (1962) (emphasis in original). While Golovine offers the above definition, his
text (written before any formal prohibition on weapons of mass destruction in
outer space) primarily addresses orbital weapons systems. Id.
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tions,56 here it is intended to focus on the area between the two.
The spatial definition is generally guided by physical, scientific,
or natural attributes, but it must be noted that this work is a
legal (and policy) endeavor—not a scientific one. So, the con-
cept of aerospace here merely uses scientific and engineering
information in the search of legal clarity; it does not seek to
rearticulate or redefine any laws of physics or astronautical or
aeronautical phenomena. This aerospace zone should be read
as overlapping or generally encompassing what other works
term near space, proto-space, suborbital space, or other high-
altitude applications.57
For vehicles—aerospace vehicles—the term is to be construed
inclusively. It is intended to include all vehicles that can reasona-
bly operate in this zone but may be intended primarily for outer
space (or airspace) activities.58 If read exclusively—including
only vehicles designed to operate in the zone between what is
clearly airspace and outer space—the definition would not only
be nearly impossible to meet (as one must transit through the
air to reach any intermediary zone above it, so some functional-
ity in the air must be practically assumed), but it would also ex-
clude the future developments at which this work is directed:
vehicles that can smoothly operate in nearly any environment
(air or space). Thus, the term should be read with some
breadth, or at least not defined in an overly narrow fashion.
56 John Cobb Cooper, Aerospace Law—Subject Matter and Terminology, 29 J. AIR L.
& COM. 89 (1963) (advocating that what is commonly regarded as the two disci-
plines of “Air Law” and “Space Law” should really be a unified “Aerospace Law”
branch of law, a sentiment with which this author agrees). See also Section IV.D.3
infra.
57 These terms are generally found throughout relevant literature, except
“proto-space” and “protozone,” used in the works of Dr. Joseph Pelton. See, e.g.,
Pelton, Geosynchronous, supra note 10; Joseph N. Pelton, Presentation at the ICAO
Space Symposium: Inclusiveness in the New Space & Protozone Transportation
Services (Mar. 18–20, 2015), http://www.icao.int/Meetings/SPACE2015/Presen
tations/6%20-%20J.%20Pelton%20-%20ISU%20GWU.pdf [https://perma.cc/38
3U-26NE].
58 For instance, the now-retired U.S. Space Shuttle, which launched directly
into orbit attached to a multi-stage rocket system but returned to Earth (typically
to Houston, Texas) as a gliding aircraft upon atmospheric reentry, would be con-
sidered an aerospace vehicle. The same would apply to the X-37B discussed
above. However, for purposes of this work, a rocket that merely transits airspace
and enters outer space would not be considered an aerospace vehicle; nor would
a traditional airplane.
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3. International Consensus
This article is contingent upon the notion that there is a lack
of international consensus as to the delimitation of airspace and
outer space. The assertion that airspace sovereignty is the de-
fault position is only valid unless or until states agree to a regime
applicable to such vehicles, activities, and geographic zones—as
they did with the U.N. Convention(s) on the Law of the Sea,59
the Outer Space Treaty of 1967,60 or other documents.61 To be
clear, the notion that the sovereignty paradigm exists until states
affirmatively change it by consent should not be read to require
a convention or treaty to the exclusion of a properly realized
custom of international law.62 However, the ongoing debate
about the proper regime for these vehicles strongly suggests that
no adequately clear consistent state practice, guided by opinio
juris, has emerged. And there is no great indication that such
consensus will emerge, particularly as states explore different ap-
proaches to security in space and disparities in space capabilities
persist.
Accordingly, this work is not an argument against consensus
among states, space-faring or otherwise, on the issue of delimita-
tion and the use of force in aerospace. (In fact, a specific treaty
or norm of international law would be the clearest and most
efficient way to address the problems for aerospace vehicles vis-
a`-vis sovereignty expressed herein.) However, this work recog-
nizes that there may come instances of necessity of action in the
gray areas of the law and seeks to address the appropriate legal
default in this lack of an obvious regime of clear and controlling
law.
59 See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833
U.N.T.S. 3, 21 I.L.M. 1261 [hereinafter UNCLOS] (entered into force on Nov.
16, 1994); see also Geneva Convention on the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, 450
U.N.T.S. 11, 13 U.S.T. 2312 (entered into force on Sept. 30, 1962).
60 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration
and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27,
1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter Outer Space Treaty] (en-
tered into force on Oct. 10, 1967).
61 The status of sovereignty as the “default” position is developed further be-
low. See Section IV.B infra.
62 See Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(1)(b), June 26, 1945,
59 Stat. 1055, 33 U.N.T.S. 933 [hereinafter ICJ Statute]. Regarding the develop-
ment of customary international law, including the concept of “international cus-
tom,” see BIN CHENG, STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL SPACE LAW (1997); see also
Michael P. Scharf, Accelerated Formation of Customary International Law, 20 ILSA J.
INT’L & COMP. L. 305, 306 (2013).
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4. A Note on Technology
This is not intended as a technical or scientific work. While
current and emerging technologies, particularly with regard to
new aerospace vehicles, form an important factual basis for the
legal analysis herein, the underlying assumption is that regard-
less of what exists today the technologies will improve tomorrow.
Therefore, while this work’s factual landscape does not envision
that simply anything from the imagination of science fiction
writers is possible, it does take a broad view of what vehicles and
modes of transport for air, space, and in between will be availa-
ble in the reasonably foreseeable future.
5. A Note on Measurements
Throughout this work, altitude matters. For ease of reference,
altitudes will typically be given in both feet (commonly used in
airspace altitudes) and kilometers (commonly used in high-alti-
tude airspace and outer space altitudes). Many authors and
states use miles (both statute and nautical) as well, but for con-
sistency and ease such measurements will typically be omitted
herein. Where distances are not provided in a desired measure-
ment (and when they were calculated by the author from other
metrics), the conversion table created by the United Kingdom
Ministry of Defence is instructive, which is recreated here.63
Nautical Miles Statute Miles Kilometers Feet
(NM) (M or mi) (km) (ft)
1 1.15 1.85 6080
.87 1 1.61 5280
.54 .62 1 3281
III. THE BLACK AND WHITE: LEGAL FRAMEWORKS IN
AIRSPACE AND OUTER SPACE—SOVEREIGNTY
AND STATE VEHICLES
The debate over where the air ends and outer space begins is
as old as space exploration itself, and even predates the bulk of
the international outer space law.64 With the foundational pub-
63 U.K. MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, THE UK MILITARY SPACE PRIMER 1-2, 1-3 (2010),
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/
file/33691/SpacePrimerFinalWebVersion.pdf [https://perma.cc/A9RP-LUDC].
64 See MANFRED LACHS, THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE: AN EXPERIENCE IN CONTEM-
PORARY LAW-MAKING 53 (2010); see also Nicholas Katzenbach, Law and Lawyers in
Space, 14 BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS 220, 220 (1958) (addressing the
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lic international air law documents, the Convention Relating to
the Regulation of Aerial Navigation of 1919 (Paris Conven-
tion)65 and the Chicago Convention,66 states never defined the
“vertical limit”67 of the concept of airspace. Instead, with the es-
tablishment of the International Civil Aviation Organization
(ICAO),68 states focused on creating a mechanism by which in-
ternational civil aviation—which functioned squarely and clearly
in airspace—could be managed.69 Similarly, the Treaty on Prin-
ciples Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and
Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial
Bodies (Outer Space Treaty) does not define the borders of
outer space; instead, that document focuses on the principles
guiding the uses of space, the Moon, and celestial bodies for
space objects.70 So, the general rules that apply while operating
in airspace or outer space are fairly black-and-white; the scope
(physical or functional) of these legal regimes, though, is more
of a gray area.
delimitation debate, and noting in June 1958 that “[l]awyers have published over
two hundred articles on Space Law, most of them in the last six months.”).
However, just because the question existed has not meant that states felt com-
pelled to answer it. Lachs noted the 1959 finding of the ad hoc U.N. Committee
on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) that “[i]t was generally believed
that the determination of precise limits for air space and outer space did not
present a legal problem calling for priority consideration at this moment.”
Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Rep. of the Ad Hoc Committee,
U.N. Doc. A/4141 (1959), http://www.unoosa.org/pdf/gadocs/A_4141E.pdf
[https://perma.cc/GH3D-QQYU]. See also Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer
Space, Rep. of the Legal Subcomm. on Its Forty-First Session, U.N. Doc. A/
AC.105/769, at 3 (2002), http://www.unoosa.org/pdf/reports/ac105/AC105_76
9E.pdf [https://perma.cc/KZ72-ZAKY] (tracing the delimitation question as a
recurring, formal agenda item for the COPUOS back to its 1966 session).
65 Convention Relating to the Regulation of Aerial Navigation, Oct. 13, 1919,
11 L.N.T.S. 173 [hereinafter Paris Convention] (no longer in force); JOHN C.
COOPER, THE RIGHT TO FLY 291 (1947).
66 Convention on International Civil Aviation, supra note 49.
67 See Reinhardt, supra note 3.
68 Convention on International Civil Aviation, supra note 49, art. 43 (Part II,
Articles 43 to 66, goes on to define the objectives and inner mechanisms of ICAO
in addition to the substantive and reporting requirements contained in the re-
mainder of the Convention); see also Paris Convention, supra note 65, art. 34 (cre-
ating the International Commission for Air Navigation, (or CINA, abbreviated
from French) under the League of Nations, generally the predecessor to ICAO
with a similar goal of creating uniformity in civil aviation); MICHAEL MILDE, INTER-
NATIONAL AIR LAW AND ICAO 11 (2d ed. 2012).
69 Convention on International Civil Aviation, supra note 49, art. 44 (listing the
objectives of ICAO, which generally focus on safety and development of civil
aviation).
70 See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 60.
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This chapter discusses the fundamental aspects, physical and
legal, of the space and air domains with particular emphasis on
two aspects relevant to the use of force against vehicles in these
domains: state sovereignty and distinction between state and ci-
vilian craft. The goal is to establish that there are indeed some
areas of accepted definition for both airspace and outer space
law, and within these areas of accepted definition are clear legal
rules relevant to the application of force. Airspace is addressed
first, followed by a discussion of outer space. The third section
then briefly addresses the area of ambiguity between the well-
defined portions of these two more established regimes, the le-
gal gray area. While this section demonstrates a degree of possi-
ble legal uncertainty, discussion of the zone of ambiguity also
helps draw focus to the fact that there are indeed settled areas of
law from which the discussion of using force against vehicles op-
erating between the zones will proceed.
A. AIRSPACE: SOVEREIGN TERRITORY
The zone known as airspace is defined both by its physical,
geographic aspects as well as through its use by aircraft. The re-
sult is a widely accepted area that extends at least to 21 kilome-
ters or 70,500 feet. In this domain, states can exercise exclusive
sovereignty over their territorial airspace. This assertion of con-
trol, though, is limited by various agreements, most importantly
the Chicago Convention, which distinguishes between state and
civil aircraft.71 The nature of the airspace domain, the role of
sovereignty therein, and the importance of the distinction be-
tween state and civil aircraft are discussed in this section.
71 Further adjustments to sovereign authority may be self-imposed by states,
under their internal laws and regulations relating to domestic control of airspace.
For instance, since 1926 the U.S. government has asserted federal control over its
domestic airspace, to the exclusion of individual property or control interests. See
PAUL STEPHEN DEMPSEY, AVIATION LIABILITY LAW 5.11 (2nd ed. 2013); DAVID LOTH
& MORRIS ERNST, HOW HIGH IS UP 2–3 (1964); see also PAUL STEPHEN DEMPSEY,
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL AIR LAW 109 (2008) (discussing the general framework for
domestic Civil Aviation Authorities). The focus of this work, however, involves
international law; that is, the issues of sovereignty and rights among states (not
internal to them). For an early discussion of the vertical boundaries of sover-
eignty and rights for individuals vis-a`-vis national authorities, see LOTH & ERNST,
supra; Terrence Benshoof, Air Law—The Memory Lingers On: Ad Coelum in the
1970’s—Some New Approaches, 20 DEPAUL L. REV. 525, 528 (1970) (discussing the
rejection of cujus est solum ejus est usque ad coelum as a basis for individual property
rights in U.S. domestic jurisprudence).
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1. The Physical Nature of Airspace: The Domain of Aircraft
Perhaps the most succinct definition of this area comes from
Cheng, who stated “[a]irspace is space where air is normally to
be found and is, therefore, identical with atmospheric space.”72
Of course, this seemingly straightforward definition disguises
many unclear areas, both technical and legal.73 But, at its core, it
expresses the black-and-white of airspace: certainly, it is where
there is air and where traditional aircraft can fly.
The legal regime for airspace, therefore, is primarily designed
for the flight of such “aircraft.” ICAO defines aircraft as “[a]ny
machine that can derive support in the atmosphere from the
reactions of the air other than the reactions of the air against
the earth’s surface.”74 Regarding this definition, ICAO states
that “[y]ears of considerable effort permit the classification of
aircraft to be as simple as possible, and yet encompass as many
types of flying machines as the human mind can devise.”75 As
such, the purposefully expansive definition includes airplanes,
gliders, balloons, helicopters, and a host of other lighter- and
heavier-than-air vehicles. The notable exclusions from “aircraft”
are rockets, missiles, or other similarly thrust-driven flying ma-
chines.76 Hovercraft are also excluded, based on a 1968 amend-
72 CHENG, STUDIES, supra note 62, at 18.
73 For instance, “trace amounts of atmospheric gases can still be detected as
high as 10,000 kilometers (6,200 miles) above sea level, far above many orbiting
spacecraft.” MATTHEW J. KLEIMAN ET AL., THE LAWS OF SPACEFLIGHT: A GUIDEBOOK
FOR NEW SPACE LAWYERS 3 (2012); see also SPACE ACTIVITIES AND EMERGING INTER-
NATIONAL LAW 375 (Nicolas Matte ed., 1984) (“establishing a point of delineation
predicated on the atmosphere is quite unsuitable if it is considered that some
hydrogen atoms are believed to be orbiting the [E]arth at distances of 50,000
kilometers.”). So the question of airspace is not just a matter of where one can
technically claim to find “air” or “atmosphere.”
74 Convention on International Civil Aviation, supra note 49, annex 7. This
definition has been in effect since 1968. Id.
75 INT’L CIVIL AVIATION ORG. [ICAO], ANNEXES BOOKLET 12 (1974) [hereinaf-
ter ICAO ANNEXES BOOKLET], http://www.icao.int/safety/airnavigation/Nation-
alityMarks/annexes_booklet_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/C6KK-WMGH].
76 ICAO’s position on rockets, generally and in the context of suborbital travel,
is captured in the discussion of SpaceShipOne, a vehicle that is carried by an
aircraft to 50,000 feet, dropped, and then uses a rocket motor to reach approxi-
mately 100 kilometers, after which it travels back to Earth like a glider:
SpaceShipOne, strictly speaking, does not operate as an aeroplane
or even as an aircraft during the ballistic portion of the flight while it is not
supported by the reactions of the air, even though some degree of aerody-
namic control exists throughout the trajectory from launch altitude
until the craft enters the upper reaches of the atmosphere where
the air density is no longer sufficient for aerodynamic flight.
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ment to Annex 7 of the Chicago Convention.77 Though
hovercraft do not directly impact the aerospace domain and the
definition has not been altered since 1968, this modification
does demonstrate that the aircraft definition is not entirely
static, and ICAO—when member states desire—can modify the
Annexes to clarify the vehicles that do and do not fall under its
purview. However, while there are present calls to expand the
definition of aircraft to encompass more objects (particularly
rocket-like thrust-driven conveyances) to bring them into the
ICAO traffic management, security, and safety regimes, the cur-
rent definition is limited to the named vehicles and craft.78
Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Rep. of the Legal Subcomm. on Its
Forty-Ninth Session, U.N. Doc. C-WP/12436, at 2 (2010) [hereinafter ICAO
Working Paper], http://www.unoosa.org/pdf/limited/c2/AC105_C2_2010_CRP
09E.pdf [https://perma.cc/FLH6-85ZW] (emphasis added). However, the ICAO
Working Paper goes on to state that, “After apogee, during [re]entry into the
atmosphere the vehicle transitions to unpowered aerodynamic (gliding) flight
for the return to [E]arth. Consequently, depending upon some design and oper-
ational aspects, it could be considered operating as an aircraft in flight during
this latter portion of the journey.” Id. Thus, the nature of a craft can change
throughout its operation; however, in the “rocket” portions it is not subject to the
regime of aircraft. See also MILDE, supra note 68, at 60 (noting that “rockets also
travel through the air space but do not derive support from the reactions of the
air.”). But see I.H.PH DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR & M. A. BUTLER, AN INTRODUCTION TO
AIR LAW 6 (8th rev. ed. 2006) (arguing that a rocket can meet the ICAO
definition).
77 ICAO ANNEXES BOOKLET, supra note 75, at 12 (noting that the 1968 amend-
ment “implemented a decision that all air-cushion-type vehicles, such as hover-
craft and other ground-effect machines, should not be classified as aircraft.”); see
also MILDE, supra note 68, at 60.
78 See THE NEED FOR AN INTEGRATED REGULATORY REGIME FOR AVIATION AND
SPACE: ICAO FOR SPACE? 64 (Ram Jakhu et al., eds., 2011) (“as the United Nations
arm for air transportation, ICAO should provide clarification on the issues of
what is contemplated by aircraft, and what is contemplated by airspace, and then
proffer standards of harmonization as SARPs, which member States would be
obliged to follow.”). The authors note that ICAO has already begun to examine
whether its regulations would impact any suborbital flights that cross interna-
tional borders, and advocate:
It is therefore reasonable to predict that, in due course, ICAO not
only should but would expand its jurisdiction to cover space-related
matters by slowly starting with those space activities that affect the
safety of civil aviation. The Chicago Convention vests in ICAO am-
ple jurisdiction to address these critical issues. Article 37 authorizes
the promulgation of SARPs addressing “such other matters con-
cerned with the safety, regularity, and efficiency of air navigation as
may from time to time appear appropriate.” Under this provision,
for example, ICAO has promulgated Annexes addressing environ-
mental issues and aviation security, areas not contemplated when
the Chicago Convention was originally drafted in 1944. It is mani-
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The required “reactions of the air” for aircraft have a vertical
limit. As an aircraft moves forward, due to the shape and angle
of the wing “the static air pressure above the wing decreases
while it remains substantially stable below it due to the shape of
the wing . . . [and this] difference in pressure causes the aerody-
namic lift.”79 This lift effect requires adequate density of the air,
which decreases as altitude rises. Additionally, air affects the
amount of power (and forward motion, thus lift) a plane can
produce—again, as altitude rises, the air thins and engines can-
not produce adequate momentum.80 Given these requirements,
it has been concluded that “[i]t is unlikely . . . that an aircraft
will ever fly above 60 kilometers with an air-breathing engine.”81
As the defining feature of airspace, the effective vertical geo-
graphic range of current aircraft must be discussed. As a base-
line, at the dawn of aviation, planes such as those operated by
the Wright Brothers82 or Alberto Santos-Dumont83 flew only a
few feet off the ground but are certainly considered aircraft. On
the upper tier of aircraft operation are specialized (typically mil-
itary) aircraft such as the U-284 and SR-7185 that fly at altitudes
festly desirable for the same essential rules of safety and navigation
to be applied to all users of common airspace – aircraft and aero-
space vehicles and space objects on launch and re-entry, as a first
step. The extension of these regulations to the geosynchronous or-
bit would be a desirable second step.
Id. at 42–43.
79 BENKO¨ & PLESCHER, supra note 5, at 7.
80 Id. at 7.
81 Id. at 8.
82 DANIEL HAULMAN, ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF FLIGHT: USAF CHRONOLOGY OF
SIGNIFICANT AIR AND SPACE EVENTS, 1903-2002, at 1 (2003) (detailing the first
flights, piloted by Orville and Wilbur Wright on Dec. 17, 1903). The famous im-
age of the flight shows it was at best only a few feet off the ground. Photograph of
First Flight, 120 Feet in 12 Seconds, 10:35 AM, Kitty Hawk, North Carolina by
John T. Daniels (1903), in Prints and Photographs Online Catalog, LIBR. OF CON-
GRESS, http://www.loc.gov/pictures/resource/ppprs.00626/ [https://perma.cc/
9T7K-KUVW]. While some debate whether the Wright Brothers were actually the
first to fly, there is no indication that any other pilots achieved significantly supe-
rior altitude in an airplane. See Linda Shiner, Not the First?, AIR & SPACE MAG.
(2013), http://www.airspacemag.com/daily-planet/not-the-first-3384507/
[https://perma.cc/QV4C-WA5H] (discussing claims that Gustave Whitehead of
Connecticut was actually the first to fly an airplane).
83 Perry Turner, 10 Milestone Flights, AIR & SPACE MAG. (2003), http://www.air-
spacemag.com/history-of-flight/10-milestone-flights-4056259/ [https://perma
.cc/7TWC-JYHW] (in the first public flight of an airplane, Santos-Dumont is esti-
mated to have flown at an altitude of two feet for a distance of 23 feet).
84 See Factsheets: U-2S/TU-2S, U.S.A.F. (2015), http://www.af.mil/AboutUs/
FactSheets/Display/tabid/224/Article/104560/u-2stu-2s.aspx [https://perma
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up to 85,000 feet (approximately 26 kilometers or 16 miles).
While typically described as aircraft, these vehicles push the lim-
its of what is black-and-white airspace and venture into the gray
areas of altitude discussed below.86 More squarely in airspace are
civilian aircraft, which typically operate with a ceiling of approxi-
mately 40,000 feet (12 kilometers)87 but with a high end of
51,000 feet (under 16 kilometers).88
Perhaps the best demonstration of the vertical extent of air-
space came with the 1960 shoot-down of a U.S. U-2 plane by the
Soviet Union. The CIA plane, on a spy mission over Soviet air-
space, was shot down at 70,500 feet (over 21 kilometers).89 As
will be discussed further below, national airspace is sovereign,
and therefore, its incursion potentially triggers hostile action,
which is just what the Soviet Union did, downing the plane. Had
the shoot-down been over free airspace (such as over the high
seas or another sovereign’s territory with permission), the
United States could have protested the use of force. However,
the U.S. government did not assert legality of overflight; instead
it initially prepared a more defensible cover story—that the
.cc/Q7R5-FWV9] (listing the aircraft ceiling as “above 70,000 feet (21,212+
meters)”).
85 NASA Armstrong Fact Sheet: SR-71 Blackbird, NASA (2014), http://www.nasa
.gov/centers/armstrong/news/FactSheets/FS-030-DFRC.html#.VVOmU5MYOzI
[https://perma.cc/UTU6-HBAX] (describing an 85,000 feet ceiling).
86 See Factsheets: Lockheed SR-71A, NAT’L MUSEUM OF THE U.S.A.F. (2015), http:/
/www.nationalmuseum.af.mil/Visit/MuseumExhibits/FactSheets/Display/
tabid/509/Article/198054/lockheed-sr-71a.aspx [https://perma.cc/S4ZD-J2AW]
(noting that despite its technology, the SR-71 is still an aircraft. “Throughout its
nearly [twenty-four]-year career, the SR-71 remained the world’s fastest and high-
est-flying operational aircraft.”). Further, beyond the U-2 and SR-71, in both alti-
tude and rocket-like technology, are the X-15 and MiG E-266M (achieving well
over 100,000 feet in altitude). See Rebecca Maksel, Who Holds the Altitude Record for
an Airplane?, AIR & SPACE MAG. (2009), http://www.airspacemag.com/need-to-
know/who-holds-the-altitude-record-for-an-airplane-141522931/ [https://perma
.cc/KPP9-MDM3]. Even the MiG E-266M’s 123,523 feet, though, only translates
to under 38 kilometers of altitude. Id.
87 See Trepczynski, supra note 4, at 38; Ceiling (Aeronautics), WIKIPEDIA, http://
en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?titleCEiling_(aeronautics)&oldid=659862810
[https://perma.cc/RMB9-4NEC]; see also KEVIN FONG, EXTREME MEDICINE: HOW
EXPLORATION TRANSFORMED MEDICINE IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 183 (2014)
(“A typical commercial jet airliner cruises at around 36,000 feet.”).
88 See, e.g., Learjet 75, BOMBARDIER, http://businessaircraft.bombardier.com/
en/aircraft/learjet/learjet75.html [https://perma.cc/24QW-WKUR].
89 GREGORY PEDLOW & DONALD WELZENBACH, THE CIA AND THE U-2 PROGRAM,
1954-1974, at 176–77 (1998).
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plane was a NASA weather plane off course and in distress.90
This incident reflects acceptance by both the Soviet Union
(which acted) and the United States (which did not protest the
action) that vertical airspace sovereignty extends at least to
70,500 feet (21 kilometers).91 Writing shortly after the incident,
Cheng noted “that the U-2 flight constituted a violation of Soviet
territorial sovereignty is so elementary a point in international
law that it would be merely flogging a dead horse to [labor] it
here.”92
2. The Legal Nature of Airspace: Sovereign Territory
The assertion of state sovereignty over airspace has a long his-
tory. At the dawn of aviation there were academic and political
debates over whether the skies should be free.93 However, by
1919 (with the Paris Convention) and consistently thereafter,
states had asserted sovereign control over their airspace. As
stated in Article 1 of the Chicago Convention, “The contracting
States recognize that every State has complete and exclusive sov-
ereignty over the airspace above its territory.”94 This echoes the
sovereignty asserted in the Paris Convention.95 From this funda-
mental premise the relevant legal scheme emerges for opera-
tions in airspace, specifically that the air is sovereign territory.
90 Id. at 178. For more on the politics of the incident and the failed cover-up by
the United States, see generally id.; CHENG, STUDIES, supra note 62, at 105–06.
91 See also Section IV.B.2.c infra (discussing a 1956 incident between the United
States and the Soviet Union involving overflight of weather balloons, which simi-
larly demonstrated a high-altitude assertion of territorial sovereignty, though with
a less defined height and less definitive response).
92 CHENG, STUDIES, supra note 62, at 105 (extracted from a 1961 article by
Cheng).
93 See DEMPSEY, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL AIR LAW, supra note 71, at 11–12 (noting
that in 1900, French jurist Paul Fauchille argued that “[b]ecause the air cannot
be appropriated, . . . real property of the air is impossible, and the same principle
prescribes State assertions of dominance over it; airspace therefore is res com-
munes, and l’air est libre.”). For a thorough history of the development of the pre-
sent air regime, see Reinhardt, supra note 4, at 70; DEMPSEY, PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL AIR LAW, supra note 71, at 9; MILDE, supra note 68, at 5; JOHN C.
COOPER, EXPLORATIONS IN AEROSPACE LAW: SELECTED ESSAYS OF JOHN COBB
COOPER, 1946-1966, at 104–155 (Ivan Vlasic ed., 1968) (including three articles
by Cooper regarding the Paris Convention and its history). See also Section IV.B.1
infra (further discussing the debate over air sovereignty and its effect on air and
space delimitation).
94 Convention on International Civil Aviation, supra note 49, art. 1.
95 Paris Convention, supra note 65, art. 1 (“The High Contracting Parties
recognise that every Power has complete and exclusive sovereignty over the air
space above its territory.”).
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Addressing the spatial extent of territorial sovereignty, Lachs
noted that the notion of cuius est solum eius est usque ad coelum et
ad sidera was “inherited from Roman law, [and] was accepted by
international law and adapted to its needs.”96 The oft-cited
phrase (and its varying articulations) essentially means “whoever
owns the land owns it all the way to the sky and to the stars.”97
While the precise language may not have originated in Rome,
the concept did.98 And its present applicability is a clear articula-
tion of air sovereignty, such as that recognized (and not cre-
ated) in the Paris Convention and Chicago Convention with
their respective first articles.99 More recently, the sovereignty of
96 LACHS, supra note 64, at 40; see also DEMPSEY, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL AIR LAW,
supra note 71, at 746–47.
97 Abramovitch notes:
This rule means: “Whose is the soil, his it is up to the sky,” or in a
more simple explanation “He who possesses the land possesses also
that which is above it.” Other elucidations are: “He who owns the
soil owns everything above (and below) from heaven (to hell),” and
“He who owns the land owns up to the sky.”
Yehuda Abramovitch, The Maxim “Cujus Est Solum Ejus Usque ad Coelum” as Applied
in Aviation, 8 MCGILL L.J. 247, 247 (1962) (citations omitted); see also MILDE,
supra note 68, at 5 (translating the related phrase cuius est solum eius est usque ad
coelumet ad inferos); JOHN C. COOPER, Roman Law and the Maxim “Cujus est solum” in
International Air Law, in EXPLORATIONS IN AEROSPACE LAW: SELECTED ESSAYS OF
JOHN COBB COOPER, 1946-1966, supra note 93, at 54; IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 115–16 (7th ed. 2008); Katzenbach, supra note 64, at
220 (noting that ad coelum can be translated to mean both “to the sky” or “to the
heavens”).
98 Milde disputes that this is actually “Roman law” as it is often described.
While the Latin is the popular text for the phrasing of the concept, he found no
actual link to the Romans or Byzantine Corpus Iuris Civilis. MILDE, supra note 68,
at 5; see also COOPER, Roman Law, supra note 97, at 55 (Author’s Note). Instead, its
first use appears to be in the 13th century in a commentary on Roman texts. Id.
However, while Cooper agrees that this terminology did not appear in Roman
text, “[w]hen the maxim is carefully analyzed, however, and reasonably con-
strued, it is apparent that it must have sprung originally from principles of Ro-
man law—though stated in a non-Roman manner.” Id. at 85. Cooper goes on to
note that overly-extensive articulations of sovereignty based on this notion may
exceed the Roman roots, but are grounded in later English statements “of the
existence of present ownership of space to infinity.” Id.
99 See MILDE, supra note 68, at 10 (discussing the Paris Convention provision in
the context of then-existing customary international law).
The ad coelum expression had its more practical legal origins in property rights
and authorities, frequently in an individual-to-state context in the early stages of
aviation law. See LOTH & ERNST, supra note 71; Benshoof, supra note 71. However,
Brierly notes that these private law concepts are directly applicable to assessments
of sovereignty (and authority) among equal states:
Territorial sovereignty bears an obvious resemblance to ownership
in private law. . . . As a result of this resemblance early international
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airspace has been affirmed by the ICJ in the Military and
Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua case (Nicaragua
v. United States)100 and the Frontier Dispute case (Benin/Niger).101
This exclusive state sovereignty applies to “the land areas and
territorial waters adjacent thereto under the sovereignty, suze-
rainty, protection[,] or mandate of such State.”102 The extension
of sovereignty over the territorial sea, then, implicates the 1982
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS),
which sets twelve nautical miles from the baseline as the maxi-
mum limit of territorial waters.103 It further defines and limits
the horizontal extent of sovereignty by way of rights of passage
for aircraft. For instance, littoral states cannot assert full air sov-
ereignty over international straits104 or archipelagic sea lanes105
and the broader exception of innocent passage through territo-
law borrowed the Roman rules for the acquisition of property and
adapted them to the acquisition of territory, and these rules are still
the foundation of the law on the subject.
J. L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL
LAW OF PEACE 91–92 (1st ed. 1928) (Brierly’s position is echoed through the sixth
edition of this work in 1963). As Cooper explains, for states to convey or (allow
assertion of rights over) property to their citizens, they must have right to it in the
first place. COOPER, ROMAN LAW, supra note 97, at 56.
100 Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v.
U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, ¶ 251 (June 27) (“The principle of respect
for territorial sovereignty is also directly infringed by the unauthorized overflight
of a State’s territory by aircraft belonging to or under the control of the govern-
ment of another State.”). The ICJ also notes that the Chicago Convention “repro-
duces the established principle of the complete and exclusive sovereignty of a
State over the air space above its territory,” as opposed to creating the right. Id. ¶
212. (emphasis added).
101 Frontier Dispute (Benin/Niger), Judgment, 2005 I.C.J. 90, 142 (July 12) (in
resolving a river-based border dispute, the Court noted “a boundary represents
the line of separation between areas of State sovereignty, not only on the
[E]arth’s surface but also in the subsoil and in the superjacent column of air.”);
see Jinyuan Su, The Delimitation Between Airspace and Outer Space and the Emergence of
Aerospace Objects, 78 J. AIR L. & COM. 355, 357–58 (2013).
102 Convention on International Civil Aviation, supra note 49, art. 2. This repre-
sents no significant deviation from the effect of the Paris Convention. Paris Con-
vention, supra note 65, art. 1 (“For the purpose of the present Convention the
territory of a State shall be understood as including the national territory, both
that of the mother country and of the colonies, and the territorial waters adjacent
thereto.”).
103 UNCLOS, supra note 59, art. 3.
104 Id. art. 38. (Right of transit passage); see Astley & Schmitt, supra note 51, at
133.
105 UNCLOS, supra note 59, art. 53 (right of archipelagic sea lanes passage); see
Astley & Schmitt, supra note 51, at 135.
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rial seas does not apply to aircraft.106 These rules apply for both
civilian and state (including military) aircraft. Also, airspace sov-
ereignty can be limited under unique circumstances such as
distress.107
It should be noted that while China, India, Japan, Russia, and
other space-faring states have ratified UNCLOS, two major space
actors, the United States and Kazakhstan,108 have not.109 This is
germane to the degree that its effect on airspace sovereignty and
navigation regimes is relevant to the launch and return of vehi-
cles, however termed, that can operate in or near outer space as
well as in airspace (aerospace vehicles). However, for the pur-
poses of this work, the relevant UNCLOS regime will be treated
as binding on all states as a matter of customary international
law. The United States formally follows the UNCLOS air and sea
navigation regimes as customary international law, a position
spanning both time and various administrations.110 Similarly,
106 See UNCLOS, supra note 59, art. 17 (“Subject to this Convention, ships of all
States, whether coastal or land-locked, enjoy the right of innocent passage
through the territorial sea.”); Astley & Schmitt, supra note 51, at 130.
107 See UNCLOS, supra note 59, art. 18 (providing an exception to innocent
passage for aircraft rescues); id. arts. 39, 54. (providing an exception during
transit passage and in archipelagic sea lanes); Astley & Schmitt, supra note 51, at
132 (regarding the right of assistance entry, “[a]s to the use of aircraft and heli-
copters, which are otherwise forbidden from entering another State’s national
airspace without consent, U.S. policy is to employ them when needed in life-
threatening situations.”); Schmitt, Air Law and Military Operations, supra note 50,
at 320–21 (addressing military aircraft, particularly medical craft, over a neutral
state’s territory).
108 While Kazakhstan does not have a major space program of its own, its
Baikonur Cosmodrome is a major launch facility for Russian and other interna-
tional space programs. As the launch site of a space object, Kazakhstan bears
potential international responsibility and liability as a “launching state.” See Outer
Space Treaty, supra note 60, art. VII (“each State party from whose territory or
facility an object is launched, is internationally liable for damage to another State
Party to the Treaty or to its natural or juridical persons by such object or its
component parts on the Earth, in air space or in outer space, including the
Moon and other celestial bodies.”); Convention on International Liability for
Damage Caused by Space Objects art. I(c), Mar. 29, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389, 961
U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter Liability Convention] (entered into force on Sept. 1,
1972) (“The term ‘launching State’ means: . . . (ii) A State from whose territory
or facility a space object is launched”.).
109 See Chronological Lists of Ratifications of, Accessions and Successions to the Conven-
tion and the Related Agreements, U.N. DIVISION FOR OCEAN AFF. AND THE L. OF THE
SEA (June 23, 2016), http://www.un.org/depts/los/reference_files/chronologi-
cal_lists_of_ratifications.htm [https://perma.cc/87WU-UQA5].
110 See Ronald Reagan, supra note 17. While the decree does not explicitly de-
scribe the UNCLOS as reflecting customary international law, subsequent state-
ments from the United States do. See William H. Taft, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep’t of
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Kazakhstan, though landlocked except for Caspian Sea access,
seems to call upon the UNCLOS for territorial matters as well.111
The exclusive sovereignty of states over their airspace is en-
dorsed throughout the Chicago Convention as well. Beyond Ar-
ticle 1’s recognition of sovereignty, Articles 6 (Scheduled air
services) and 7 (Cabotage) confirm that international carriers
may not operate in or over a state without that state’s permis-
sion.112 Additionally, Articles 11 (Applicability of air regula-
tions), 13 (Entry and clearance regulations), and 16 (Search of
aircraft) further “confirm the complete jurisdiction of the State
within its territorial airspace.”113 These convention principles
are effectuated and translated into practical guidance through
ICAO and its promulgation of Standards and Recommended
Practices (SARPs) as Annexes to the Chicago Convention and
other procedural guides and requirements.114 Of course, the ter-
State, Statement Before the S. Comm. on Armed Servs.: Accession to the 1982
Law of the Sea Convention and Ratification of the 1994 Agreement Amending
Part XI of the Law of the Sea Convention (Apr. 8, 2004), http://iipdig-
ital.usembassy.gov/st/english/texttrans/2004/04/200404131333172xtkcol-
lub0.3148462.html#axzz3aszK2DxR [ https://perma.cc/M4HB-J9H8]; UNCLOS,
supra note 59, appendix G, http://www.iwar.org.uk/military/resources/us-de-
fense-report/2001/G.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z32Z-W9U5] (“Since 1983, the
[United States] has acknowledged that the Law of the Sea Convention reflects,
for the most part, customary international law. Since that time, the [United
States] has abided by that international law, and has, through its Freedom of
Navigation Program, sought to encourage other nations to respect the balance of
rights contained within the Convention.”).
111 See Legal Status of the Caspian Sea, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFF. REPUBLIC OF
KAZ. (Mar. 25, 2016, 11:35 AM), http://www.mfa.kz/index.php/en/foreign-pol-
icy/current-issues-of-kazakhstan-s-foreign-policy/legal-status-of-caspian-sea [
https://perma.cc/6BVK-LECN].
112 Convention on International Civil Aviation, supra note 49, art. 6 (“No
scheduled international air service may be operated over or into the territory of a
contracting State, except with the special permission or other authorization of
that State, and in accordance with the terms of such permission or authoriza-
tion.”); id. art. 7 (“Each contracting State shall have the right to refuse permis-
sion to the aircraft of other contracting States . . . .” to take on passengers and
cargo); see also MILDE, supra note 68, at 43 (noting that Article 6’s “ ‘special per-
mission or other authorization’ is usually exchanged between States in the form
of a bilateral air services agreement (BASA).”).
113 MILDE, supra note 68, at 46.
114 See DEMPSEY, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL AIR LAW, supra note 71, at 51–52 (dis-
cussing “ICAO’s quasi-legislative authority” and its various rule-making
mechanisms).
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ritorial sovereignty is not without limits or exception. For in-
stance, aircraft in distress must be accommodated to a degree.115
Thus, under current law (the Chicago Convention and the
long-standing custom of sovereignty) and in practice (as estab-
lished by ICAO in executing the Chicago Convention, as well as
states in incidents such as the 1960 U-2 shoot-down), the air-
space above a state and its territorial waters is sovereign.
3. The Legal Nature of Airspace: Civil and State Aircraft
While the recognition of sovereignty over the airspace found
in Article 1 of the Chicago Convention is absolute, it is not with-
out exceptions. Reflecting the desire of early proponents of
“open skies” for commercial aviation, Article 5 carves out an ex-
ception to allow for non-scheduled aircraft (that is, not in the
regular passenger business) “to make flights into or in transit
non-stop across [a State’s] territory and to make stops for non-
traffic purposes without the necessity of obtaining prior permis-
sion.”116 Similarly, Article 6 sets the foundation for the creation
of bilateral and multilateral agreements between states to allow
for entry, stoppage, and traditional international air services,
which most states have adopted.117
However, the scope of the Chicago Convention’s exemptions
and exclusions are far narrower than its confirmation of sover-
eignty. Aside from Article 1, the rules and exceptions for flight
under the Chicago Convention apply only to civil aircraft, not
state craft.118 Article 3 (Civil and state aircraft) distinguishes be-
tween the two:
(a) This Convention shall be applicable only to civil aircraft, and
shall not be applicable to state aircraft.
(b) Aircraft used in military, customs and police services shall be
deemed to be state aircraft.
(c) No state aircraft of a contracting State shall fly over the terri-
tory of another State or land thereon without authorization by
special agreement or otherwise, and in accordance with the
terms thereof.
115 Convention on International Civil Aviation, supra note 49, art. 25 (aircraft
in distress); see also Michel Bourbonnie`re & Louis Haeck, Military Aircraft and
International Law: Chicago Opus 3, 66 J. AIR L. & COM. 885, 916 (2001).
116 Convention on International Civil Aviation, supra note 49, art. 5 (though
such flights are subject to limitations imposed by the territorial state); DEMPSEY,
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL AIR LAW, supra note 71, at 49.
117 See DEMPSEY, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL AIR LAW, supra note 71, at 520.
118 Convention on International Civil Aviation, supra note 49, art. 3.
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(d) The contracting States undertake, when issuing regulations
for their state aircraft, that they will have due regard for the
safety and navigation of civil aircraft.
Article 3(b) is a departure from the Paris Convention, which
further subdivided state craft into military craft and aircraft “ex-
clusively employed in State service, such as posts, customs, po-
lice.”119 This separation allowed for further subdivision of rights
of passage and a framework geared toward allowing non-military
state vehicles rights akin to those enjoyed by civil craft under the
Chicago Convention.120
Overall, the practical effect, vis-a`-vis territorial sovereignty, is
that state vehicles enjoy less freedom of movement over territo-
rial airspace; there is no grant of innocent or transit passage and
specific rights have to be explicitly negotiated.
4. Airspace: Conclusion
In conclusion, there is a core, black-and-white understanding
of airspace—it includes, at a minimum, the range of operation
of aircraft at least to 70,500 feet (21 kilometers). In airspace,
territorial sovereignty can be asserted by subjacent states and
must be respected by other states. While the Chicago Conven-
tion allows for overflight for civilian craft, the airspace regime
shows no such deference to state craft—they are distinct from
civilian aircraft. This means that overflight options are limited if
an area is regarded as airspace, and aerospace (or other) vehi-
cles engaging in overflight run the risk of committing a territo-
rial incursion and provoking a hostile response.
B. OUTER SPACE: FREE USE AND EXPLORATION (THE PROVINCE
OF ALL HUMANKIND)
The zone known as outer space has no outward boundaries; it
extends beyond Earth as far as exploration can take our law. On
the lower end, however, the widely accepted notion of outer
space (and outer space law) extends at least to 150 kilometers
(approximately 492,100 feet or 93 miles). In outer space, states
cannot assert or exercise any territorial sovereignty over the
space, the Moon, or other celestial bodies, but states are free to
119 Paris Convention, supra note 65, art. 30. While the Paris Convention
deemed “every aircraft commanded by a person in military service” to be “mili-
tary aircraft” (Article 31), it did not give any further definition. MILDE, supra note
68, at 64–65.
120 Paris Convention, supra note 65, art. 32; MILDE, supra note 68, at 64.
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use and explore the domain. This use and exploration is open
to state and civil craft without distinction, though states are re-
quired to assert responsibility and control over the craft of their
nationals and organizations in outer space. This section dis-
cusses the nature of the outer space domain, its status regarding
state sovereignty, and the lack of distinction between state and
civil aircraft.
1. The Physical Nature of Outer Space: The Domain of Space
Objects in Orbit and Beyond
Perhaps the most fitting definition (or lack thereof) for space
is found in the glossary portion of the U.S. Department of De-
fense publication on Space Operations: “space. None.”121 While
it goes on to define many other aspects of space use and opera-
tions, the guide cannot clearly define the domain itself.
Defining space by the craft that operate in it is equally unavail-
ing. The outer space treaties use the terms “space objects” and
“national activities in outer space,” but neither of those are
clearly defined or delimited in scope. The Convention on Inter-
national Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects of 1972
(Liability Convention) and the Convention on Registration of
Objects Launched Into Outer Space of 1975 (Registration Con-
vention) merely state that the “space object” term “includes
component parts of a space object as well as its launch vehicle
and parts thereof.”122 Dempsey noted that, “[p]resumably, a
spacecraft should be capable of moving in outer space (either
orbital or suborbital) without any support from the air, and it
would have a power source not dependent upon external oxy-
gen.”123 But, the parenthetical caveat of “either orbital or subor-
bital” reveals the difficulty of using craft to define what is clearly
“outer space.” To state the obvious, humans are terrestrial be-
ings and airspace lies between Earth and outer space; similarly,
the suborbital area, however defined, lies below orbit. There-
121 JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUBLICATION 3-14: SPACE OPERATIONS GL-6
(2013), www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_14.pdf [https://perma.cc/2EQ8-
32W9].
122 Convention on Registration of Objects Launched Into Outer Space arts.
I(b), I(d), Jan. 14, 1975, 28 U.S.T. 695, 1023 U.N.T.S. 15 [hereinafter Registra-
tion Convention] (entered into force on Sept. 15, 1976); Liability Convention,
supra note 108.
123 DEMPSEY, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL AIR LAW, supra note 71, at 755. Compare
Convention on International Civil Aviation, supra note 49, annex 7 (defining air-
craft by its capacity to derive support from the air).
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fore, to reach outer space, the farthest zone from Earth, a vehi-
cle must pass through (and be able to function, to some degree
at least) in all zones.124 So, the nature or capacity of a space-
bound vehicle and where it can operate should not be a deter-
mining factor for where “outer space” exists. With the further
development of vehicles that can more seamlessly operate in
outer space and airspace, this distinction is becoming even less
useful as a discriminating criterion.
Further, while the outer space treaties extend jurisdiction and
responsibility over “national activities in outer space,”125 one
cannot definitively declare what the notion of “space activities”
includes.126 This is a new topic that the U.N. Committee on
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) intended to address,
but as of 2014, the committee has no headway as yet.127
The fragility of human life does not help define outer space
either. Even at civilian airliner cruising altitudes (36,000 feet, or
11 kilometers—far below the limits of what is clearly accepted as
airspace), without cabin pressurization, passengers and crew
would fall victim to persistent unconsciousness “as a prelude to
death from oxygen starvation.”128 Once a human reaches 60,000
feet (just over 18 kilometers, still well below the line established
by the U-2 incident), the liquids in a human body would begin
to boil.129 Certainly, a major aspect of space flight and explora-
tion is that “bubbles of life support must be artificially created,
124 For instance, while a rocket is not particularly maneuverable as an airspace
vehicle, it has the capacity to cut through the air to reach beyond airspace.
125 See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 60, art. VI.
126 In much of the “national activities” analysis, the discussion tends to focus
on the “national” portion (that is, attribution to the state) and less on the matter
of what constitutes activity in space. See, e.g., Bin Cheng, Article VI of the 1967 Space
Treaty Revisited: “International Responsibility,” National Activities,” and “the Appropriate
State”, 26 J. SPACE L. 7, 20–26 (1998).
127 See Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Draft Rep. of the Legal
Subcomm. on Its Fifty-Fourth Session, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/L.296 (2015),
http://www.unoosa.org/pdf/limited/c2/AC105_C2_L296E.pdf [https://perma
.cc/EVD9-8KP7]; Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Programme of
Meetings and Agenda for Friday, 24 April 2015 of the Legal Subcomm. on Its
Fifty-Fourth Session (2015), http://www.unoosa.org/res/oosadoc/data/docu-
ments/2015/lscjournal/lscjournal2015no_11_0_html/lscj2015-11E.pdf [https://
perma.cc/648D-LDUU] (the Legal Subcommittee adopted the report as a whole
at its 913th Meeting).
128 FONG, supra note 87, at 183.
129 Id. at 185 (describing the Armstrong Line, at which—due to low pressure—
the boiling point of water falls below the normal core body temperature of a
human (98.6 degrees Fahrenheit)).
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maintained, and sealed against the exterior.”130 But, this alone is
not a determining factor for when one reaches outer space.
The most effective definition for when one is in outer space,
and clearly subject to outer space law, may be reached by a nega-
tive definition—what it is not.131 The often discussed idea of
“near space” encompasses areas that may or may not be outer
space. So that which is clearly outer space must be beyond near
space, which can be “defined as space above where commercial
airliners fly but below orbiting satellites.”132
An object reaches orbit when it achieves a balance between its
velocity (pushing it out) and the gravitational pull of the Earth
(pulling it in) such that it is continually in a state of freefall.133
130 Id. at 191.
131 This incremental approach is reflected in the thinking of Bin Cheng, who
commented, “outer space can be said to begin arguably at an altitude of 96
kilomet[er]s above the [E]arth, clearly so at 110 kilomet[er]s and definitely so at
130 kilomet[er]s.” Bin Cheng, “Space Objects”, “Astronauts” and Related Expressions,
34 PROC. COLLOQ. L. OUTER SPACE 17, 26 (1991), quoted in Katherine M. Gorove,
Delimitation of Outerspace and the Aerospace Object – Where is the Law, 28 J. SPACE L.
11, 12 (2000); see also CHENG, STUDIES, supra note 62, at 450–451 (“Above this
height [110 kilometers,] one is definitely in outer space. . . .”).
132 Taro Kuusiholma & Ram Jakhu, Presentation to the Legal Subcomm. of the
Comm. on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space in Its Fifty-Fourth Session: The Need for
International Approach and Framework for Operations in Near-Space 2 (Apr. 20,
2015), http://www.unoosa.org/pdf/pres/lsc2015/tech-06.pdf [https://perma
.cc/FKD2-D8PY]; see also Leonard David, Sky Trek to the “Near Space” Neighborhood,
SPACE (Nov. 9, 2005), http://www.space.com/1761-sky-trek-space-neighborhood
.html [https://perma.cc/288F-MXBD] (“Near Space is between 65,000 feet (20
kilometers) and 325,000 feet (99 kilometers) above sea level.”). However, near
space is a zone without a fixed legal definition; so it may encompass areas that
may be considered otherwise part of airspace or outer space.
133 BENKO¨ & PLESCHER, supra note 5, at 8. For a simple, but effective, explana-
tion of orbits from early in the space age, see Dwight Eisenhower, President of
the United States, Statement Prepared by the President’s Science Advisory Com-
mittee: Introduction to Outer Space 2–3 (Mar. 26, 1958), http://fas.org/spp/
guide/usa/intro1958.html [https://perma.cc/SW6Z-P633]. The document in-
vites the reader to imagine throwing a stone; the harder it is thrown, the further
it flies. If it was thrown at 18,000 miles per hour, though:
It would travel so far that it would overshoot the [E]arth, so to
speak, and keep falling until it was back where it started. Since in
this imaginary example there is no atmospheric resistance to slow
the stone down, it would be travelling at the original speed, 18,000
m.p.h., when it had got back to its starting point. So around the
[E]arth it goes again. From the stone’s point of view, it is continu-
ously falling, except that its very slight downward arc exactly
matches the curvature of the [E]arth, and so it stays aloft—or as the
scientist would say, “in orbit”—indefinitely.
Since the [E]arth has an atmosphere, of course, neither stones nor
satellites can be sent whizzing around the [E]arth at tree-top level.
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Orbits come in numerous varieties, but all reflect this balance of
outward velocity and the gravitational effect of Earth.134 The
lowest altitude of natural135 orbit is called Low Earth Orbit
(LEO). This typically extends to 1,000 kilometers, but, like
much of outer space law, it lacks any fixed lower definition.136
The “lowest known sustained orbital altitude” was held by the
Soviet Union’s “Zenit” series satellite at 150 kilometers (approxi-
mately 492,100 feet or 93 miles).137 However, not all orbits have
a consistent eccentricity; that is, they are not perfect circles that
maintain the same altitude over Earth throughout an orbital ro-
tation. At their lowest orbital point, or perigee, some satellites
have operated at around 100 kilometers (328,000 feet or 62
miles).138 Notably, this approximate altitude is also known as the
von Ka´rma´n line, a popular reference point for air versus space
demarcation and the point at which it is believed an aircraft
would have to reach orbital velocity to produce enough lift to
Satellites must first be lifted beyond the reach of atmospheric
resistance.
Id.
134 For a more substantial discussion of orbits, see KLEIMAN ET AL., supra note
73, at 3–11 (with a practical explanation of orbits geared towards legal thinkers);
LUCY ROGERS, IT’S ONLY ROCKET SCIENCE: AN INTRODUCTION IN PLAIN ENGLISH
84–113 (2008) (for a more technical explanation of orbits).
135 Parenthetically, for purposes of this work, the idea of orbits include only
natural orbits, or those driven primarily by physics and limited propulsion. Cer-
tainly, one can argue that there is nothing “natural” about terrestrially-bound
humans flying anywhere, let alone past where our bodies can survive exposure to
the environment. But there must be a distinction between orbits discussed above
(which are driven by physics—velocity versus gravity) and the mere capacity to
indefinitely circle the Earth in a predictable pattern. For instance, if fuel and
thrust capacity were no issue, a vehicle could theoretically circle the Earth at any
altitude independent of gravitational forces. Thus, the term “natural orbit” is
used for the former category, and the latter is not regarded or discussed as an
“orbit.”
136 See KLEIMAN ET AL., supra note 73, at 29 (assigning 160 to 1,000 kilometers as
LEO); JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, supra note 121, at G-6 (defining LEO as no more
than 1,000 kilometers); Holli Riebeek, Catalog of Earth Satellite Orbits, EARTH OB-
SERVATORY (Sept. 9, 2009), http://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/Features/Orbit-
sCatalog/ [https://perma.cc/4M9G-75B2] (placing LEO between 180 and 2000
kilometers); ROGERS, supra note 134, at 89 (extending LEO down to 100
kilometers).
137 U.K. MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, supra note 63, at 1–3; see also CHENG, STUDIES,
supra note 62, at 38 (“The initial perigees and apogees of the orbits of Sputnik I,
Discoverers I, II, V, VII, [and] XI and the Soviet Space Ship are, respectively,
142–588, 99–605, 142–220, 136–450, 100–520, 109–380 and 193–230 miles.”).
138 See CHENG, STUDIES, supra note 62, at 396.
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remain aloft.139 But like orbit, there is debate as to the exact
altitude of this line.140
In conclusion, space has been defined to a degree. There are
no outer limits of space—the domain extends ad infinitum to
cover use and exploration beyond Earth, in outer space, and on
the Moon and other celestial bodies.141 Fine tuning the outward
limits or creating exemptions for an age of possible colonization
is certainly a future possibility but is beyond the scope of this
work. On the lower limits, it can reasonably be argued as ac-
cepted that space extends down to 100 kilometers as a matter of
broad acceptance. So craft in orbit should fairly comfortably be
considered as operating in outer space, from both a scientific
perspective and a legal one.142 Below 100 kilometers, however,
whether one has reached space (and is governed by outer space
law) would be a matter of significant debate on law and policy.
2. The Legal Nature of Outer Space: Res Communis
Early in the space age, states rejected the assertion of territo-
rial sovereignty in outer space—however defined—in the U.N.
General Assembly with Resolution 1962, the Declaration of Le-
139 Dennis Jenkins, Extra Feature: A Word About the Definition of Space, NASA:
DRYDEN FLIGHT RESEARCH CENTER (Oct. 21, 2005), http://www.nasa.gov/centers/
dryden/news/X-Press/stories/2005/102105_Schneider.html [https://perma.cc/
U2N2-RGH6]; DEMPSEY, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL AIR LAW, supra note 71, at 750
(noting the line, and its popularity, as a possible point of demarcation); Gbenga
Oduntan, The Never Ending Dispute: Legal Theories on the Spatial Demarcation Bound-
ary Plane between Airspace and Outer Space, 1 HERTFORDSHIRE L.J. 64, 72–73 (2003).
140 Frans von der Dunk, International Space Law, in HANDBOOK OF SPACE LAW 29,
65–66 (Frans von der Dunk & Fabio Tronchetti eds., 2015) (noting some devia-
tions in the generally-accepted 100 kilometers or 62 mile line).
141 See generally Outer Space Treaty, supra note 60, art. I; LACHS, supra note 64,
at 55 (“One may safely postulate that the realm of the law of outer space extends
to infinity.”). The one exception to this came in 1976, when eight equatorial
states asserted territorial claims to the geosynchronous orbit (at approximately
36,000 kilometers, or 118 million feet) in what came to be known as the Bogota
Declaration. Declaration of the First Meeting of Equatorial Countries, Dec. 3,
1976, I.T.U. Doc. WARC-BS 81-E (1977) [hereinafter Bogota Declaration], http:/
/www.jaxa.jp/library/space_law/chapter_2/2-2-1-2_e.html [https://perma.cc/
92RN-H9BL]. However, this assertion has been overwhelmingly rejected by the
international community. See CHENG, STUDIES, supra note 62, at 455; Oduntan,
supra note 139, at 76.
142 KLEIMAN ET AL., supra note 73, at 3 (writing for space law practitioners, not-
ing the Karman “line has become the de facto demarcation accepted by most
people in the space community.”); Gorove, supra note 131, at 11–12 (“What ap-
pears to have emerged as international customary law is that the lowest perigee
orbit of artificial [E]arth satellites (currently, that would be approximately
100–110 kilometers above sea level) lies at a point in outer space . . . .”).
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gal Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Explora-
tion and Uses of Outer Space (Declaration of Legal Principles):
2. Outer space and celestial bodies are free for exploration and
use by all States on a basis of equality and in accordance with
international law.
3. Outer space and celestial bodies are not subject to national
appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occu-
pation, or by any other means.143
While this Declaration of Legal Principles was non-binding
and aspirational,144 its mandates for free use and exploration
and non-appropriation were solidified with the Outer Space
Treaty, which remains the primary governing document of
outer space law relevant to the analysis of territorial
sovereignty.145
Two key provisions of the Outer Space Treaty establish outer
space as an area free of territorial sovereignty. First, Article I
states in relevant part:
The exploration and use of outer space, including the Moon and
other celestial bodies, . . . shall be the province of all mankind.
Outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, shall
be free for exploration and use by all States without discrimina-
tion of any kind, on a basis of equality and in accordance with
143 Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Ex-
ploration and Uses of Outer Space, Dec. 13, 1963, G.A. Res. 1962 (XVIII), U.N.
Doc. A/RES/18/1962. These principles were adopted unanimously. Outer Space
Treaty, supra note 60, pmbl.; see also Oduntan, supra note 139, at 64 (stating that
“it makes no sense in conventional terms to speak of sovereignty in outer space
. . . because ab initio international legislation developed to govern outer space has
been unequivocal on the prohibition of the application of state sovereignty in
outer space.”).
144 Declaration of Legal Principles, supra note 143, pmbl. (“The General As-
sembly . . . [s]olemnly declares that in the exploration and use of outer space
States should be guided by the following principles.”). For greater discussion of
the international law of outer space as a regime largely governed by “soft law” (as
opposed to conventional or customary dictates of “hard law”), see Ram Jakhu &
Steven Freeland, The Sources of International Space Law, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE
INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE OF SPACE LAW 2013, at 461 (Corinne Jorgenson ed.,
2014).
145 The Outer Space Treaty has 103 ratifications and an additional 25 signato-
ries. Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Rep. of the Legal Subcomm.
on Its Fifty-Fourth Session, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/2015/CRP.8 (2015), http:/
/www.unoosa.org/pdf/limited/c2/AC105_C2_2015_CRP08E.pdf [https://per
ma.cc/XTJ5-T8PE]. These include major and emerging space-faring states, such
as Brazil, Canada, China, India, Japan, Russia, South Africa, and the United
States.
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international law, and there shall be free access to all areas of
celestial bodies.146
According to Jakhu, the second paragraph of Article I alone
“categorically and unambiguously denied any and all claims of
national sovereignty, especially traditional territorial sover-
eignty, to outer space and celestial bodies.”147
However, Article II continues: “Outer space, including the
Moon and other celestial bodies, is not subject to national ap-
propriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupa-
tion, or by any other means.”148 This explicitly precludes states
from asserting territorial sovereignty in outer space. Demon-
strating the breadth of this prohibition, it precludes the tradi-
tional means of states under other legal regimes (such as formal
claims or actual occupation), and it forecloses assertions “by any
other means” as well.
While Article I, and particularly Article II, eliminate assertions
of state sovereignty over outer space, the Outer Space Treaty
does not establish outer space as a legal vacuum. The treaty in-
stitutes guiding principles, and creates obligations for states to
govern their own space activities (both state activities and those
of their nationals). So outer space law works on two levels—in-
ternationally and domestically (applied through states to space
actors).149 The lack of sovereignty and ownership (appropria-
tion) is so firm that even commercial ventures in outer space are
legally unclear due to concerns of property rights for natural
resources mined or otherwise extracted from celestial bodies.
This shows the degree to which states regard outer space as both
the territory of no one and the property of all humanity.
Thus, outer space cannot be claimed by any state, and all
states are free to operate in space—in stark contrast to the sover-
eignty regime of airspace. In this regard, according to Brownlie,
outer space resembles the high seas as a res communis.150 How-
146 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 60, art. I.
147 Ram Jakhu, Legal Issues Relating to the Global Public Interest in Outer Space, 32 J.
SPACE L. 31, 39 (2006).
148 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 60, art. II.
149 See CHENG, STUDIES, supra note 62, at 429 (discussing the division between
international space law and municipal space law but noting that “in the matter of
boundaries between airspace and outer space[,] it is international law [that] is
controlling.”). This is similar to the divide between international and domestic
air law noted supra note 71 and infra note 254.
150 BROWNLIE, supra note 97, at 255 (describing outer space as similar to the
high seas due to the free use).
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ever, the term res communis carries with it no particular legal re-
gime; it is more descriptive (providing a term for outer space’s
nature) than proscriptive (which would suggest it provides legal
guidance on how outer space is governed).151
This departure from the air regime was established early in
the era of space exploration. As Judge Lachs stated:
[T]he first instruments that men sent into outer space traversed
the air space of States and circled above them in outer space, yet
the launching States sought no permission, nor did the other
States protest. This is how the freedom of movement into outer
space, and in it, came to be established and recognized as law
within a remarkably short period of time.152
It must be noted that this passage is dicta from a discussion of
the potential for rapid formation of customary international law,
in a case not involving outer space law. However, the aspects
relating to freedom of movement in outer space were certainly
endorsed with Articles I and II of the Outer Space Treaty and
the preceding Declaration of Legal Principles, as discussed
above. Further, while the Outer Space Treaty and the Declara-
tion of Legal Principles were agreed upon by consensus within
the COPUOS and in the General Assembly, the two key parties
were the United States and the Soviet Union—at the time, the
world’s two superpowers and the two primary space-faring states.
And the drafting history of the Outer Space Treaty demon-
strates the close coordination and general agreement of these
powers with regard to the free use and exploration (that is, lack
of sovereignty) in space.153
151 See id. at 169.
152 North Sea Continental Shelf (Ger. v. Den., Ger. v. Neth.), Judgment, 1969
I.C.J. Rep. 3, 230 (Feb. 20) (separate opinion by Lachs, J.). For further discussion
of how the outer space regime emerged (not just what it presently is), see Section
IV.B infra.
153 See Letter from Arthur Goldberg, Permanent Representative of the United
States of America to the United Nations, to U Thant, Sec’y General, United Na-
tions (May 9, 1966), http://www.unoosa.org/pdf/gadocs/A_6327E.pdf [https://
perma.cc/3T6P-48GJ] (noting close coordination with the U.S.S.R. and advocat-
ing freedom in space); Letter from P. Morozov, Permanent Representative of the
U.S.S.R. to the United Nations, to Manfred Lachs, Chairman, Legal Subcommit-
tee, Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, United Nations (July 11,
1966), http://www.unoosa.org/pdf/limited/c2/AC105_C2_L013E.pdf [https://
perma.cc/FQR3-JD5S].
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3. The Legal Nature of Outer Space: Civil and State Vehicles
Quite the opposite of the private, civilian efforts of the Wright
Brothers, for Santos-Dumont, and other aviation pioneers, space
flight and exploration was a state enterprise from its inception.
It was the United States and the Soviet Union, through their
national space programs that launched the first unmanned and
manned missions into space.154 Moreover, it was not just states
(specifically the Soviet Union and the United States) but mili-
tary missions by states—though for peaceful purposes—with
military members at the helm.155 One amalgamation of astro-
naut data found that “[u]ntil 2004, astronauts were sponsored
and trained exclusively by governments, either by military agen-
cies or by civilian space agencies.”156 At the dawn of space explo-
ration, U.S. President Dwight Eisenhower intended the U.S.
space program to be civilian-run and for scientific purposes; but
after Sputnik, reaching space became perceived as a matter of
exigency for the United States to preserve both prestige and se-
curity.157 Unlike the Paris Convention for aircraft, however, the
distinction between military and other state operation has no
legal bearing on the status of spacecraft.158 In fact, not even the
civil versus state distinction from the Chicago Convention was
included.
154 See DEMPSEY, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL AIR LAW, supra note 71, at 753 (noting
that because the space launches were state craft, ICAO had no basis for jurisdic-
tion over them).
155 StarChild Team, Yuri Gagarin, NASA, http://starchild.gsfc.nasa.gov/docs/
StarChild/whos_who_level2/gagarin.html [https://perma.cc/WB8H-SPQY]
(noting that Gagarin, the first human in space, was drawn from the Soviet Air
Force (where he was a fighter pilot) for cosmonaut training); Information Summa-
ries: Astronaut Fact Book, NASA 1-2 (April 2013), https://www.nasa.gov/pdf/
740566main_current.pdf (noting that the entire first cadre of U.S. astronauts
were military members); id. at 10-1. (providing basic service data for all U.S. mili-
tary astronauts).
156 List of Astronauts by Name, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php
?title=List_of_astronauts_by_name&oldid=663957240 [https://perma.cc/L932-
SCDU].
157 See HOUCHIN, supra note 3, at 81 (“Indeed, the president would not com-
promise his position on launching a civilian satellite with a civilian (not a mili-
tary) booster until after Sputnik and the failure of the Vanguard in December
1957. Following these events, he openly conceded the need for studies of military
space programs.”). See also Section IV.D.4 infra.
158 Of course, as a matter of fact and perception the line between military and
non-military activities in outer space can make a great deal of difference in the
context of the debate over the meaning of “peaceful” uses of outer space. See
Section IV.D.5.a infra.
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The international law of outer space makes no distinction be-
tween civil and state vehicles. They are grouped together under
Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty:
States Parties to the Treaty shall bear international responsibility
for national activities in outer space, including the Moon and
other celestial bodies, whether such activities are carried on by
governmental agencies or by non-governmental entities, and for
assuring that national activities are carried out in conformity with
the provisions set forth in the present Treaty.
Thus, a state is responsible for all activities of its nationals in
outer space (state or civil) and for assuring its nationals adhere
to the Outer Space Treaty.159 Such “international responsibility”
suggests that states would desire to assert control over national
activities, and Article VI goes on to make this obligation explicit:
“The activities of non-governmental entities in outer space, in-
cluding the Moon and other celestial bodies, shall require au-
thorization and continuing supervision by the appropriate State
Party to the Treaty.”160 Thus, the Outer Space Treaty assigns re-
sponsibility to and requires states to provide significant and ac-
tive oversight (“authorization and continuing supervision”) of
civil activities in outer space.161 This obligatorily close relation-
159 Article VI also assigns states responsibility for the activities of international
organizations of which they are part. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 60, art. VI
(“When activities are carried on in outer space, including the Moon and other
celestial bodies, by an international organization, responsibility for compliance
with this Treaty shall be borne both by the international organization and by the
States Parties to the Treaty participating in such organization.”).
160 Id. art. VI. The requirement to create controlling domestic legislation was
accentuated in the U.N. General Assembly in 2013 with Resolution 68/74, which
accentuates the Outer Space Treaty requirements and stresses the importance of
state involvement “in view of the increasing participation of non-governmental
entities in space activities” and other modern developments and problems with
the expanded use of outer space. Recommendations on National Legislation Rel-
evant to the Peaceful Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Dec. 11, 2013, G.A.
Res. 68/74, U.N. Doc. A/RES/68/74, http://stage.tksc.jaxa.jp/spacelaw/world/
1_02/02.E-10.pdf [https://perma.cc/3758-PRAS].
161 Additionally, Article VIII of the Outer Space Treaty ensures that jurisdic-
tion and control remains with a state throughout the duration of space activities,
through the registration process:
A State Party to the Treaty on whose registry an object launched
into outer space is carried shall retain jurisdiction and control over
such object, and over any personnel thereof, while in outer space
or on a celestial body. Ownership of objects launched into outer
space, including objects landed or constructed on a celestial body,
and of their component parts, is not affected by their presence in
outer space or on a celestial body or by their return to the Earth.
Outer Space Treaty, supra note 60, art. VIII.
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ship can largely blur the distinction between state and civil
activities.162
This is “radically different”163 than general norms of interna-
tional law, and certainly a departure from the airspace regime.
For instance, the commentary to the U.N. International Law
Commission (ILC) Articles on State Responsibility notes the re-
quirement of attribution to a state before responsibility can be
assigned:
Thus, the general rule is that the only conduct attributed to the
State at the international level is that of its organs of government,
or of others who have acted under the direction, instigation or
control of those organs, i.e. as agents of the State. . . . As a corol-
lary, the conduct of private persons is not as such attributable to
the State.164
Under air law, every aircraft must have a nationality and a
flag.165 Through the Convention on Offenses and Certain Other
Acts Committed on Board Aircraft of 1963166 (Tokyo Conven-
tion) and other agreements, a degree of jurisdiction and control
flies along with that flag. From this stems a general ability to
control (or regulate) one’s citizens and activities. But short of
properly demonstrated attribution to a state actor or activities,
there is no requirement that a state be responsible for its aircraft
such as in the outer space legal regime.167
This unique relationship between space-faring states and their
national actors is particularly significant for non-governmental
activities in that Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty mandates
that all activities be carried out in conformity with the Treaty.
And Article III mandates that states “shall carry on activities in
the exploration and use of outer space, including the Moon and
162 This blur is the case, at least, in the view of parties external to the state.
Internally, a state may create whatever regime it finds appropriate to manage civil
space activities; the requirements can be the same as those for state activities, or
more onerous. See generally CHENG, STUDIES, supra note 62, at 429.
163 Cheng, Article VI of the 1967 Space Treaty Revisited, supra note 126, at 13 (dis-
cussing the unique Article VI requirement that states “assure” compliance, saying
it “assumes an air of guarantee by the State of such compliance.”).
164 Int’l Law Comm’n, supra note 38, at 39 (commentary); see also Convention
on International Civil Aviation, supra note 49, arts. 4–11.
165 Convention on International Civil Aviation, supra note 49, art. 17.
166 Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Air-
craft, Sept. 14, 1963, 704 U.N.T.S. 220 [hereinafter Tokyo Convention] (entered
into force on Dec. 4, 1969) (addressing jurisdiction for crimes and other acts on
board aircraft that prejudice the good order and discipline of aviation).
167 See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 60, arts. VI–VIII.
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other celestial bodies, in accordance with international law, in-
cluding the Charter of the United Nations, in the interest of
maintaining international peace and security and promoting in-
ternational cooperation and understanding.”168 Reading these
two requirements together, they dictate the acceptable limits
and legitimate interests of civil (non-governmental) activity, that
is “maintaining international peace and security and promoting
international cooperation and understanding.”169 This is a fairly
early case of public international law potentially reaching be-
yond states to govern the actions of individuals (assuming states
adhere to their Outer Space Treaty obligations and actually en-
act rules to adequately authorize and supervise their national
actors in space). If states are required to meet this standard and
their national activities are expected to adhere to state stan-
dards, then the private and civil activities must therefore meet
these international standards.170
4. Outer Space: Conclusion
In conclusion, there is a core, black-and-white understanding
of outer space: it includes the space and vehicles in natural orbit
around Earth and beyond.171 This limit can be safely read to
extend at least down to 150 kilometers (or 492,000 feet) and
likely down to 100 kilometers (328,000 feet) in the thoughts of
most writers. Further, outer space law establishes that it is the
sovereign territory of no state, and instead its use and explora-
168 Id. art. III.
169 Id.
170 Further, it could be argued that there is no need to distinguish between
state and civil craft in outer space because the lack of territorial sovereignty and
guarantees of free use and exploration mean any craft (civil or state) may fly
freely, or at least without discrimination due to state or civilian status. Also, the
Article VI responsibility, supervision, and control mandates create a construct by
which everything launched into space can, in effect, be construed as a state (or
state-affiliated) craft. The liability regime for space objects similarly ignores any
distinction between state and civil craft in the case of damages caused—in either
case, the state is obligated to make reparations as required by the relevant con-
ventions. See id. art. VI; Liability Convention, supra note 108, arts. II–III; VALE´RIE
KAYSER, LAUNCHING SPACE OBJECTS: ISSUES OF LIABILITY AND FUTURE PROSPECTS
40–41 (2001) (discussing liability of non-governmental entities in outer space).
Compare Int’l Law Comm’n, supra note 38, at Chapter II (discussing the bases for
attribution to a state, including actions by, inter alia, an organ of the state (Arti-
cle 4); those exercising governmental authority (Article 5); and those acting
under direction or control of a state (Article 8)).
171 See John Bellflower, The Influence of Law on Command of Space, 65 A.F.L. REV.
107, 141 (2010) (“In fact, there is no controversy that all current satellite orbits
transit within the space domain.”).
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tion is “the province of all mankind.”172 Further, outer space law
is a unified regime for state and civilian vehicles—there is no
legal distinction between the two, at least with regard to interna-
tional obligations.
C. THE LEGAL GRAY AREA BETWEEN AIRSPACE AND
OUTER SPACE: GRAY SPACE
Reconciling the widely settled zones of airspace and the outer
space leaves question as to what law governs the area between 21
kilometers (70,500 feet) and 100–150 kilometers (328,000-
492,000 feet). This zone represents the gray area in the law: the
zone of ambiguity at the edges of both airspace and outer space,
herein referred to as gray space. Many writers talk of the delimi-
tation problem, and many make proposals on how best to re-
solve it; but there is no overall consensus. As Lyall and Larsen
noted, “there is uncertainty—not that space law exists, but as to
the exact location of its application. Needless to say there have
been many suggestions.”173 More importantly, there is similarly
no consensus among states.174
Two primary schools of thought have emerged on the issue of
air and space delimitation: spatialism and functionalism. Spatial-
ism essentially argues for a fixed line, at a set altitude, for the
division of airspace and outer space. Under a strict spatialist
analysis, if a craft, regardless of its nature and capabilities, is be-
low the line, it is in airspace; when it is above the line, it is in
outer space.175 Conversely, functionalism focuses on the nature
of the craft in question. If it serves outer space functions, outer
space law applies wherever it is operating; if it is an aircraft, air-
space law applies to its flight.176 In effect, this “approach would
render it unnecessary to solve the theoretical dispute whether
there is a boundary between airspace and outer space and where
it should be located.”177 Of course, even within these broad
172 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 60, art. I; see also THE NEED FOR AN INTE-
GRATED REGULATORY REGIME, supra note 79, at 53 (“Freedom of the use of space is
a fundamental principle of the space law regime.”).
173 FRANCIS LYALL & PAUL LARSEN, SPACE LAW: A TREATISE 153 (2009); see also
id. at 11–30 (providing a thorough outline of the development of the institu-
tions—academic, governmental, and other—that study and address space law).
174 For discussion of state positions in COPUOS, see BENKO¨ & PLESCHER, supra
note 5; Su, supra note 101, at 371; KAYSER, supra note 170, at 45 n.97. For greater
development of this issue, see Section IV.C.3.b infra.
175 See, e.g., DEMPSEY, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL AIR LAW, supra note 71, at 746.
176 See, e.g., LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 173, at 169–70.
177 BENKO¨ & PLESCHER, supra note 5, at 35.
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schools are more particular and inconsistent theories of delimi-
tation.178 Further, some thinkers and space-faring states believe
there is no need to decide the issue.179
The emergence of hybrid aerospace vehicles challenges these
theories and compounds the lack of consensus. Their ability to
operate in either airspace or outer space, straddling any line es-
tablished between the two, can make their control and regula-
tion ambiguous and inconsistent if spatially-based. Further, their
function is novel. On any given flight, they may operate both as
an aircraft and a space craft. As one description of the func-
tional approach explained, “one way to answer the question as
to which regime of law applies is to ask what type of vehicle is
being considered—is it an aircraft, or a spacecraft, or an aero-
space vehicle?”180 But, the extant legal regimes present just a
binary option—only airspace or outer space law can apply; there
is presently no established regime for aerospace vehicles. The
existing theories provide no definitive or universal guidance for
the operation of aerospace vehicles, particularly in the gray area
between air and space law.
In the current state of world tensions and provocative actions,
there may come a moment where an answer is needed—where,
at least in one state, a conclusion will be drawn as to whether an
overflight at high-altitude either is or is not a territorial incur-
178 See Su, supra note 101, at 363 (noting the lack of consensus within spatial-
ism); CHENG, STUDIES, supra note 62, at 444–45 (noting inconsistency in the func-
tionalist approaches). Matte and Oduntun provide thorough outlines of many of
these more particular schools of thought. See SPACE ACTIVITIES AND EMERGING IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 73, at 357; Oduntan, supra note 139, at 69–72.
179 For instance, the United States has stated:
With respect to the question of the definition and delimitation of
outer space, we have examined this issue carefully and have lis-
tened to the various statements delivered at this session. Our posi-
tion continues to be that defining or delimiting outer space is not
necessary. No legal or practical problems have arisen in the ab-
sence of such a definition. On the contrary, the differing legal re-
gimes applicable in respect of airspace and outer space have
operated well in their respective spheres. The lack of a definition or
delimitation of outer space has not impeded the development of
activities in either sphere.
Delegation of the U.S., Statement on the Definition and Delimitation of Outer
Space and the Character and Utilization of the Geostationary Orbit, to the
Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Legal Subcomm. of Its Fourtieth
Session (Apr. 2–13, 2001), http://www.state.gov/s/l/22718.htm [https://perma
.cc/DLM2-BKZ4]; see also Oduntan, supra note 140, at 66–67 (discussing what he
terms “The No Present Need Theory” of delimitation).
180 THE NEED FOR AN INTEGRATED REGULATORY REGIME, supra note 79, at 50.
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sion. And if the decision is that the gray area is sovereign and
the foreign craft is a potential threat, the subjacent state might
act with force.
This scenario is part of what makes the use of force context
unique as a mode of analysis for delimitation. In a liability case,
for example, the law follows the facts. That is, the aerospace ve-
hicle would have crashed independent of its legal status or what
regime applied to it. It would potentially be for litigators, judges,
and insurance companies—years later—to determine whether
the space regime or air regime applied. For the use of force,
however, the legal status of the craft is likely a determining fac-
tor in the decision. Thus, states would benefit from a clear defi-
nition of the extent of sovereignty, so it can be incorporated
into rules of engagement and operating procedures related to
aerospace vehicles.
D. CONCLUSION
This chapter sought to demonstrate that—despite the lack of
clarity as to the edges—there are settled (black-and-white) as-
pects of the airspace and outer space domains. That is, while
there is no clear edge of the airspace or no precise lower border
for outer space, these domains are universally acknowledged as
both existing and possessing a fairly straightforward legal regime
(vis-a`-vis sovereignty and state vehicles). This discussion of the
more settled law then supplies the context and forms the basis
for the later analysis of how vehicles that can transcend these
zones, operating in the gray areas, should be treated under the
law.
IV. ADDRESSING THE GRAY SPACE
Proving a negative is nearly impossible, but this argument as-
serts (and this chapter demonstrates) that there is inadequate
conventional law or state practice to lower the cap on sover-
eignty, and correspondingly the line between air and space, be-
low orbit. Outer space, like the airspace below it, is not a legal
vacuum; something has to (and had to from the dawn of the
space age) be the law there.181 The same is true for the gray area
at the edges of the two domains. The question, then, is how does
181 LACHS, supra note 64, at 135 (“Thus it was necessary to agree that outer
space never had been a lawless area or legal vacuum, but had been subject to
international law, though the matter could never have been put to the test
before.”).
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one determine the law that applies at a given location? But to
ask what is perhaps a natural follow-up question to this—”How
do you choose which law applies?”—would be a misstep here.
This chapter does not purport to propose a solution for gray
space; it seeks to argue that one is already there through the
practice of states and their existing legal dispositions toward the
assertion of sovereignty. The first part of this chapter addresses
this issue and sets the stage for the legal approach taken below
with a discussion of the troubles posed by normative and non-
binding prescriptions for a legal regime.
Then, in what is termed here a conservative, state-based, ap-
proach,182 this chapter argues that one should look at the status
of sovereignty in airspace, and in general, at the time of the
dawn of the space age. This establishes the general rule with
regard to assertions of sovereignty by states. Then one should
examine how space became free for use and exploration, as out-
lined in the Declaration of Legal Principles and the Outer Space
Treaty. This establishes a deviation from, or exception to, the
rule. From there, one should narrowly construe the exception
to the general rule to find the limits of where the exception
applies. When this is done, it reveals that orbit is the lowest clear
deviation from the general disposition of sovereignty. As such,
the regime shifts at that point—airspace (with sovereignty and
limited craft access) below, and outer space (with freedom and
non-distinction of craft) in and above orbit. In essence, one
should apply the baseline rule (sovereignty) until it is clear that
the rule no longer applies—the first place this is true is orbit.
Conversely, the matter can be articulated as applying the excep-
tional rule only so far as its regime allows, at which point it no
longer applies—again, the lowest zone in which outer space law
clearly applies is orbit. This analysis comprises the second and
third parts of the chapter.
Finally, the fourth part of this chapter examines the issue
from another perspective—that of a commensurability argu-
ment. Operating on the basis that the airspace and outer space
regimes are comparable and commensurable, the section seeks
to read them in harmony. When this is done, it reveals that na-
tional security is an overriding interest of states that unifies the
182 “Conservative” is not meant in any political sense but as a method of pro-
ceeding with legal analysis in a restrained manner with deference to the known,
existing law. The approach presupposes a perspective consistent with the ICJ Stat-
ute and other sources of interpretive guidance—that states are the primary actors
in international law. See Section IV.C.1 infra.
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development of the disparate rules affecting the use of force
(sovereignty and the distinction of state and civilian craft) and
that these regimes have a logical separation point at orbit. Thus,
the delineation at orbit makes further sense when examined in
the context of the use of force and aerospace vehicles.
A. WHAT IS AND WHAT OUGHT TO BE
One legal writer has noted that “[t]he lack of codified defini-
tions of airspace and outer space makes the role of international
scholars necessary, taking into account that a demarcation point
is still an open question within the air and space law branch.”183
Certainly, this approach is, generally speaking, consistent with
international rules of interpretation found in Article 38 of the
Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ Statute).184
However, the application of an academic solution for the re-
gime applicable to aerospace vehicles fails for two reasons.
First, reference can be made to “the most highly qualified
publicists” only “as a subsidiary means” of interpretation.185
When the law is clear, there is no need to seek out the opinions
of publicists. Instead, the extant conventional or customary in-
ternational law or the accepted general principles of law should
apply.186 Thus, the matter for sovereignty over aerospace comes
down, to a degree, to a framing issue. That is, while there is
ambiguity as to where the precise line (spatial or functional) be-
tween airspace and outer space may lie, that does not mean that
there is no law that applies in this zone. In many ways, the per-
ceived ambiguity in the law applicable to aerospace activities is a
created phenomenon. This is not a critique of the current writ-
ers on delimitation—they point to many problems created by
the fact that there are divergent regimes for airspace and outer
space, and this work itself does the same with its focus on mat-
ters of security and potential use of force. However, just because
the law causes problems for operations does not mean that the
183 Francesco Gaspari, Space Transportation and International Air Transportation:
The Transition Towards a Common Legal System, in REGULATION OF EMERGING MODES
OF AEROSPACE TRANSPORTATION 141, 147 (Ram Jakhu & Kuan-Wei Chen eds.,
2014).
184 See ICJ Statute, supra note 62, art. 38(1)(d) (In resolution of cases before it,
the ICJ will consider, among other sources, “judicial decisions and the teachings
of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means
for the determination of rules of law.”).
185 Id.
186 Id. art. 38(1)(a)–(c).
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law is unclear or nonexistent.187 A problematic rule of a law is a
rule nonetheless.188
Second, even if publicists are an appropriate consideration
for resolution of this matter, there is no adequate consensus on
the issue of what law should be applicable to aerospace opera-
tions. There are many ideas circulating through the legal litera-
ture, and many are very wise and practical. However, they
typically reflect what the law should be; they do not reveal what
the law is. Some of the most highly qualified publicists address,
and certainly one of the most prolific, Cheng, addresses this is-
sue directly, devoting large sections of his outer space writings to
the distinction of lex lata (what the law is) and lex ferenda (future
law, or what the law should be).189
Of course, asserting that this work can exclusively and purely
articulate what the law is—devoid of perspective, predisposition,
or unconscious bias—would be folly; there is inherently some
degree of what an author thinks ought to be in the description
of what presently is.190 However, the goal here is to strip down
187 Of course, this also does not mean that the law should not be rewritten or
readdressed to better accommodate the coming reality of aerospace vehicles.
However, the question is who has the power to rewrite the law.
188 One may assert that unsatisfactory outcomes militate against such a rule
actually being the operative interpretation of an international law. This may be
based on a reading of Article 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Trea-
ties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 311 [hereinafter VCLT] (entered into force on
Jan. 27, 1980) (“Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation
. . . when the interpretation according to article 31: (a) Leaves the meaning am-
biguous or obscure; or (b) Leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unrea-
sonable.”). But this fails for two reasons here. First, the notion of extensive
airspace is not a treaty provision, albeit best articulated in the Paris Convention
and the Chicago Convention. Instead, it is an articulation of the customs of inter-
national law derived from state practice. This not only undermines the absurdity
argument (if absurd, why do states practice maximum sovereignty?), but it also
removes it from the VCLT’s purview. Second, and more importantly, the asser-
tion of broad sovereignty is not “absurd” or “unreasonable” at all. Reasonable
minds may differ as to the overall best approach to delimitation, but as discussed
below, there are numerous practical bases for the broad (though not infinite)
assertion of an airspace regime, even beyond the more legalistic ones.
189 See CHENG, STUDIES, supra note 62, at 191, 677. Lachs commented that “not
even of my heroes, could I say: ‘this man made law.’ For teachers are not legisla-
tors, nor lawmakers in international relations.” Jakhu & Freeland, supra note 144,
at 471 (discussing the limitations, in general and as a practical source of outer
space law, of the writings of publicists).
190 In this regard, David Hume noted:
In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have
always remark[ed], that the author proceeds for some time in the
ordinary way of reasoning . . . ; when of a sudden I am surpri[se]d
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the issue of vertical territorial sovereignty to its core and from
there expose the essential disposition of states regarding the ex-
isting law of how high sovereignty can be (or has been) ex-
tended and what limits (if any) have been placed to cap such
assertions.
B. THE IMPORTANCE OF CONTEXT: HISTORY OF SOVEREIGNTY IN
AIRSPACE AND OUTER SPACE
In the state-based approach taken here, it is vital to address
the history of the development of the two relevant legal regimes.
The legal literature provides no shortage of perspectives on the
status of sovereignty at any given time. But, upon review of the
publicists and their works, an inescapable context for the discus-
sion of both air law and outer space law is the potential for war
and concern over national security—World Wars I and II for
airspace and the Cold War for outer space. This concern drives
the rights of state vehicles found in the regimes, and particularly
the extent to which sovereignty is asserted by states. This section
examines assertions of vertical sovereignty in general (in the
pre-air and early-air periods), as well as the notions of vertical
sovereignty at the dawn of the space age. While there is a degree
of fluidity among these categories, it is generally set out in three
parts—sovereignty before space, at the dawn of the space age,
and after Sputnik. Overall, this section demonstrates that states
are predisposed to maximal assertions of territorial sovereignty,
up to a limit of where other interests are better served by free-
dom of use and exploration.
1. Sovereignty Before Space Applications
The concerns over avoiding future wars and the extent of a
state’s “right to fly” is evident in the opening of John Cobb
Cooper’s The Right to Fly.191 Having examined the early debates
to find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and
is not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an
ought, or an ought not. This change is imperceptible; but is, how-
ever, of the last consequence.
DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE: BEING AN ATTEMPT TO INTRODUCE
THE EXPERIMENTAL METHOD OF REASONING INTO MORAL SUBJECTS 469 (L.A. Selby-
Bigge ed., 1896). As with morality, the same seems to hold true to articulations of
law.
191 COOPER, THE RIGHT TO FLY, supra note 65. See Section IV.D.4.a infra
(Cooper discussing the overwhelming interest in state security after World War
II, advocating the demilitarization of Germany and Japan’s air power capacities).
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over airspace sovereignty, including the preclusion of military
craft from state airspace, a few years later he concluded:
[I]t is apparent that by the outbreak of World War I the principle
of sovereignty in usable space over national lands and waters had
been accepted by the international community as a customary
rule. None questioned the right of each state to control at its
discretion all flight over its surface territories and to prohibit the
entry into its usable space of any foreign aircraft.192
But the operative question for this work is whether this sover-
eignty notion can be expanded beyond what is exclusively air-
space. Above, Cooper speaks broadly of “usable space over
national lands” (and not airspace exclusively), but the sentiment
he is discussing culminated in the Paris Convention and recog-
nized “that every Power has complete and exclusive sovereignty
over the air space above its territory.”193
Others have stressed that the Paris Convention (and thereby
the re-articulation in the Chicago Convention, operative in the
space age) focused on “air space” for sovereignty. So, they ex-
press a more limited view of sovereignty, tied to what can be
construed as “airspace” or “atmospheric space.”194
This strict limitation should not preclude an expansive dispo-
sition towards sovereignty for two reasons. First, there is no for-
mal definition for either airspace or “atmospheric space” (or
any of the other terms for the same concept) contained in the
Paris Convention, Chicago Convention, or in customary interna-
tional law. So, capping sovereignty solely on this definition is
unavailing. Though a bit of an extreme example, Loftus Becker,
as Legal Advisor to the U.S. Department of State, noted in 1958:
I am informed that astronomically the earth’s atmosphere ex-
tends 10,000 miles above its surface.
It follows that it would be perfectly rational for us to maintain
that under the Chicago Convention the sovereignty of the
United States extends 10,000 miles from the surface of the earth,
an area which would comprehend the area in which all the satel-
192 JOHN C. COOPER, State Sovereignty in Space: Developments 1910 to 1914, in EX-
PLORATIONS IN AEROSPACE LAW: SELECTED ESSAYS OF JOHN COBB COOPER, 1946-
1966, supra note 93, at 125, 136 (writing in 1954, drawing this conclusion from
analysis of United States, British, French, German, and other European state po-
sitions); see also Reinhardt, supra note 4, at 72–73.
193 Paris Convention, supra note 65, art. 1.
194 Eugene Pepin, The Legal Status of the Airspace in the Light of Progress in Avia-
tion and Astronautics, in SPACE LAW: A SYMPOSIUM 231, 233 (1958) (comparing the
Paris Convention and the Chicago Convention and the terms of their texts in
different official languages).
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lites up to this point have entered. At any rate, that type of defini-
tion would afford us enough elbowroom for discussion.195
Certainly, subsequent international law caps the notion of sov-
ereignty significantly below this level, as Article II of the Outer
Space Treaty applies to orbital activities below 10,000 miles
(16,000 kilometers, or over 52 million feet).196 But, such cap on
sovereignty does not necessarily correspond to a cap on where
states could otherwise assert sovereignty, whether called air-
space, atmospheric space, or anything else.
Second, and more importantly, such an expansive presump-
tion against state sovereignty is on the wrong side of history and
practice. The Paris Conference of 1910 and subsequent negotia-
tions over the Paris Convention reveal that states are inclined
toward assertions of sovereignty.197 Even the more restrictive
state positons focused more on rights of innocent passage and
the number and degree of exceptions to sovereignty in airspace;
the underlying premise was that the subjacent state had a right
to assert sovereignty into the zone above it.198
Pepin correctly stressed that the Paris Convention explicitly
used the term “air space.” However, as Cooper explained, “the
Paris Convention is not to be construed as meaning that in in-
ternational law States have territorial rights only in this airspace.
The airspace was accepted as part of State territory but no inter-
national determination was made as to the regions of space
195 Loftus Becker, Major Aspects of the Problem of Outer Space, in SPACE LAW: A
SYMPOSIUM 367, 372 (1958); see also Doc. 442. National Security Council Report: State-
ment of Preliminary U.S. Policy on Outer Space, in 2 FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE
UNITED STATES, 1958–1960, UNITED NATIONS AND GENERAL INTERNATIONAL MAT-
TERS para. 9 (1958), https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v
02/d442 [https://perma.cc/F5XB-5RUV] (the U.S. National Security Council in-
ternally noting that “the upper limit of air space has not been defined”).
196 See Section III.B.1 supra.
197 The author acknowledges that here, “states” is comprised of Western Euro-
pean states, which by today’s standards are a fairly homogenous block. But they
were the relevant powers in the creation of the current construct (found in the
Chicago Convention), which has been very broadly adopted.
198 Reinhardt, supra note 4, at 71–73; JOHN C. COOPER, United States Participation
in Drafting Paris Convention 1919, in EXPLORATIONS IN AEROSPACE LAW: SELECTED
ESSAYS OF JOHN COBB COOPER, 1946-1966, supra note 93, at 137, 140–41; COOPER,
State Sovereignty, supra note 192, at 136; JOHN C. COOPER, The International Air Navi-
gation Conference, Paris 1910, in EXPLORATIONS IN AEROSPACE LAW: SELECTED ESSAYS
OF JOHN COBB COOPER, 1946-1966, supra note 93, at 104; see also Section III.A.2
supra.
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above.”199 Therefore, the Paris Convention and the Chicago
Convention express where sovereignty extended relevant to, re-
spectively, “Aerial Navigation” and “International Civil Avia-
tion,” but should not be read as a constriction or limitation on
state capacity to assert sovereignty in general.
Instead, one should recall the Latin articulation of sover-
eignty, cuius est solum eius est usque ad coelum et ad sidera, and that
it extends indefinitely or to the stars.200 While the sentiment may
not be properly Roman, it is certainly old—and tried and
true.201 After an exhaustive study of the phrase and its applica-
tion, Cooper noted that in the 300 years since the English case
of Bury v. Pope (1586) and text Coke on Littleton (circa 1628)
where the present Latin construct is first found:
[A] significant change had been made. The words “debet esse”
(“ought to be”) of the more important glosses had become “est”
(“is”). By this change the statement in the glosses that the land-
owner ought to have the use or enjoyment of the airspace over
his property to an indefinite height had become, in the maxim
(particularly as cited by Coke), a statement of the existence of
present ownership of space to infinity.202
Similarly, Vlasic’s study of state sovereignty assertions led him
to conclude that, “[t]hus the State asserted airspace sovereignty
many centuries before the age of flight.”203 So upward and in-
definite assertions of sovereignty are not tied to practical appli-
199 JOHN C. COOPER, High Altitude Flight and National Sovereignty, in EXPLORA-
TIONS IN AEROSPACE LAW: SELECTED ESSAYS OF JOHN COBB COOPER, 1946-1966,
supra note 93, at 256, 259.
200 LACHS, supra note 64, at 42; see also Section III.A.2 supra, particularly notes
88–90 and accompanying text.
201 COOPER, Roman Law, supra note 97, at 83–85.
202 Id. at 85. Regarding the extent of the sovereignty, Katzenbach somewhat
skeptically notes that ad coelum can be translated to mean both “to the sky” or “to
the heavens,” making an assertion beyond the sky (and strictly “airspace”) more
dubious. Katzenbach, supra note 64, at 221. However, it should be recalled that in
many articulations of the Latin ad coelum is juxtaposed with ad inferos (“to hell”).
See Abramovitch, supra note 97, at 247; MILDE, supra note 68, at 5. This suggests
that, despite the lack of certainty as to a particular altitude or even finite plane of
existence, “to the heavens” may be a more appropriate read.
203 COOPER, Roman Law, supra note 97, at 55 (“this author’s research convinced
him that such a rule had long existed and that its beginnings went far back into
history.”); see also Reinhardt, supra note 4, at 71 (quoting Dr. J. F. Lycklama a`
Nijeholt in 1910: “We therefore conclude that state sovereignty reaches quite as
high as the state’s interest can reach, the possibility of which but ends at the
uttermost limit of the atmosphere.”).
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cations or extant technology—they reflect a baseline disposition
of states towards the space above them.
2. Sovereignty at the Dawn of the Space Age
From the baseline of airspace sovereignty, and the notion that
it may not be limited just there, states and scholars began con-
sidering how high sovereignty extended upwards—to what de-
gree and to what limit. The prior disposition of broad
sovereignty held strong.
a. State Positions
For instance, the Soviet positon, typically pre-Sputnik but
even after, was for an ad infinitum application of sovereignty.204
Soviet authors stated that the issue was well-settled and cited the
1913 thoughts of French jurist Clunet:
The right of the sovereignty of each country to its territorial at-
mosphere must theoretically [it was not a practical question at
the time] extend usque ad coelum [right to the skies, that is to
infinity], as they used to say in olden times. Contemporary British
lawyers interpreting the expression “complete and exclusive sov-
ereignty of the state over airspace”, point out that “complete” sig-
nifies “without limit”, that is, there is “no limit of height.”205
Official Soviet legal textbooks contained similar assertions un-
til at least 1958.206 This position was not long-lived, however; it
changed for the Soviets with greater contemplation of the ef-
fects of the launch and orbit of Sputnik. Initially, they advocated
a low ceiling for sovereignty (generally based on the then-ex-
isting capacity of plane flight) to allow for free flight of satellites
but that proved problematic from a security perspective.207
Similarly, in 1958, there was evidence of doubts about the lim-
its, ad infinitum, of sovereignty in the U.S. Senate. The U.S. Sen-
ate’s Special Committee on Space and Astronautics, chaired by
then-Senator Lyndon B. Johnson, compiled a substantial collec-
tion of literature and testimony on the emerging issues of outer
204 LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 173, at 6 (discussing E. Korovin’s conference
presentation of “Conquest of the Stratosphere and International Law” in 1933).
205 J. F. McMahon, Legal Aspects of Outer Space, 38 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 339, 345
(1964) (citing Kislov and Krylov, who relied on and interpreted Clunet) (addi-
tional language by McMahon).
206 Id. at 345.
207 Id. at 346; see also Section IV.D.4.b infra.
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space, with particular emphasis on the delimitation question.208
The bulk of the writings were from United States or allied posi-
tions, or at least unaffiliated writers from such states, but Soviet
and other international positions and thinkers were considered
as well.209 While there was no clear consensus as to the upward
bounds of state sovereignty, almost all of the asserted or pro-
posed limits were quite high. On the lower range, thinkers
capped sovereignty at the highest extent of airspace. But the
overall thrust was that sovereignty could be asserted well into
what is now considered as clearly outer space.
b. Effective Control Theories
Effective control theories were popular early in the assess-
ment of outer space legal regimes. Essentially, they assert that
states can claim sovereignty as high as they can exert control
over the area. The first installment of the 1958 U.S. Senate sym-
posium was a 1951 article by Cooper arguing that effective con-
trol should determine delimitation of air and space.210 It was
similarly popular for a short time among Soviet writers.211
However, the proposition was short lived in the space age for
two reasons, both relating to technology. First, as Cooper even
recognized as he proffered it, the doctrine lent itself to inequity
among states; the more wealthy and powerful (and technologi-
cally advanced), the more control a state could assert verti-
cally.212 This would leave less advanced states with significant
territorial disadvantage. This, among other problems, led
Cooper to conclude that even he was not convinced by the effec-
tive control theory for delimitation he proffered.213 This prob-
lem, however, is not the most compelling argument against an
effective control theory. It can be fairly easily reconciled with a
208 See S. SPECIAL COMM. ON SPACE AND ASTRONAUTICS, 85TH CONG., SPACE LAW:
A SYMPOSIUM (Comm. Print 1958).
209 See id. at 485–522.
210 JOHN C. COOPER, Air Law—A Field for International Thinking, in EXPLORA-
TIONS IN AEROSPACE LAW: SELECTED ESSAYS OF JOHN COBB COOPER, 1946-1966,
supra note 93, at 1, 6 (writing in 1951, “[p]erhaps the rule should be, in the
absence of international agreement, that the territory of every state extends up-
ward as far into space as it is physically and scientifically possible for any one state
to control the regions of space directly above it.”).
211 McMahon, supra note 205, at 346.
212 COOPER, Air Law, supra note 210, at 6; see also Oduntan, supra note 139, at
78–79 (critiquing the inequity of the approach).
213 COOPER, Air Law, supra note 210, at 7 (“Frankly, this is not put forward as a
final solution.”).
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universal view of where technology stands; so the line in outer
space would not be set where one particular state can assert con-
trol—it should be set where any state can assert control.
A more critical difficulty with the effective control theory,
though, is that it could not address advancements in technology
(universal or particular to one state). Fauchille, the early free-
dom of the air advocate before the Paris Convention, essentially
employed an effective control basis for his position.214 He ar-
gued, among other bases, that the air should be free because
states “could not exercise any powers over the atmosphere,
neither modifying nor transforming it.”215 Further, he advo-
cated a sovereignty limit of 300 meters, corresponding to the
height of the Eiffel Tower, to allow for buildings (an indicator
of where states could control space above the earth).216 This
shows the limited capacity of a strict control-based line of
thought in the face of new technology (architectural, as well as
aeronautical).
Now, there is no reasonable limit for the geographic extent of
effective control. It is believed that the Chinese military pos-
sesses ASAT technology capable of reaching geosynchronous or-
bit (GEO), which essentially expands the scope of potential
control toward the furthest reaches of useful satellite space
(nearly 36,000 kilometers or 22,300 miles).217 This is certainly
broader than the closer reaches of orbit at 150 kilometers or at
nearest 100 kilometers (93 miles or 62 miles). And, of course,
for other nearer-space control issues, the U.S. X-37B orbital
spaceplane is suspected to have offensive capacity, and the Rus-
sians are suspected to have a craft capable of maneuvering in
outer space and intercepting satellites.218 Regardless of whether
the suspicions of these capabilities are accurate, they are all in
214 See supra Section III.A.2.
215 SPACE ACTIVITIES AND EMERGING INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 73, at 162.
216 Id. at 162 n.26.
217 See Brian Weeden, Through a Glass, Darkly: Chinese, American, and Russian
Anti-Satellite Testing in Space, THE SPACE REV. (Mar. 17, 2014), http://www.thes-
pacereview.com/article/2473/1 [https://perma.cc/CEV4-B7VE] (piecing to-
gether evidence from a recent Chinese launch to conclude the rocket likely
achieved an apogee of 30,000 kilometers).
218 Sam Jones, Object 2014-28E – Space Junk or Russian Satellite Killer?, FIN. TIMES
(Nov. 17, 2014, 6:17 PM), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/cdd0bdb6-6c27-11e4-
990f-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3XDxYKR1I [https://perma.cc/ZY4S-6486]; Mike
Wall, Is Russian Mystery Object a Space Weapon?, SPACE (Nov. 19, 2014, 7:01 AM),
http://www.space.com/27806-russia-mystery-object-space-weapon.html [https://
perma.cc/D4ZZ-BD84].
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addition to the more conventional and extant electronic and ki-
netic force options (including shorter range ASATs) more read-
ily available to “negate (deceive, disrupt, degrade, deny, or
destroy) an adversary’s efforts to interfere with or attack” space
systems.219 Further, the premise of this article assumes the exis-
tence in the near future of vehicles that can bridge any gaps
between clear air and clear space—so effective control is effec-
tively limitless.
In 1957, Wassenbergh commented on this phenomenon in
the context of the law of the sea while addressing air law.220 In
his time, thanks to technology, the high seas could be controlled
well past any reasonable limits of territorial sovereignty; and he
believed that airspace similarly had expansive bounds of poten-
tial control.221 So we are left with a legal limitations approach;
the practical limits of effective control are no longer reasonable
guideposts. Employing the high seas analogy: “[T]he sea is no
longer ‘free by nature.’”222 That is, the seas are made free by
states—by agreement—notwithstanding state capacity to control
them. So “[s]overeignty can no longer be based on the effective
power of a State, but ‘only’ on law.”223 In that context, states’
interests in maximizing territory for both economic and strate-
gic ends must be considered.224 The same is true today (or will
be in the near future) with aerospace and outer space capacities
for control.
Overall, the effective control theory was well-founded in his-
torical assertions from the law of the sea’s “cannon-shot rule” as
well as various early aviation sovereignty positions. But, like
those regimes, its utility is limited by technological advance-
ments. Nonetheless, its underpinnings and its enduring popu-
larity underlines and highlights the going disposition—that
219 JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, supra note 121, at GL-7; see also U.S. Air Force Doc-
trine, Annex 3-14 Space Operations: Offensive Space Control, U.S.A.F. (June 19, 2012),
https://doctrine.af.mil/download.jsp?filename=3-14-D35-SPACE-OPS-OSC.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3GYU-HMP4] (outlining the United States’ approaches with
greater specificity); Bhupendra Jasani, Introduction, in PEACEFUL AND NON-PEACE-
FUL USES OF SPACE: PROBLEMS OF DEFINITION FOR THE PREVENTION OF AN ARMS
RACE 1, 10–14 (Bhupendra Jasani & UNIDIR eds., 1991) (outlining various types
of space-oriented weapons).
220 H. A. WASSENBERGH, POST-WAR INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION POLICY AND
THE LAW OF THE AIR 102–03 (1957).
221 Id.
222 Id. at 102.
223 Id. at 152.
224 Id. at 104.
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states get to claim as sovereign that which they can control (up
to any otherwise imposed limits).
c. The 1956 “Weather” Balloon Incident: Sovereignty Above
Effective Control
Like the U-2 incident of 1960, a 1956 balloon incident be-
tween the United States and the Soviet Union helps illustrate
state positions on sovereignty, particularly with regard to incur-
sion by the aerial objects of other states.
In the mid-1950s, the United States, through the U.S. Air
Force and in conjunction with Western European allies, organ-
ized a large meteorological survey involving large helium-filled
balloons carrying survey equipment. Some of the balloons were
expected to reach up to 90,000 feet (over 27 kilometers or 17
miles).225 More recent documents show that at least a portion of
this was named project GENETRIX, a U.S. Air Force operation
to use high-altitude balloons as a mechanism for intelligence
photography over the Soviet Union, the Eastern Block, and
China from December 1955 to February 1956.226 In that short
time, 516 balloons were launched as part of the project, but only
46 were ever recovered (and only 34 of those had “useful photo-
graphs”).227 However, regardless of what the Soviets actually
knew or just suspected about the project, they protested the
overflight of these balloons even at this high altitude.228 Amid
these protests, the program was cancelled even though the
United States maintained they were merely “weather research”
balloons.229 The United States never asserted that the overflight
was appropriate or legal, even under the purported weather-sur-
vey circumstances. The United States agreed to stop the pro-
225 CHENG, STUDIES, supra note 62, at 14 (writing in 1957).
226 PEDLOW & WELZENBACH, supra note 89, at 84–85.
227 Id. at 85.
228 See CHENG, STUDIES, supra note 62, at 14–15; PEDLOW & WELZENBACH, supra
note 89, at 86. By late 1956, the Soviets were also protesting the more controlled,
but potentially lower-altitude, flights of the U-2. PEDLOW & WELZENBACH, supra
note 89, at 126; see also Section III.A.2 supra.
229 PEDLOW & WELZENBACH, supra note 89, at 86. Ironically, despite that the
weather balloon designation was subterfuge for terrestrial photography, part of
the limited value derived from the program (at expense to the United States’
reputation and some degree of embarrassment over the incursion) was indeed
meteorological. The United States and NATO tracked the balloons via radar, and
the “data provided the most accurate record to date of high-altitude wind cur-
rents, knowledge that meteorologists were later able to put to use to determine
optimum flightpaths for U-2 flights.” Id. at 87.
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gram but did not acknowledge that it was illegal. At the time,
“Soviet writers ha[d] not, however, been slow in pointing out
that, in its official communications, the United States has not
asserted any strict right of one State to fly such balloons into the
airspace of another State.”230
Overall, this case demonstrates that there can be assertions of
sovereignty (that go essentially uncontested) with no shoot-
down or other kinetic assertion of control—even without a
known capacity to shoot the balloons down at that altitude with
any accuracy. Even without all of these potential criteria, it is still
regarded as a territorial violation. Thus, the case demonstrates
that sovereignty can, and does, potentially extend beyond any
bounds of effective control.
d. Overall View: Broad Assertions of Upward Sovereignty
Regardless of the bases, legal or practical, the general disposi-
tion at the dawn of the space age was toward expansive asser-
tions of upward state territorial sovereignty. Even Cooper, who
abandoned his effective control argument from 1951, by 1956
argued for sovereignty up to 300 miles, though advocating for a
convention or treaty (like the Chicago Convention) to this effect
that would also cement a transit passage regime for non-military
vehicles.231 This proposal (and the underlying premise that the
assumption should be toward state sovereignty) became the
baseline for the discussion amassed in the U.S. Senate sympo-
sium—most authors either explicitly or tacitly commented on or
critiqued Cooper’s position.232
230 CHENG, STUDIES, supra note 62, at 15.
231 JOHN C. COOPER, Legal Problems of Upper Space, in EXPLORATIONS IN AERO-
SPACE LAW: SELECTED ESSAYS OF JOHN COBB COOPER, 1946-1966, supra note 93, at
268, 276 (writing in 1956 before the Sputnik launch). Cooper’s proposed conven-
tion would include three essential parts:
a) Reaffirm Article I of the Chicago Convention, giving the subja-
cent state full sovereignty in the areas of atmospheric space above
it, up the height where “aircraft” as now defined, may be operated,
such areas to be designated “territorial space.”
b) Extend the sovereignty of the subjacent state upward to 300
miles above the [E]arth’s surface, designating this second area as
“contiguous space,” and provide for a right to transit through this
zone for all non-military flight instrumentalities when ascending or
descending.
c) Accept the principle that all space above “contiguous space” is
free for the passage of all instrumentalities.
Id.
232 See generally S. SPECIAL COMM. ON SPACE AND ASTRONAUTICS, supra note 208.
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Similarly, writing in 1960, Cheng presumed state sovereignty
up to 300–500 miles (400–805 kilometers):
So far there has been little opposition to the passage of foreign
artificial [E]arth satellites over national territories. The initial
perigees and apogees of the orbits of Sputnik I, Discoverers I, II,
V, VII, [and] XI and the Soviet Space Ship are, respectively,
142–588, 99–605, 142–220, 136–450, 100–520, 109–380 and
193–230 miles. These are all wholly or partly in the [E]arth’s at-
mosphere—at least the upper regions thereof—and, assuming
that the sovereignty of States skyward is conterminous with the
terrestrial atmosphere and, therefore, extends to approximately
300–500 miles, within the national airspace of the countries over
which they pass.233
While Cheng moved away from this position over the years, it
shows the inclination toward upward sovereignty at the dawn of
the space age (here, up to 300–500 miles above Earth). It is use-
ful as historical knowledge, showing the position of a qualified
publicist frozen in time.
3. Sovereignty, the Satellite (Sputnik), and Beyond: The Innocent
Passage Exception
The preeminence of the disposition toward sovereignty is fur-
ther illustrated in how it was curtailed for uses of outer space.
Examining early state positions on overflight and sovereignty, it
was the innocent passage concept for “mere overflights by artifi-
cial satellites”234 that was the breakthrough. Even this exception,
though, was not automatically seen as assured initially. As Cheng
warned:
The lack of protest about these satellites up to now hardly affects
the principle of airspace sovereignty; for those States which di-
rectly or indirectly took part in the International Geophysical
Year, and those now taking part in the work of COSPAR (the
Committee on Space Research of the International Council of
Scientific Unions), can be said to have given their implied con-
sent. For the rest, the passage of such satellites through national air-
space depends on the tacit acquiescence of the States over which their
orbits pass. It would be erroneous otherwise to conclude that a
legal right of innocent passage has already arisen in fav[o]r of
artificial satellites, similar to the right of innocent passage of
merchant ships through foreign territorial seas.235
233 CHENG, STUDIES, supra note 62, at 38.
234 Id. at 678.
235 Id. at 38 (emphasis added).
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As was the case with the air in the debates of 1910 and before
the Paris Convention and the Chicago Convention, an innocent
passage regime could have been considered and explicitly re-
jected by states as they passed through this “national airspace” in
orbit.236
However, the overflight of satellites in orbit was allowed by
states—they neither protested overflight nor sought permission
to overfly other states over the years of satellite flight.237 As one
early U.S. adviser put it, “the Russians having been the first with
their Satellite to overfly all countries, they have thereby estab-
lished the international characteristic of orbital space.”238 So this
rule for overflight was “established,” or created, contrary to the
norm of sovereignty.
Some states advocated for free overflight while others pas-
sively permitted it.239 Still, the freedom was not without limits or
reservations, demonstrating the vestiges of sovereign assertions.
For instance, the Soviet Union, after Sputnik, strongly advocated
a freedom of orbit theory, but they distinguished simple passage
from different types of use, particularly satellite surveillance and
reconnaissance. While the United States’ position was that re-
connaissance from orbit was permissible, the Soviets placed it in
a class with other aerial spying, such as the U-2 incursions and
the meteorological balloon incident over Russian airspace.240 In
both instances, the Soviets objected to the overflight, and in the
U.N., the General Assembly protested such a use of orbit.241 So
the location was not objectionable, but the function was (and
would be regardless of where it occurred), taking the objection
beyond an orbital (or spatial) context. Even the United States,
an advocate for the free use of orbit, made only a qualified asser-
236 See COOPER, The International Air Navigation Conference, supra note 198, at
123.
237 See McMahon, supra note 205, at 353; North Sea Continental Shelf (Ger. v.
Den., Ger. v. Neth.), Judgment, 1969 I.C.J. Rep. 3, 230 (Feb. 20) (separate opin-
ion by Lachs, J.); LACHS, supra note 64, at 125–26.
238 Doc. 347. Memorandum of a Conference, President’s Office, White House, Washing-
ton, October 8, 1957, 8:30 a.m., in 11 FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES,
1955–1957, UNITED NATIONS AND GENERAL INTERNATIONAL MATTERS para. 5
(1958), https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v11/d347
[https://perma.cc/6YQC-ZUEQ].
239 See, e.g., McMahon, supra note 205, at 351–52 (collecting numerous state-
ments at the U.N. General Assembly in favor of free use of outer space, including
those from Argentina, Australia, Austria, Brazil, Canada, Cuba, France, Great
Britain, Iran, Italy, Japan, Peru, Poland, Spain, Sweden, and Yugoslavia).
240 Id. at 371–73.
241 Id.
2016] SOVEREIGNTY’S GRAY AREA 449
tion about the free use of orbit, protecting the potential sover-
eign interests against any activities not regarded as peaceful:
Although the [United States] has not to date recognized any up-
per limit to its sovereignty, a principle of freedom of outer space,
such as that expressed by the [U.N.] Ad Hoc Committee, sug-
gests that at least in so far as peaceful exploration and use of
outer space are concerned, the right of states to exclude persons
and objects may not obtain. However, the full implications of a
principle of freedom of outer space, in contrast with a principle
of national sovereignty over outer space, remain to be fully
assessed.242
But over time, the free use and travel in orbit became ce-
mented as the law—first as a custom,243 then in the Declaration
of Legal Principles, and finally with the Outer Space Treaty.244
As thousands of satellites have circled the Earth since, the prin-
ciple has remained consistent.
4. Conclusions: The Disposition is Sovereignty; the Exception is Res
Communis
The history of aerial sovereignty demonstrates its broad appli-
cation traveling to great altitudes. Further, there must be a polit-
ical expectation that states will make such assertions. As such,
the general, or baseline, position should be that states can claim
or have claimed territorial sovereignty over an area.
242 Doc. 479. Report by the National Aeronautics and Space Council, in 2 FOREIGN
RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1958–1960, UNITED NATIONS AND GENERAL IN-
TERNATIONAL MATTERS para. 24 (1960), https://history.state.gov/historicaldocu-
ments/frus1958-60v02/d479 [https://perma.cc/ABA9-NH6W].
243 See, e.g., McMahon, supra note 205, at 356 (“[N]o matter where the bound-
ary line is drawn, a customary rule of international law has now been established,
giving a State the right to place a satellite in orbit for peaceful and scientific
purposes.”).
244 See Section III.B.2 supra. This broad assertion regarding the universality of
freedom of orbit comes from a sovereignty perspective; there is still debate as to
the potential effect of “free” use of outer space (and especially advantageous
orbits) by states that reach it first with regard to the protections of the Outer
Space Treaty. This may particularly include Article I (“free for exploration and
use by all states without discrimination of any kind”) and Article II (“Outer space
. . . is not subject to appropriation . . . by means of use or occupation, or by any
other means”), which could preclude de facto discrimination based on lesser
technology and capacity to reach space (thereby precluding use of the orbits by
prior occupation by advanced states). See, e.g., Bogota Declaration, supra note 141
(asserting sovereignty over equatorial GEO); Jakhu, supra note 147, at 40;
Oduntan, supra note 139, at 75.
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However, this default rule—particularly regarding vertical
limits of sovereignty—can be curbed, as with the Outer Space
Treaty and its reflection of the agreement that outer space “shall
be free for exploration and use by all States.”245 But the limita-
tions and reservations in this freedom further enforce that the
underlying position is always a right of sovereignty.
C. A CONSERVATIVE (POSITIVIST) APPROACH
The approach taken here gives deference to the clear and es-
tablished law and regimes, asserting that clarity trumps ambigu-
ity. In essence, states typically assert the most sovereignty
possible. The cap on this reach must come from a clear limit on
the ability of a state to claim sovereignty. Otherwise, states are
free to assert their natural disposition. The lowest that one can
argue that state power has been capped, as a matter of law, is
with the beginning of the outer space regime. Thus, under the
approach offered here, sovereignty must be read to reach as
high as the clear beginnings of the outer space regime. And the
lowest point at which there is consensus as to a lack of sover-
eignty (that is, the beginning of the outer space regime) is in
satellite orbit. So this should be regarded as the line between
airspace and outer space, considering sovereignty as the deter-
mining factor.
This section first seeks to justify the propriety of this conserva-
tive approach and its focus on positive law in the context of
outer space law. Then it provides analysis of how the approach
demonstrates that the line between air and space should be
drawn to maximize the state disposition toward sovereignty. Fi-
nally, it develops why satellite orbit should form that line.
1. In Defense of a Positivist Approach
This argument is written from a generally positivist perspec-
tive.246 That is, it assumes that states are the drivers of interna-
tional law, are the primary actors (and creators, by their
245 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 60, art. I, para. 2.
246 An opposing view to this positivist, state-focused view may be that of legal
pluralism:
The force of the law must be explained in some way beyond a refer-
ence to state sovereignty. Legal pluralism offers a number of in-
sights in this context, finding law to exist in parallel and
intersecting spheres beyond the state. Legal norms arise whenever
communities of practices can be found, linking actors on the basis
of shared interests or practices.
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consent), and are generally free to act in the absence of prohibi-
tive rules of international law.247
a. The Approach is Consistent with State Behavior and
International Law Norms
Created by states in 1945, the ICJ Statute cements the primacy
of states in international law with Article 38.248 Often regarded
as outlining the acceptable sources of international law,249 it
demonstrates that states, through their consent and practice,
create binding international law.250
State consensus also drives the creation of law in the air and
space context. For instance, the COPUOS operates with a con-
sensus-based approach.251 It is not a legislative body but a mech-
anism by which states can express their views, and law can be
derived from the intersection of those positions. This reflects a
recognition that the consent of all affected states is key—not just
as a matter of law or procedure, but also for practical effect.252
Rene´ Provost, The Move to Substantive Equality in International Humanitarian Law: A
Rejoinder to Marco Sassoli and Yuval Shany, 92 INT’L REV. OF THE RED CROSS 437,
441 (2011). But Provost is addressing how to (effectively) ensure application and
compliance of IHL to non-state actors, particularly in armed conflicts not of an
international nature. Here, though, the essential matter in question involves
states and their activities—so the pluralist argument does not terribly undermine
this positivist approach toward states’ uses of force based on state territorial
sovereignty.
247 See MALCOLM SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 131, 215 (6th ed. 2008).
248 ICJ Statute, supra note 62, art. 38.
249 Jakhu & Freeland, supra note 144, at 461–62.
250 Article 38 states:
1. The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with inter-
national law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply:
a. international conventions, whether general or particular, es-
tablishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting states;
b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice ac-
cepted as law;
c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;
. . .
ICJ Statute, supra note 62, art. 38(1) (the article also outlines subsidiary means of
determining the existence of such laws, including “judicial decisions and the
teachings of the most highly qualified publicists”). Of these three sources, even
the most potentially far-leaning away from open consent by a state is the general
principles of law; but even those principles must be “recognized” by states to
become binding.
251 LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 173, at 20–21.
252 See CHENG, STUDIES, supra note 62, at 184–85. Cheng quotes the Soviet dele-
gate to COPUOS, addressing the necessity of uniform agreement (at least among
the space-faring nations) for creation of outer space law:
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Also, ICAO is a globalized forum for discussion of relevant is-
sues, but the power remains in the hands of states that ulti-
mately have to approve the ICAO regime through the
representative Council253 and then domestically implement
what the ICAO regime dictates.254 Similarly, the International
Telecommunication Union (ITU) may have numerous non-
state sector members, but the essential power is held by states.255
The primacy of states is also evident in the substance of outer
space law. For example, Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty’s
placement of states squarely into a position of responsibility
(hence approval and control) for space activities only adds to
the involvement of states in the creation of laws (municipal or
international) affecting matters of outer space.256
Twenty-six signatures on this document would have no value; there
must be twenty-eight signatures [the entirety of COPUOS member-
ship at the time]. Even if all of us, including the Soviet Union, the
countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America—which are in princi-
ple in favor of signing the declaration, sign, if there is no signature
of the United States, the whole endeavour would have no result. It
is clear that without agreement of the United States it is impossible
to resolve such a problem.
Id. at 185 (citing U.N. GAOR, Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, 18th
Sess., 15th mtg., U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/PV.15 (Feb. 21, 1963), http://www.unoosa
.org/pdf/transcripts/copuos/AC105_PV015E.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q3BN-
QBCX]). This deference to the practical necessity of affected states being particu-
larly accounted for in determinations of applicable law was noted by the ICJ in
the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases. North Sea Continental Shelf (Ger. v. Den.,
Ger. v. Neth.), Judgment, 1969 I.C.J. Rep. 3, 43 (Feb. 20) (“an indispensable
requirement would be that within the period in question, short though it might
be, State practice, including that of States whose interests are specially affected,
should have been both extensive and virtually uniform in the sense of the provi-
sion invoked”).
253 Convention on International Civil Aviation, supra note 49, arts. 50–55;
DEMPSEY, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL AIR LAW, supra note 71, at 50.
254 See Convention on International Civil Aviation, supra note 49, art. 37; DEMP-
SEY, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL AIR LAW, supra note 71, at 53 (“Annexes are not self-
executing[ ] and depend upon the willingness of member States to promulgate
national laws and regulations and implement and enforce them vigilantly.”). The
exception to this is the ICAO regime over the high seas, which applies without
subsequent promulgation. Convention on International Civil Aviation, supra note
49, art. 12.
255 See Int’l Telecomm. Union [ITU] Constitution arts. 3, 7, 10.
256 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 60, art. VI; see also Cheng, Article VI of the
1967 Space Treaty Revisited, supra note 126.
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Also, the context in which this issue is examined—the law of
war—is largely a positivist one in its roots and construction.257
Provost discusses reciprocity among equal, sovereign states as a
basis for the current system of IHL, and this reciprocity notion
ties directly into the importance of the consent of states as the
creators of international law:
It reflects the fact that most agents will agree to be bound by a
norm on the basis that they thereby obtain a benefit. In the con-
text of public international law, states will indeed usually demand
a quid pro quo in the exchange of rights and obligations created
by a treaty or under customary law.258
The same positivist construct that holds true for the develop-
ment of air law, space law, and the law of war should apply to the
analysis of the use of force in aerospace. Overall, states are in
the driver’s seat of international regimes, and they recognize
that control.259
b. The Approach is Consistent with Other Examinations of
International Law
The deference to states and concern not to overstep the
bounds to which states have consented is present throughout
the writings of relevant publicists.260 However, major institu-
257 See Rene´ Provost, Asymmetrical Reciprocity and Compliance with the Laws of War,
in MODERN WARFARE: ARMED GROUPS, PRIVATE MILITARIES, HUMANITARIAN OPERA-
TIONS, AND THE LAW 17, 18–19 (Benjamin Perrin ed., 2012).
258 Id. at 18. However, this is not an endorsement of strict positivism in IHL.
Instead, he concludes that to bring non-state (asymmetrical) actors into the pur-
view and control of IHL, “[t]he solution is to expose the hollowness of a state
monopoly on the power to create rules . . . [which] then paves the way for a
pluralization of the norm creation process to attract, from all classes of agents,
normative commitments on the basis of understandings shared in a community
of practice.” Id. at 37.
259 See, e.g., Allie Malloy, Putin Congratulates Obama on Independence Day, CNN
POL. (July 5, 2015, 7:08 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/07/04/politics/putin-
obama-independence-day/index.html [https://perma.cc/GTX3-UW3L] (In a
diplomatic note to President Obama, President Putin stated, “Russian-American
relations remain the most important factor of international stability and
security.”).
260 For instance, Lachs, in the context of discussing an innocent passage re-
gime for reaching outer space, admonished:
It should not therefore be lightly presumed, especially where it
does not result from any express declaration of will. Thus while ac-
quiescence may create a presumption of acceptance, it precludes
the assumption that States have renounced, once and for all, the
right to any activity connected with outer space that may be carried
on in their airspace.
454 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE [81
tional examinations of the law also endorse this positivist
approach.
For instance, the International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC) produced a study on customary international law that
took a similarly state-driven, conservative approach to its exami-
nation of the law pertaining to armed conflicts.261 Some com-
mentators dispute the ICRC’s adherence to the method in
practice (that is, in finding more law or prohibitions on state
activity than may actually exist).262 Nonetheless, the conserva-
tive, state-driven method, if applied, appears to be sound and in
line with one of the most credible institutions involved in the
relevant issues.
Also, the ILC study on Fragmentation of International Law
can be read consistent with this approach.263 That expansive
study examines the interplay of legal regimes and, in particular,
the relationship between lex specialis and “general international
law.” It shows a preference for reading laws in harmony264 but
recognizes that there may be conflict in the application of
norms. If the two notions of law cannot be harmonized, they
must be prioritized.265
LACHS, supra note 64, at 57–58. This demonstrates aversion to overstepping the
bounds of state acceptance of new norms of law.
261 JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, CUSTOMARY INTERNA-
TIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW xxxvii (Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross ed., 2005) (pro-
viding a detailed explanation of the method employed in the ICRC study of
customary international law with the central focus on state practice to defend the
development of rules).
262 See CLAUDE EMANUELLI, INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 37–41 (2009)
(critiquing the ICRC study on three bases by essentially declaring the findings
self-serving and criticizing the breadth of what is considered “state practice” and
the lack of definition of opinio juris).
263 See Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. of the Study Group on Fragmentation of Inter-
national Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of Inter-
national Law to the Fifty-Eighth Session, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.682 (2006)
[hereinafter ILC Fragmentation Report Analysis], http://legal.un.org/ilc/docu-
mentation/english/a_cn4_l682.pdf [https://perma.cc/L2X5-G9G4] (analysis);
Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. of the Study Group on Fragmentation of International
Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International
Law to the Fifty-Eighth Session, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.702 (2006) [hereinafter
ILC Fragmentation Report Conclusions], http://legal.un.org/ilc/documenta-
tion/english/a_cn4_l702.pdf [https://perma.cc/8HH7-G2R5] (conclusions).
264 See ILC Fragmentation Report Analysis, supra note 263, at 25.
265 See id. at 24–25 (“legal reasoning will either have to seek to harmonize the
apparently conflicting standards through interpretation or, if that seems implau-
sible, to establish definite relationships of priority between them”).
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The ILC endorses the maxim lex specialis derogat legi generali,
but this application is limited to the appropriate scope of the lex
specialis. Overall, the study sanctions a narrow construction of
deviations to general rules: “The scope of special laws is by defi-
nition narrower than that of general laws. It will thus frequently
be the case that a matter not regulated by special law will arise in
the institutions charged to administer it. In such cases, the rele-
vant general law will apply.”266 That is, in the prioritization of
laws, lex specialis should not be read beyond its intended, inher-
ently limited, bounds. What makes lex specialis so powerful—its
specificity—is also arguably its greatest weakness when it comes
to breadth of application.
c. Addressing the Lotus Issue
The Lotus case is emblematic of this conservative, positivist ap-
proach. In 1927, the Permanent Court of International Justice
(PCIJ) decided the Lotus case, which generally involved the as-
sertion of national criminal jurisdiction at sea.267 It is perhaps
best known, though, for the assertion that “[r]estrictions upon
the independence of States cannot therefore be presumed.”268
Essentially, this means that which is not prohibited by law is al-
lowed by states: “all that can be required of a State is that it
should not overstep the limits which international law places
upon [it].”269 While this work does not directly cite to the Lotus
case as a legal basis for the assertion of a conservative or positiv-
ist approach to regime selection, the conservative genesis is cer-
tainly the same. Therefore, attacks on the Lotus principle could
be construed as an attack on the notion put forth here.
And, the Lotus assertion has its critics in the legal literature,
particularly the analysis of outer space law. One especially co-
gent attack on use of the Lotus principle (and the idea of free-
dom of state actions) in the context of space law comes from
266 ILC Fragmentation Report Conclusions, supra note 263, at 12; see also ILC
Fragmentation Report Analysis, supra note 263, at 35.
267 S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), Judgment, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 1 (Sept.
7).
268 Id. at 18 (before this conclusion, stating that “rules of law binding upon
States therefore emanate from their own free will as expressed in conventions or
by usages generally accepted as expressing principles of law and established in
order to regulate the relations between these co-existing independent communi-
ties or with a view to the achievement of common aims.”). But see ICJ Statute,
supra note 62, art. 38(1).
269 Fr. v. Turk., 1927 P.C.I.J. at 19 (directly addressing the discretion to assert
jurisdiction).
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Jakhu.270 He noted that “[a]s early as 1962, Christol wrote that
‘[t]he Lotus Case does not constitute a precedent in favor of
unrestricted national uses and activities in outer space.’” Instead
of the Lotus principle, he argued that state uses and applications
of space must be guided (and limited) by the global public in-
terest.271 The use of force is arguably contrary to this notion.272
So the use of force and security-based construct articulated here
would run into problems in this context.
However, the concern over the application of the Lotus case
(or requirement of state consent to any limitations on their ca-
pacity to act) does not preclude the present analysis. First, as
discussed above, general international law and air and space law
reveal that states are the key actors. In discussing who creates
international law, Cheng noted the truism that solely “interna-
tional persons” have “the capacity to bear rights and duties
under international law.”273 In addressing “international per-
sons” he stated:
The truth is that present-day international persons are, with at
most only one or two exceptions, primarily States, i.e., territori-
ally organized political entities recognized as sovereign and inde-
pendent (i.e., subject to no other [E]arthly authority), together
with a number of inter-State organizations to which international
270 Jakhu, supra note 147, at 41 (“In space law, the ‘general presumption in
favor of freedom of action’ is not applicable.”); see also Jakhu & Freeland, supra
note 144, at 470 (citing Brownlie and noting that the Lotus case was a narrow,
bare majority decision); see generally Jakhu, supra note 147, at 41–43.
271 Jakhu, supra note 147, at 37 (the global public interest contains many (thir-
teen named) facets, including: space activities must be for the benefit and in the
interests of all countries (and space activities are the “province of all mankind”);
there is freedom of use and exploration; there can be no national appropriation;
and states will exhibit mutual respect, cooperation, and assistance where re-
quired.). The global public interest in the use and exploration of outer space is
also referred to as the “common interest principle.” See id. at 34; see also Outer
Space Treaty, supra note 60, art. I.
272 See Jakhu, supra note 147, at 97. According to Jakhu:
It seems that, perhaps relying on the obiter dictum of the Lotus case,
the U.S. Government believes that “[t]here is no blanket prohibi-
tion in international law on placing or using weapons in space, ap-
plying force from space to Earth or conducting military operations
in and through space.” However, the fallacy of this position from
the international law perspective is evident, not only because of in-
applicability of the Lotus decision to outer space activities, but also
in view of almost unanimous rejection by the international commu-
nity of this position, expressed most recently in the December 2004
U.N. General Assembly Resolution.
Id. at 98 (citations omitted) (alterations in original).
273 CHENG, STUDIES, supra note 62, at 172–73.
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legal personality has been granted. Since membership of these
organizations is normally limited to States, the basic unit of inter-
national society remains, therefore, the sovereign and indepen-
dent State.274
Thus, the principle articulated in the Lotus case, that states
are bound by rules only upon which they have agreed, is gener-
ally operative today.275 Cheng reiterated that “[i]n international
law, as the Permanent Court of International Justice in the
above passage quoted from the judgment in the case of The Lo-
tus said, rules of international law emanate from the free will of
States.”276
Moreover, Jakhu’s argument need not preclude state action
and control (and the general requirement of state consent for
binding law). To the contrary, his thesis is that states have
agreed to certain general principles of law for the use of outer
space, largely through the Outer Space Treaty and subsequent
widely accepted space treaties. So the argument is really that
states should be held to these general principles to which they
have already agreed (more of a pacta sunt servanda argument).
These are not norms created by third parties or arbitrarily im-
posed on space-faring actors; they are in the properly consti-
tuted corpus juris spatialis itself—albeit not in great deal of
operative detail.
Also, it must be noted that the common interest principle ap-
plies in space but not in the air—that is explicitly sovereign ter-
ritory, and the defense of this sovereignty is acceptable (within
the limits of the law of war or other controlling laws such as
Article 3bis of the Chicago Convention). In this context, perhaps
for the assessment of aerospace vehicles and applications, the
law of war makes more sense than an outer space law that argua-
bly restricts all force as an affront to free use and exploration.277
There is an issue as to which regime applies. It is conceded that
if space law applies to this gray area, so too would the common
274 Id. at 173.
275 See Ramey, supra note 22, at 65–66.
276 CHENG, STUDIES, supra note 62, at 178.
277 While the laws of war may apply, that does not necessarily mean they are
well-suited to or even adequate for outer space applications. See Freeland, supra
note 22, at 83 (“although the laws of war do (in theory) appear to apply to activi-
ties in outer space, the principles may not be specific enough to provide appro-
priate regulation for the increasingly diverse ways in which outer space could be
used during the course of armed conflict.”); see also Bourbonnie`re & Lee, Jus ad
Bellum, supra note 22; Bourbonnie`re & Lee, Legality of the Deployment, supra note
22; Ramey, supra note 22.
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interest principles govern aerospace vehicles operating therein.
But space law (and deference toward its common principles)
should not govern the issue of whether space law applies at all in
the zone. Of course, if the Outer Space Treaty articulated where
the space regime began it would be clear how it applied to de-
limitation, but it does not. Therefore, one should not assume
that space law with its unique modalities applies in the first
place—particularly, one should not assert that the deviation
from more terrestrial procedures (such as the freedom of action
for sovereign states absent a clear prohibition, as captured in the
Lotus case) would apply.
2. Analysis: Sovereignty is the Rule; Free Movement the Exception
Section B of this chapter demonstrated that there is a law, or
at least a general disposition of states, regarding their vertical
territorial claims: it is toward sovereignty ad coelum, or to the
heavens.278 This baseline disposition should be respected until it
is formally capped by those with the authority to do so: the
states.
This argument (or description of the state of the law) is prof-
fered to suggest that sovereign airspace is the default, but that
position need not be considered automatic to serve as the base-
line. Though the analysis here dates back to the Chicago Con-
vention, and before that the Paris Convention and the general
disposition of Roman law, it is not necessarily a natural law—a
way that things inherently are or must be. It can be considered
as a construct as well. But, surely, it is a construct long-accepted
and time-tested, particularly relative to outer space law. As such,
it serves as a baseline or default for measuring the legal status
quo when confronting a new or conflicting regime.279
Of course, states must recognize that their territorial claims
cannot go to infinity (as a practical matter, at least); there are
limits. Regarding an usque ad infinitum theory of sovereignty, Mc-
Mahon noted that “[s]uch a view may be more accurately char-
acterized as usque ad absurdum.”280 Oduntan expanded on this
278 See discussion at Sections III.A.2 and IV.B.1 supra.
279 This preference for the baseline is not inconsistent with the construction
norms outlined in the ILC Fragmentation Report Conclusions, supra note 263. A
central premise of this argument is that, regarding the relevant criteria, airspace
and outer space constitute distinct regimes and apply exclusively in a given area.
As such, a hierarchical approach to comparing them (that is, which one trumps
the other in a situation where both apply) is unnecessary.
280 McMahon, supra note 205, at 342.
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sentiment, similarly critiquing an overly-expansive assertion of
sovereignty into outer space.281 While it is reasonable to note the
absurdity of an overly broad view of sovereignty (well into outer
space), this critique is inapplicable here. This work concedes
that once outer space is reached, outer space law (with free
movement) would be the governing regime; so there is no pro-
jection of sovereignty into outer space. The question is where
outer space begins—the theory Oduntan addressed and dis-
missed is really not one of delimitation at all; it is better con-
strued as a denial of the application of the Outer Space Treaty
in general, which is not advocated here.
So where is the cap on assertions of sovereignty (and the air-
space regime)? The clear point is at the beginning of outer
space. As an early position of the United States on air and space
delimitation stated, “space is divided into two regions: ‘air space’
and ‘outer space.’ ‘Outer space’ is considered as contiguous to
‘air space,’ with the lower limit of ‘outer space’ being the upper
limit of ‘air space.’”282 Where one ends, the other, with its
unique regime for sovereignty and state craft, begins.
Outer space law was not a nascent law to be discovered—it
was carved out and created in a process in the mid-1960s
through the mid-to-late-1970s.283 The process was controlled
and deliberate, largely through the mechanism of the
COPUOS.284 Also, the numerous documents available from the
U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian reveal the ef-
281 In discounting what he refers to as the “Usque Ad Infinitum Theory” of de-
limitation, he stated:
It is agreed that any projection of territorial sovereignty into space
infinitum will not only violate international law, but will be incon-
sistent with basic astronomical facts. The revolution of the Earth
requires that its position in relation to space and celestial bodies is
never constant for the slightest conceivable fraction of time. Such a
projection into Space would give us a series of adjacent irregularly
shaped cones of jurisdiction, continuously moving into themselves;
with celestial bodies moving into and out of these cones ceaselessly.
In these circumstances the concept of a space cone of sovereignty is
both meaningless and a dangerous abstraction.
Oduntan, supra note 139, at 78.
282 Doc. 442. National Security Council Report: Statement of Preliminary U.S. Policy on
Outer Space, supra note 195, para. 13.
283 The Moon Agreement was signed in 1979, but its status as a controlling
space document is dubious as it has only sixteen ratifications (and an additional
four signatures). See Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, supra note 145,
at 10.
284 See CHENG, STUDIES, supra note 62, at 151 (writing in 1985 about the pro-
cess, “in the development of space law in the United Nations one witnesses in
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forts made to craft outer space law, both by the United States
and other countries.285 While the assessments are from a U.S.
point of view, they also contain assessments of other states’ (par-
ticularly the Soviet Union or key U.S. allies) positions and ef-
forts at and motivations for creating outer space law. The overall
conclusion is that outer space law was no accident—it was based
on a series of conscious decisions made by states to create it.
This supports a perspective of outer space law as a carve out
from the disposition; an exception to the rule and a cap on the
sovereignty regime of airspace.
3. Orbit as the Line
That airspace is sovereign is well-accepted among states and
scholars alike.286 The question, then, is at what line does the law
deviate from the baseline (sovereignty) to the exceptional re-
gime (freedom of use and exploration)? From the development
of outer space freedom, it appears that the line is at orbit.
a. Affirmative Evidence of Orbit as the Line
The academic and political debate of passage of satellites
dominated the discussion of outer space freedom of naviga-
tion—satellites were the breakthrough innovation that precipi-
tated the development of the outer space regime. So absent any
further guidance from the Outer Space Treaty or other source
of law, satellites (and their flight path) must be the guide point
for the differentiation between the two regimes.
Recalling the oft-quoted passage from Judge Lachs:
[T]he first instruments that men sent into outer space traversed
the air space of States and circled above them in outer space, yet
the launching States sought no permission, nor did the other
States protest. This is how the freedom of movement into outer
space, and in it, came to be established and recognized as law
within a remarkably short period of time.287
effect, in almost laboratory conditions, the birth and growth of an entirely new
branch of international law.”).
285 See generally Historical Documents: Foreign Relations of the United States, U.S.
DEP’T OF STATE, OFF. OF THE HISTORIAN, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocu-
ments [https://perma.cc/5AYB-QQLE].
286 See Section III.A.2 supra; see also COOPER, Roman Law, supra note 97, at 55.
287 North Sea Continental Shelf (Ger. v. Den., Ger. v. Neth.), Judgment, 1969
I.C.J. Rep. 3, 230 (Feb. 20) (separate opinion by Lachs, J.).
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He also later stated, “[i]t seemed therefore justified to inter-
pret their acquiescence as consent.”288 If sovereignty did not
otherwise exist where the orbital activities were taking place,
consent or acquiescence would be irrelevant. To use a law of the
sea analogy, states do not have to “permit” foreign vessels to op-
erate on the high seas (or even in exclusive economic zones)—
they are free to do so because the area of operation has been
determined to be free. So through this practice of orbit, states
recognized that there should be (and, therefore, after no pro-
tests, was) freedom of orbit.
Others have a slightly different articulation of the meaning of
the lack of protest from states over which Sputnik circled. Ac-
cording to Freeland, “[t]his international (in)action confirmed
that this new frontier of human activity did not possess the ele-
ments of sovereignty that had already been well[-]established
under the international law principles regulating land, sea, and
air[ ]space on Earth.”289 Under this view, the lack of protest did
not carve out a new area or exception to the rule; instead, it
revealed that outer space, inherently, was not subject to state
sovereignty. This may be a subtle distinction, but it could make a
difference in the analysis as to the default regime (and whether
they can be regarded along a spectrum or divided by a line).
However, even if this view is more accurate, it must be noted
that Sputnik only revealed that there is no state sovereignty
down to orbit. Below orbit, there was no such revelation of free-
dom, and the Outer Space Treaty ten years later did nothing to
expand on that position. Thus, the analysis ends up in the same
place; that is, orbit is the lowest known position of non-sover-
eignty—be it by its inherent nature or as an accepted exception
to the rule.
From a practical perspective, the U.K. Military Space Primer
analogizes orbital paths to the law of the sea and international
straits passage. By their nature, satellites cannot (reasonably)
maneuver out of their path, so they require a passage regime to
operate.290 While this is a recent articulation, it was true at the
dawn of the space age as well.
288 LACHS, supra note 64, at 126. But Lachs is not entirely clear overall that the
passage exception is a deviation from airspace law as opposed to the discovery of
a new law. See id. at 125 (describing the overflight, without consent or objection,
“like ‘a path across the common.’”). So the “common” notion could suggest a
preexisting res communis and not a forged one.
289 Freeland, supra note 22, at 88.
290 U.K. MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, supra note 63, at 2-2.
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Also, it is important that passage (whether considered “inno-
cent” or “transit,” to use the law of the sea nomenclature) must
be just that: passage.291 Many articulations of the orbital excep-
tion that underlies the outer space regime refer to it as “inno-
cent passage.” Under the law of the sea, this would preclude
offensive maneuvers as well as espionage and a host of other
activities conducted by satellites since the early years of the
space age.292 And it should be recalled that such passage for
state craft (such as warships) is unique to the sea entirely—it
does not generally apply to aircraft.293 Even if the regime is con-
strued as more akin to “transit passage,” there are still degrees of
restrictions.294 And, inherently, there still must be passage (not
loitering or operations)—thus, the overflight would be fleeting.
In orbit, states can generally be assured that satellites or orbi-
tal vehicles are conducting passive passage; that is, they are gen-
erally powered by natural forces and will only last for a short,
fleeting period (depending on the size of the subjacent state
and the relative speed of the craft). Regardless of whether states
endorse the additional activities (remote sensing, communica-
tions, etc.) conducted while passing over, it is not controlled
flight based on conscious maneuvering of the craft (aside from
being placed in orbit initially). Below orbit, however, is a zone of
controlled flight and purposeful, active operation. And many of
the future aerospace applications contemplated herein would
involve more than mere passage. Particularly with regard to state
(and especially military) craft, this is a freedom beyond what
states accepted with the first overflights, and it was no further
defined in the Outer Space Treaty or subsequent agreements.
Aside from just being less offensive to subjacent states, the dis-
tinction between passive and controlled flight also makes an im-
portant difference in the application of force. Even assuming
291 See UNCLOS, supra note 59, art. 18(2) (regarding innocent passage, “Pas-
sage shall be continuous and expeditious.”); id. art. 38(2) (“Transit passage
means the exercise . . . of the freedom of navigation and overflight solely for the
purpose of continuous and expeditious transit”).
292 See id. arts. 18–19; John Oliver, National Security and the U.N. Convention on
the Law of the Sea: U.S. Coast Guard Perspectives, 15 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 573,
585 (2009); Su, supra note 101, at 376; see also Rolph, supra note 18, at 160. Rolph
addresses whether passage must be navigationally “necessary” to be innocent. In
the context of provocative overflights by Russia, and the United States’ drive to
test territorial boundaries (in the sea), the issue could be ripe for friction in
aerospace.
293 See Sections III.A.2 and III.A.3 supra.
294 UNCLOS, supra note 59, arts. 38–39.
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that shooting down an encroaching state craft (in sovereign
space) would be legal under a targeting (that is, jus in bello) anal-
ysis in a particular circumstance, a state may have difficulty justi-
fying force against a satellite or mere passage incursion from a
jus ad bellum perspective (which, of course, must come first in
times of peace). While operations in the gray area could consti-
tute a threat or a sustained violation of sovereignty tantamount
to force or a threat thereof,295 mere fleeting passage is not likely
to be reasonably construed as an “armed attack” under Article
51 of the U.N. Charter or as a case where a “necessity of self-
defense is instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means,
and no moment for deliberation.”296 Thus, the distinction be-
tween that which is in orbit (creating the orbital line) and that
which operates below is of prudential significance.
Finally, it should be noted that it is not just “natural” move-
ment (like orbit) that triggers the peak of sovereign territory.
Recall the 1956 balloon incident between the United States and
the Soviet Union. There, the high-altitude balloons were set
adrift to travel where the winds took them. In this regard, this is
like “orbit” in that it is not really a controlled flight; it is at the
beck and call of natural forces—winds, physics, and gravity. In
some ways, balloons are even more so at the whim of natural
forces than orbits (as there are occasional corrections by satel-
lites to ensure maintenance of a particular orbit). But just being
subject to nature did not save the balloons from being regarded
(and accepted by the silence of the United States) as violating
sovereignty. Despite the changes in technology and world polit-
ics since this 1956 incident (or the 1960 U-2 shoot-down), practi-
cally little has changed in the law. A 2005 U.S. Air Force analysis
of high-altitude balloons (operating in near space), as com-
295 This particularly could be the case from the perspective of a state asserting
a preemptive self-defense right. See Section II.B.1 supra.
296 See Miller, supra note 25; see also Murphy, supra note 22, at 711 (discussing
the Caroline incident in the context of anticipatory self-defense). But see Turkey’s
Downing of Russian Warplane—What We Know, supra note 46 (even by Turkish ac-
counts, the incursion by two Russian jets resulting in a shoot-down by Turkish
forces was at most “2.19 [kilometers] (1.36 miles) and 1.85 [kilometers] (1.15
miles) into Turkey for 17 seconds” over a small peninsula of Turkish sovereignty
jutting into Syria.). This may reveal that some states are less inclined toward def-
erence to fleeting passage, at least in the context of heightened concerns (and
sensitivity) over respect for borders. See Letter from Y. Halit Cevik, supra note 47
(noting six prior complaints by Turkey at the U.N. Security Council for violations
of its territorial integrity).
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pared to satellites, supports the idea of an expansive upward ex-
tent of sovereignty, particularly from incursion by military craft:
So, if satellites are so expensive and so nonresponsive and if they
are physically unable to provide persistence, why, then, do we
buy them at all? The answer today is the same as it has been since
the 1950s—freedom of overflight. The importance of freedom of
overflight cannot be overemphasized as a positive aspect of orbi-
tal operations. Satellites are the only legal means by which over-
head ISR can be performed deep inside the territory of sovereign
nations during peacetime.297
So only when hostilities commence (and the territorial integ-
rity of an enemy belligerent is no longer respected) would near-
space usage be appropriate under this analysis. The 1956 inci-
dent and this more recent analysis demonstrate that states are
not willing to allow just any high-altitude incursion due to natu-
ral paths—the allowance is unique to orbit, making it a distinc-
tion in practice; that is, a line.
b. The Lack of Contrary Evidence
There is a dearth of evidence to contradict the assertion of
orbit as the line of demarcation between airspace and outer
space as it pertains to sovereignty. There is no conventional law
on point.298 Regarding state practice, there is a similar lack of
297 Ed Tomme & Sigfred Dahl, Balloons in Today’s Military? An Introduction to the
Near-Space Concept, XIX AIR & SPACE POWER J. 39, 48 (2005).
298 In fact, a recent attempt at conventional law demonstrates the lack of con-
sensus as to a fixed definition of outer space and actually bolsters the notion of
an orbital definition as a more widely acceptable one. The 2008 draft of the
Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space and the
Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space Objects (PPWT), explicitly defined
“outer space” as “the space above the Earth in excess of 100 [kilometers] above
sea level.” Draft Treaty on Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer
Space and of the Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space Objects, Feb. 29,
2008, http://www.cfr.org/space/treaty-prevention-placement-weapons-outer-
space-threat-use-force-against-outer-space-objects-ppwt/p26678 [https://perma
.cc/25MS-99JB] [hereinafter 2008 Draft PPWT]. However, the 2014 draft PPWT
removed this provision, or any reference to a specific definition of “outer space.”
Draft Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space, the
Threat or Use of Force Against Outer Space Objects, June 10, 2014, http://
reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/cd/2014/docu-
ments/PPWT2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/G9VX-9BEX] [hereinafter 2014 Draft
PPWT]. This omission was made to address “some of the criticism and concerns”
with the 2008 version and to make it more widely acceptable. Id.; see SPACE SECUR-
ITY INDEX 2015, at 109 (Anna Jaikaran ed., 2015). Still, in this attempt at making
the 2014 PPWT more palatable, it added an orbit-based definition of “placed in
outer space” at Article I(c): “a device is considered as ‘placed in outer space’
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activity to contradict the idea that states are entitled to sover-
eignty up to the point of orbit, both in international pronounce-
ments and in state domestic laws.
Many have argued for a right of passage to and from outer
space through airspace. This could form the seeds of a function-
alist mode of operation below orbit for outer space craft. Ac-
cording to Lachs, the “right of innocent passage should on
principle be attributed to all States without discrimination.”299
However, this is still an assertion of what should be versus what
is. Instead, it is at best unclear whether transit passage is allowed
in airspace to reach outer space.300
This is because the matter has not been tested in reality—
there is no state practice. The United States and European
Space Agency launches generally take place in locations that do
not require overflight of sovereign territory (just the launching
state, or the high seas). Further, discussing Kazakhstan (home
of the primary Russian launch site) and in general, Benko¨ and
Plescher stated:
[W]e would like to emphasize that passage through foreign terri-
tory for the purpose of reaching orbit is not necessary . . . and has
never been practi[c]ed without consultation of foreign States po-
tentially affected. As to the passage of re-entering spacecraft no cur-
rent practice is known either in this respect, since the U.S. Space
Shuttle, which has been the only operational system for decades,
which could have affected passage, does not have to pass through
foreign airspace under regular (non-accident) conditions. As to
the Shuttle’s emergency landing sites on foreign territory, agree-
ments have been concluded . . . so that these cases are not rele-
vant for international practice or customary law.301
While these are typically state vehicles, making them more of-
fensive from an airspace perspective, the rights of civilian craft
remain unclear as well.302 In the 1990s, Russia passed a law al-
when it orbits the Earth at least once, or follows a section of such an orbit before
leaving orbit, or is placed at any location in outer space or on any celestial body
other than Earth.” 2014 Draft PPWT, supra, art. I.
299 LACHS, supra note 64, at 57.
300 Stephan Hobe, Airspace, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 20 (2008), http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199
231690/law-9780199231690-e1138 [https://perma.cc/3EA3-3XKH].
301 BENKO¨ & PLESCHER, supra note 5, at 34 (emphasis in original).
302 For instance, the Google Loon project, a commercial endeavor to provide
high-altitude balloon-based internet service, is seeking clearances and approvals
from states to operate at around 20 kilometers (12 miles). See What is Project Loon,
supra note 10; Zacks Equity Res., Google’s Project Loon to Beam 3G Across Sri Lanka?,
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lowing for a foreign craft to “execute a single inoffensive flight
through the airspace of the Russian Federation for the purpose
of” reaching or returning from outer space.303 However, if Rus-
sia is empowered to limit it to one such flight, that is a clear
indicator that they retain sovereignty over the zone vis-a`-vis such
space-bound craft in subsequent flights. As such, it is a one-time
exception that further proves the rule. So, overall, there has
been no practice from which a customary norm either lowering
the spatial ceiling on sovereignty or creating a functionalist ex-
ception thereto could have emerged.
Similarly, there is little in the way of consistency of state posi-
tions to demonstrate an inchoate opinio juris (which may be an
indicator of how states will or would act to formulate a custom of
international law). This is best demonstrated by the COPUOS
questionnaires on the matter and the responses thereto.304 For
delimitation in general, states were asked:
(i) Does your Government consider it necessary to define outer
space and/or to delimit airspace and outer space, given the cur-
rent level of space and aviation activities and technological devel-
opment in space and aviation technologies?
(ii) Does your Government consider another approach to solv-
ing this issue?
(iii) Does your Government give consideration to the possibility
of defining a lower limit of outer space and/or an upper limit of
airspace, recognizing at the same time the possibility of enacting
special international or national legislation relating to a mission
carried out by an object in both airspace and outer space?305
Regarding the “possible legal issues with regard to aerospace ob-
jects,” states were asked:
Question 1. Can an aerospace object be defined as an object
which is capable both of travelling through outer space and of
YAHOO! FIN. (July 31, 2015) http://finance.yahoo.com/news/googles-project-
loon-beam-3g-195207177.html [https://perma.cc/9WYX-543D].
303 BENKO¨ & PLESCHER, supra note 5, at 33–34; LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 174,
at 172–73, n.82.
304 The COPUOS Legal Subcommittee (LSC) posts responses to its state ques-
tionnaires on delimitation, aerospace vehicles, and other matters online, on a
rolling basis, generally grouped as responses are presented. See generally Legal Sub-
committee: 2015, Session Documents, U.N. OFF. FOR OUTER SPACE AFFS., http://www
.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/copuos/lsc/2015/index.html [https://perma
.cc/PX7V-Z9TC].
305 Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Rep. of the Legal Subcomm.
on Its Fifty-Third Session, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/1067, at 40 (2014), http://www
.unoosa.org/pdf/reports/ac105/AC105_1067E.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q7M7-
VP68].
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using its aerodynamic properties to remain in airspace for a cer-
tain period of time?
Question 2. Does the regime applicable to the flight of aero-
space objects differ according to whether it is located in airspace
or outer space?
Question 3. Are there special procedures for aerospace objects,
considering the diversity of their functional characteristics, the
aerodynamic properties and space technologies used and their
design features, or should a single or unified regime be devel-
oped for such objects?
Question 4. Are aerospace objects while in airspace considered
as aircraft, and while in outer space as spacecraft, with all the
legal consequences that follow therefrom, or does either air law
or space law prevail during the flight of an aerospace craft, de-
pending on the destination of such a flight?
Question 5. Are the take-off and landing phases specially distin-
guished in the regime for an aerospace object as involving a dif-
ferent degree of regulation from entry into airspace from outer
space orbit and subsequent return to that orbit?
Question 6. Are the norms of national and international air law
applicable to an aerospace object of one State while it is in the
airspace of another State?
Question 7. Are there precedents with respect to the passage of
aerospace objects during take-off and/or re-entry into the
Earth’s atmosphere, and does customary international law exist
with respect to such passage?
Question 8. Are there any national and/or international legal
norms with respect to the passage of aerospace objects during
take-off and/or re-entry into the Earth’s atmosphere?
Question 9. Are the rules concerning the registration of objects
launched into outer space applicable to aerospace objects?
Question 10. What are the differences between the legal regimes
of airspace and outer space?306
306 Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Analytical Summary of the
Replies to the Questionnaire on Possible Legal Issues with Regard to Aerospace
Objects of the Legal Subcomm. on Its Forty-Sixth Session, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/
C.2/L.249/Add.2 (2007), http://www.unoosa.org/pdf/limited/c2/AC105_C2_
L249Add2E.pdf [https://perma.cc/CT3E-423S]. Similarly, regarding suborbital
flights and their effects, states were asked:
(i) Is there a relationship between suborbital flights for scientific
missions and/or for human transportation and the definition and
delimitation of outer space?
(ii) Will the legal definition of suborbital flights for scientific mis-
sions and/or for human transportation be practically useful for
States and other actors with regard to space activities?
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A survey of state responses to each of these questionnaires
reveals that states accept the distinction of airspace and outer
space and the importance of respect for sovereignty, but it also
shows a great lack of consistency in substantive answers to the
question of the international law with regard to delimitation.307
With the wide-ranging responses, the only real consensus
reached in each report on delimitation and aerospace vehicles
was that the COPUOS would continue to address the issues.
State responses regarding domestic laws defining outer space
are equally unavailing as to state consistency.308 The U.N. Office
for Outer Space Affairs (UNOOSA) posts relevant legislation
online; however, only twenty-two states provide national legisla-
tion at all, and few of those elect to define or delimit the mean-
ing or scope of “outer space.”309 One oft-cited domestic
determination of “outer space” comes from Australia, which in
various definitions of terms for its Space Activities Act of 1998
refers to 100 kilometers as a line of demarcation.310 But Austra-
lia explicitly denied that this was a definition of “outer space”
and asserted that there is no international law as to delimitation;
instead, the Space Activities Act is said to be designed merely to
provide the intended scope of domestic regulation (without ex-
(iii) How will the legal definition of suborbital flights for scientific
missions and/or for human transportation impact the progressive
development of space law?
(iv) Please propose other questions to be considered in the frame-
work of the legal definition of suborbital flights for scientific mis-
sions and/or for human transportation.
Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Rep. of the Legal Subcomm. on Its
Fifty-First Session, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/1003, at 35 (2012), http://www.unoosa
.org/pdf/reports/ac105/AC105_1003E.pdf [https://perma.cc/RM5U-HT2W].
307 See Su, supra note 101, at 371 (discussing lack of consensus in COPUOS on
innocent passage of aerospace vehicles); see also BENKO¨ & PLESCHER, supra note 5;
KAYSER, supra note 171, at 45 n.97.
308 See Su, supra note 101, at 361–63.
309 Space Law: National Space Law Database, U.N. OFF. FOR OUTER SPACE AFFS.,
http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/spacelaw/nationalspacelaw/index
.html [https://perma.cc/EV5N-SWZM].
310 Space Activities Act 1998 (Cth) pt 2 sch 8 (Austl.), https://www.comlaw
.gov.au/Details/C2013C00462 [https://perma.cc/5F29-P95L] (using above 100
kilometers as the threshold for space in definitions of “launch,” “launch vehicle,”
“return,” and “space object”). Similarly, European Union Regulation No. 388/
2012, in the context of export controls, defined “space-qualified” products as
those “designed, manufactured and tested to meet the special electrical, mechan-
ical or environmental requirements for use in the launch and deployment of
satellites or high-altitude flight systems operating at altitudes of 100 km or
higher.” Council Regulation 388/2012, 2012 O.J. (L 129) 31 (EC); see Comm. on
the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, supra note 305, at 39.
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ternal effect).311 Other states, such as South Africa312 and
Belgium,313 focus on orbit as the trigger for outer space and
outer space activities. However, while these domestic assertions
bolster the validity of orbit as the line (as offered as a default, or
“safe,” position here), there are simply too few for them, alone,
to provide evidence of an emerging norm.
Though only signed by eight states, the Declaration of the
First Meeting of Equatorial Countries of 1976 (Bogota Declara-
tion) presents an interesting potential counterpoint to the idea
that orbit is the line as a matter of opinio juris.314 The assertion of
sovereignty at such a high altitude may seem odd at first, espe-
cially in the context of what is settled in the delimitation debate.
But the Bogota Declaration actually reveals a kernel of difficulty
in the orbital-based analysis of the system. GEO is definitely an
orbit by any scientific definition. But, it is unlike an orbit in a
sovereignty context. That is, a satellite moving in a geostationary
orbit (a GEO with zero eccentricity along the equator) appears
to be stationary vis-a`-vis a particular point on Earth because the
speed of orbit matches the relative rotational speed of the Earth
along its axis.315 In effect, it seems like an object at any other
altitude that is able to loiter in a given position.316 This flies con-
trary to the disposition of orbits that steered the acceptance of
311 U.N. Secretariat, National Legislation and Practice Relating to Definition
and Delimitation of Outer Space, Note by the Secretariat, para. 2, Comm. on the
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/865/Add.1 (Mar. 20, 2006),
http://www.unoosa.org/pdf/reports/ac105/AC105_865Add1E.pdf [https://per
ma.cc/2SMC-UT7F] (“There is no definition of ‘outer space’ in domestic Austra-
lian law and Australia recognizes that there is no internationally accepted defini-
tion or delimitation of the term . . . .”); id. para. 6. (“The 100-[kilometer] altitude
represents a practical clarification of where the Act applies. The 100-[kilometer]
altitude was not an attempt on Australia’s part to define or delimit ‘outer
space.’”).
312 Space Affairs Act of 1993 art. 1 (S. Afr.) (“‘outer space’ means the space
above the surface of the earth from a height at which it is in practice possible to
operate an object in an orbit around the earth”).
313 Loi relative aux activite´s de lancement, d’ope´ration de vol ou de guidage
d’objets spatiaux [Law on the Activities of Launching, Flight Operations or Gui-
dance of Space Objects] of Sept. 17, 2005, MONITEUR BELGE [M.B.] [Official Ga-
zette of Belgium], Mar. 19, 2008, 19520, http://www.belspo.be/belspo/space/
doc/beLaw/Loi_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/FGB5-8NWV] (Article 3 states that
“‘space object’ means, . . . any object launched or intended to be launched, on
an orbital trajectory around the Earth or to a destination beyond the earth
orbit”).
314 See Bogota Declaration, supra note 141.
315 See Basics of Space Flight Section I, Chapter 5: Planetary Orbits, NASA, http://
www2.jpl.nasa.gov/basics/bsf5-1.php [https://perma.cc/35JM-EETK].
316 See Pelton, Geosynchronous, supra note 10.
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the orbital exception to sovereignty, namely the inevitability of
their crossing borders by their nature. From an upward projec-
tion of state borders, a satellite in GEO would not appear to be
crossing any horizontal boundaries in its flight. Based on this
“link” to an equatorial point on Earth, the eight equatorial states
declared GEO as part of their territory and not outer space.317
The Bogota Declaration supports the notion that state sover-
eignty could, in theory and absent contrary agreement, extend
fairly deep into outer space, a major premise of this work. But it
also undermines the notion that states have actually conceded
claims of sovereignty at orbit. If this was a dominant view of
states, it would be problematic for the argument. However, the
assertion of the Bogota Declaration has been rejected by most
all other states, so it does not form any contrary or clear law.318
Also, even if accepted, its premise is not controlling on the gray
area discussion here—geographically, it falls well within the set-
tled area of outer space law, so its application would not illumi-
nate a line between air and space so much as undermine the
entire outer space regime in general. And that is beyond the
intended argument made here.
4. Conclusion: Orbit is the Division Point
Overall, orbital passage is the exception to the rule of sover-
eignty; it is the starting point for the new regime, which allows
free movement above sovereign airspace. In the absence of clear
rules or modifications to the baseline regime of sovereignty, air-
space law should be assumed as the governing law. There is no
known, clear exception for loitering or operating in upper air-
space. The U.S. Space Shuttle sought permission; Google Loon
is seeking permission; and the U.S. Air Force near-space balloon
program is awaiting a time when sovereignty is not respected.
Along these lines, emerging aerospace vehicles should seek per-
mission to operate.
317 Bogota Declaration, supra note 141 (“Equatorial countries declare that the
geostationary synchronous orbit is a physical fact linked to the reality of our
planet because its existence depends exclusively on its relation to gravitational
phenomena generated by the earth, and that is why it must not be considered
part of the outer space. Therefore, the segments of geostationary synchronous
orbit are part of the territory over which Equatorial states exercise their national
sovereignty.”).
318 See CHENG, STUDIES, supra note 62, at 455; Oduntan, supra note 139, at 76;
Section III.B.1 supra.
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D. COMMENSURABILITY AND THE SECURITY SPECTRUM
Despite the argument above, it is possible that there simply is
not a positivist solution to the problem; perhaps there is no line
between air and space—both regimes coexist in aerospace and
both must be respected. The domains could be incommensura-
ble—that is, they cannot be compared and may both exist at the
same time in the same zone of operations. Thus, there would be
no clear solution for states considering the use of force to de-
fend sovereign territory (absent creating a sui generis regime that
contains a solution).
While this may be a legal possibility, it poses grave practical
challenges. For the reasons discussed previously as to why sover-
eignty matters and the potential stakes of territorial overflight by
state vehicles, states require clarity on which law applies. In the
mind of a decision maker with a binary choice (attack or not
attack), there must be a definitive answer—either an overflight
is or is not a violation of sovereignty; it cannot be both legal and
illegal at the same time.319
This section explores a commensurability argument for the
delimitation of airspace and outer space, employing state secur-
ity as the common metric by which the regimes are measured
and integrated for assessment. This security interest is evident
around the operation and applications of satellites and their or-
bit; so as with the above analysis, orbit is the pivot point in the
security nexus between air and space. Anything below orbit is a
potential threat, and free operation is contrary to security inter-
ests. Anything in or above orbit could be a threat, but states de-
termined that for security, anything operating there is better off
as free. Essentially, this commensurability continuum examines
the means and the ends to state goals in airspace and outer
space: security is the end, and the regime in a particular area is
the means.
This section first discusses commensurability in general and
how its use here is an analytical method. Then it explores how
law and politics intersect to create legal regimes that affect na-
319 Certainly, one could argue that—if both regimes applied at the same
time—the proper answer would be not to use force if there was question as to the
actual nature of a threat or incursion; the laws of war should be read to presume
that force is not appropriate in the absence of a clear armed attack or threat that
is “instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment for delib-
eration.” Miller, supra note 25. However, the counter to this is the argument ar-
ticulated above—that in the absence of clarity as to the one ruling regime, the
default position is one of state sovereignty.
472 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE [81
tional interests (here, security). Then it establishes the promi-
nence of the security interest in the development of both air
and space law. From there, it compares the two regimes to re-
veal that the break in the security interest (and hence the break
in the legal order in the regimes) falls at orbit. As such, orbit
should be considered the effective line between airspace and
outer space.
1. Commensurability as an Analytical Method
Two items are incommensurable when they cannot be as-
sessed under a common metric.320 If two notions are incommen-
surable, “you cannot conclude anything about their respective
merits” and you cannot make a normative judgement as to
which is preferable or better.321 As such, commensurability can
provide the normative guidance on an issue that the strict posi-
tivist approach explained above may not. However, if the re-
gimes cannot be valued properly, it may suggest that they
actually coexist along separate metrics in the same place. That
is, the gray area between air and space is so because it is both
black and white at the same time.
This work could be viewed as an improper analysis of com-
mensurability—it assumes that there is a conventional (not an
incommensurable) answer. In particular, it assumes that there is
a line between airspace and outer space to provide greater ex-
planation of where that line is.322 This is fair critique, which the
author will not dispute. Indeed, the commensurability concept
is used as a tool to find harmony in the seemingly disparate (or
incompatible) regimes.323
320 Ruth Chang, Value Incomparability and Incommensurability, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF VALUE THEORY 205, 206 (2015) (“If two values cannot be measured
by a cardinal unit, they are incommensurable”); Cass Sunstein, Incommensurability
and Valuation in Law, 92 MICH. L. REV. 779, 796 (1994) (“Incommensurability
occurs when the relevant goods cannot be aligned along a single metric without
doing violence to our considered judgments about how these goods are best
characterized.”).
321 H. PATRICK GLENN, LEGAL TRADITIONS OF THE WORLD: SUSTAINABLE DIVER-
SITY IN LAW 46 (5th ed. 2014).
322 This dichotomy (this or that) is what Glenn refers to as “bivalent thought,”
or an issue that “involves an initial dichotomy or bivalence but is univalent in the
end result.” Id. at 368. While he critiques this type of thought, he also notes that
it “is behind much of the construction of the western world (and is ferociously
defended).” Id. at 370.
323 But see Sunstein, supra note 320, at 803–04, 860 (warning against oversimpli-
fication of the metric or the ends of the valuation). Also, as Endicott warns,
“[i]dentifying a single criterion does not eliminate incommensurability if the ap-
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However, two points are relevant. First, as discussed below, an
argument can be made that the regimes are indeed actually
commensurable (that is, the assumption is valid). When two val-
ues are commensurable, the analysis provides guidance as to the
normative framework for that compatible end. Second, even if
some may find that they are incommensurable in a legal labora-
tory, practical concerns dictate that there be some fairly clear
delimitation between airspace and outer space. That is because
in the context of the use of force and establishing sovereignty,
states (and operational or tactical level actors) need some de-
gree of certainty as to what actions are appropriate or author-
ized.324 Simply put, having no answer is not adequate. Sunstein
and Endicott accept this practical consideration in their expres-
sions of incommensurability and its uses. Even if two values are
incommensurable, a decision maker must step in to reconcile
them.325 In so doing, that decision maker can use a balance of
competing values that best suits the people for whom he or she
is deciding.326 So whether the airspace and outer space regimes
are commensurable, the analysis will provide guidance as to how
they should interrelate.
In this context it is useful to assume that the two regimes are
commensurable as the idea that they were formed with a unify-
ing purpose may shed light on where the divergence between
notions of sovereignty and state versus civil craft may lie. In as-
sessing the interaction and interpretation between a regime of
lex specialis and general law, or among potentially applicable leges
speciales, the ILC concluded: “The principle of harmonization. It
is a generally accepted principle that when several norms bear
on a single issue they should, to the extent possible, be inter-
preted so as to give rise to a single set of compatible obliga-
plication of the criterion depends on considerations that are themselves incom-
mensurable.” Timothy Endicott, Proportionality and Incommensurability, in
PROPORTIONALITY AND THE RULE OF LAW: RIGHTS, JUSTIFICATION, REASONING
311–342, 318 (Grant Huscroft et. al., eds., 2014).
324 See Section III.C supra. Of course, while “ground level” individuals merely
execute policy, their rules of engagement and authorizations for the use of force
will be governed by state-level determinations as to the status of the law of delimi-
tation. But the importance of not just the policy but also how it is executed
should not be overlooked.
325 Endicott, supra note 323, at 324–25 (discussing how judges must make deci-
sions between incommensurable values and how that is part of the rule of law
and not a departure therefrom); Sunstein, supra note 320, at 857.
326 Sunstein, supra note 320, at 857 (“choice among incommensurables is an
act of interpretation, one that involves a dimension of fidelity to the past, but that
is also constructive.”).
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tions.”327 In sum, this analysis seeks out the “single set of
compatible obligations” that can unify the regimes into a com-
mon interest or metric.
2. The Intersection of Politics and Law: Deriving Order from Chaos
A brief discussion of the nexus of law and politics is appropri-
ate for the assessment of the development of the outer space
regime out of the airspace regime. This explains how the com-
mensurability assessment contained herein is generally consis-
tent with the conservative, positivist approach taken above,
despite the idea that an overarching regime may suggest states
have ceded some degree of power for a larger (and collective)
goal.328
Fawcett said that “law is at best a servant of power and at worst
a mere whitewashing of policy.”329 He continued, “ ‘Foreign pol-
icy like all politics is in its essence a struggle for power, waged by
sovereign nations for material advantage.’ Conflict must then be
seen in terms of relative power, and not ‘conceived in absolute
terms of peace, law and order versus aggression, crime and anar-
chy.’”330 This notion, particularly the view of law as an extension
of political struggle among states, bears resemblance in princi-
pal to the often-quoted Clausewitz assertion that war is merely
an extension of politics.331 Also, it makes for interesting compar-
ison to the concept of “lawfare,” where the perception of adher-
ence to (or deviation from) laws of war can be employed by
belligerents in a conflict—essentially, law as an extension of war
by other means.332
Thus, as discussed above, the view of political realism, realpo-
litik, legal positivism, or any other term for a focus on the pri-
327 ILC Fragmentation Report Conclusions, supra note 263, at 8.
328 See Arthur Stein, Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchic World,
in INTERNATIONAL REGIMES 115, 140 (Stephen D. Krasner ed., 1983) (“The exis-
tence of regimes is fully consistent with a realist view of international politics in
which states are seen as sovereign and self-reliant. Yet it is the very autonomy of
states and their self-interests that lead them to create regimes confronting
dilemmas.”).
329 JAMES FAWCETT, LAW AND POWER IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 35 (1982).
330 Id. (quoting HANS MORGENTHAU, IN DEFENSE OF THE NATIONAL INTEREST: A
CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 101 (1951)).
331 See CLAUSEWITZ, supra note 32.
332 See generally CHARLES DUNLAP, LAW AND MILITARY INTERVENTIONS: PRESERV-
ING HUMANITARIAN VALUES IN 21ST CENTURY CONFLICTS (2001); About Lawfare: A
Brief History of the Term and the Site, LAWFARE BLOG, http://www.lawfareblog.com/
about-lawfare-brief-history-term-and-site [https://perma.cc/P87J-TXGB].
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macy of states (and their self-interest) in international law seems
apt for discerning the regime governing gray space as the meet-
ing point of airspace and outer space law. Where one can find
consensus, one can draw a line. As Fawcett stated, the interna-
tional law with true potency is that which:
[E]mbraces rules and obligations, recognized in long practice or
specific agreements, and codes of conduct or harmonization of
policies serving common interests. There are particular common
interests both in predictability of behaviour in international rela-
tions and in the observance of at least minimum standards; no
national interest can be secured without them. . . . In sum, law
cannot itself create order in international relations, but emerges
as a fact of life where there are minimum degrees of order, which
it may serve to rationalize and extend.333
Law (such as the regime for outer space) derives from state
consensus on substantive issues of order. As outer space law
emerged (or was created—both concepts could be argued), it
should be read only to have done so to the degree that it serves
the common interests of states.334 To read more into the law
would go beyond the consensus that drove its creation in the
first place.
Schwarzenberger also reflects the need for order as a precur-
sor to the creation of law. In writing about the law of war partic-
ularly, he stated:
In the present equilibrium between the requirements of the stan-
dard of civilisation and the destructive potentialities of war, what
is needed above all is a thorough readjustment of priorities of
self-interest, especially among the super-Powers. This calls, in the
first place, for a measure of agreement on the identification of
the chief enemies of civilisation, and two of these are surely vio-
lence and chaos on any major scale anywhere in the world.335
So as there is an established legal order for both airspace and
outer space, it must have derived from space-faring states (or all
states) agreeing on what was needed—at least to prevent “vio-
333 FAWCETT, supra note 329, at 119.
334 While Fawcett did not discuss space, the ITU and ICAO are relevant exam-
ples of this phenomenon, both substantively and topically. They create regulatory
regimes in their respective areas but only do what they have to do to meet their
goals of the regulation of the necessities. To the degree that they reach beyond
their conservative pillars (essentially safety and providing an organizational struc-
ture for regulation) and into contentious zones, the less likely they will be re-
garded as binding on states with other options.
335 GEORG SCHWARZENBERGER, THE DYNAMICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 90
(1976).
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lence and chaos” above the world. From those roots, perhaps
greater order may grow; and from that order more consensus
(and law) will reveal itself through agreement or practice.336 As
Fawcett submits, from that order there can emerge law to “ra-
tionalize and extend” it.337
Schwarzenberger cautioned that international law “is an in-
strument of social control” and not “a self-executing system
which operates in a social vacuum. Whether it serves civili[z]ing
processes or trends in the opposite direction depends on its sub-
jects in the double meaning of the term.”338 This is somewhat
more pessimistic than simply assuming the broader interna-
tional order is for good purposes. It is assumed that the com-
mon interest discussed below, security, is a positive
development. However, for purposes of the analysis based on
what it is (and not whether it is a good or bad thing), the net
effect of the shared concern is largely irrelevant.
3. A Unified Metric
Given the great focus over the years (and in this work) on the
vital differences between airspace and outer space law and the
push in the legal literature to divide air and space, it may seem
difficult to imagine that they may fall under one common met-
ric or regime. However, viewing air and space law with consis-
tency and fluidity is not a new phenomenon. Cooper advocated
for a unified approach to air and space law in the early 1960s,
well before the Outer Space Treaty established space as its own
legal domain.339 These positions were not inconsistent with ac-
336 This may be evidenced in the rolling progress of the COPUOS through the
1960s and mid-1970s with the production of the 1968 Rescue Agreement, the
1972 Liability Convention, and the 1975 Registration Convention; the lack of pro-
gress since—with the dearth of “hard law” since and the emergence of “soft law”
and guidelines as the dominant mechanisms for space governance—may also be
evidence of a lack of consensus and international order. See Jakhu & Freeland,
supra note 144, at 466, 472.
337 FAWCETT, supra note 329, at 119.
338 SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 335, at 90.
339 Though the Institute over which he presided is called the Institute of Air
and Space Law, Cooper advocated for a single, unified legal regime of Aerospace
Law, “which would govern and regulate:
First:
a)  Aerospace, being the earth’s envelope of air and the space
above it, the two considered as a single realm for activity in the
flight of air vehicles and in the launching, guidance, and control of
ballistic missiles, earth satellites, dirigible space vehicles, and the
like;
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ceptance that airspace and outer space should be treated differ-
ently in some ways (or even delineated), as evidenced by the
numerous contemporaneous writings of Cooper.340 Similarly,
early in the space age, the U.S. Air Force Chief of Staff advo-
cated for a unified regime of aerospace: “Since there is no divid-
ing line, no natural barrier separating these two areas (air and
space), there can be no operational boundary between them.
Thus air and space comprise a single continuous operational
field in which the Air Force must continue to function. The area
is aerospace.”341 With the emergence of aerospace vehicles,
which effectively eliminate any operational lines between air and
space, the statement remains apt today.
The prevention of use of weapons of mass destruction is an
example of a unified or transcendent approach as evidenced in
the 1963 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmos-
phere, in Outer Space and Under Water (Partial Test Ban
Treaty).342 This Treaty broadly precludes nuclear explosions, for
tests or otherwise, in Article I:
b)  Its relationship to land and water areas on the surface of the
earth;
c)  The extent and character of the rights of individuals and States
to use or control such space, or parts thereof, or celestial bodies
therein, for flight or other purposes;
Second:
a)  Flight;
b)  The instrumentalities with which flight is effected, including
their nationality, ownership, use or control;
c)  The surface facilities used in connexion with flight, such as air-
ports, other launching or landing areas, navigation facilities and
airways;
Third:
a)  The relationships of every kind affecting or between individuals,
communities or States arising from the existence or use of the area
of flight (aerospace), or the instrumentalities or facilities used in
connexion therewith or to make flight effective.”
JOHN C. COOPER, Aerospace Law and Power, in EXPLORATIONS IN AEROSPACE LAW:
SELECTED ESSAYS OF JOHN COBB COOPER, 1946-1966, supra note 93, at 51. While
this was written before the Outer Space Treaty cemented the differences in the
concepts of sovereignty in airspace and outer space, the utility of such an ap-
proach remains today as we address vehicles that only blur the purported lines
between the zones.
340 See generally EXPLORATIONS IN AEROSPACE LAW: SELECTED ESSAYS OF JOHN
COBB COOPER, 1946-1966, supra note 93.
341 See DELBERT TERRILL, JR., THE AIR FORCE ROLE IN DEVELOPING INTERNA-
TIONAL OUTER SPACE LAW 38–39 (2004) (quoting U.S. Air Force Chief of Staff
General Thomas White in 1959).
342 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space
and Under Water, Aug. 5, 1963, 480 U.N.T.S. 43 [hereinafter 1963 Partial Test
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Each of the Parties to this Treaty undertakes to prohibit, to pre-
vent, and not to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion, or
any other nuclear explosion, at any place under its jurisdiction or
control:
in the atmosphere; beyond its limits, including outer space; or
under water, including territorial waters or high seas; or
in any other environment if such explosion causes radioactive
debris to be present outside the territorial limits of the State
under whose jurisdiction or control such explosion is
conducted. . . .343
Thus, in the interest of the object of the Treaty, states apply it
to the air and space as a continuous zone—there is a unified
regime that transcends any demarcation between air and space.
Here, states elected to impose a complete ban on nuclear explo-
sions in all relevant zones to this end. This makes sense, as the
effects of nuclear explosions in airspace or outer space (as well
as “under water” or “any place under [a state’s] jurisdiction or
control”) would broadly affect states; that is, like national secur-
ity, it does not only affect a state’s air or space (or sea) interests.
The unified approach does not just apply to use of force is-
sues. Other aspects of air and space law demonstrate this fluid-
ity. For instance, consider discussions of traffic management344
(seeking uniformity and fluidity between air and space, and in
aerospace—because, from a safety standpoint, it does not really
matter where a craft is heading if it collides with another) and
Ban Treaty] (entered into force on Oct. 10, 1963). The Treaty has 105 signatories
and 126 States Parties. Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in
Outer Space and Under Water, U.N. OFF. FOR DISARMAMENT AFFS., http://disarma-
ment.un.org/treaties/t/test_ban [https://perma.cc/GJE7-B99M]. The 1996
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) contains the same prohibition,
applicable to every party everywhere (no underground exceptions or the like).
See Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty art. I, Sept. 24, 1996, 35 I.L.M. 1439
(not entered into force). However, while the CTBT has been even more widely
adopted, with 183 signatories and 163 ratifications, it has not entered into force.
Who We Are, CTBTO PREPATORY COMM’N, https://www.ctbto.org/specials/who-
we-are/ [https://perma.cc/ZNF7-EW7Q] (stating that “44 specific nuclear tech-
nology holder countries must sign and ratify before the CTBT can enter into
force. Of these, eight are still missing: China, Egypt, India, Iran, Israel, North
Korea, Pakistan[,] and the [United States]. India, North Korea[,] and Pakistan
have yet to sign the CTBT.”).
343 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty, supra note 342, art. I.
344 See generally REGULATION OF EMERGING MODES OF AEROSPACE TRANSPORTA-
TION (Ram Jakhu & Kuan-Wei Chen eds., 2014); THE NEED FOR AN INTEGRATED
REGULATORY REGIME FOR AVIATION AND SPACE, supra note 79.
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criminal jurisdiction345 (the flag of the vessel concept dominates
both regimes). Surface damage liability may be an outlier as a
divided, different area, but even those regimes can be assessed
and compared in a context of insurance law.346 The idea of di-
verse aspects or even different legal regimes within one broader
framework is not foreign to other areas of the law either. The
Law of the Sea is one regime, but it has disparate rules for terri-
torial seas (with additional rules for straits and archipelagic
states), contiguous zones, exclusive economic zones, and the
high seas. Air and space law are no exception; there are and can
be lines within one system or construct.
The key aspect of a regime is that it has principles, and as
long as those are consistent as to the fundamentals, the regime
is strong.347 The regime’s rules or outcomes may change, but it
remains true to itself as long as the underlying principles re-
main. However, there is a weakening (or elimination) of the re-
gime if there is waffling in the principles and fundamentals.348
Certainly, airspace and outer space law are strikingly different
with regard to sovereignty (in their current constructs) and with
regard to concern for state versus civil craft. But that does not
mean they must be opposed or regarded as different or incom-
mensurable on every axis. A broader context—beyond just air
law or space law as niche categories—exposes that a broader in-
terest that has guided the development of both regimes is an
interest in security. And this interest remains consistent in both.
So the issue is one of context and framing, making the commen-
345 See Tokyo Convention, supra note 166; Stephen Gorove, Criminal Jurisdiction
in Outer Space, 6 INT’L LAWYER 313 (1972); Hans P. Sinha, Criminal Jurisdiction on
the International Space Station, 30 J. SPACE L. 86 (2004); CHENG, STUDIES, supra note
62, at 478.
346 Compare Convention on Damage Caused by Foreign Aircraft to Third Par-
ties on the Surface, Oct. 7, 1952, 24 U.S.T. 2389, 961 U.N.T.S. 187 (entered into
force on Feb. 4, 1958) (calling for a complex regime with limited liability for
aircraft damage); with Liability Convention, supra note 108, art. II (asserting abso-
lute liability for surface damage caused by space objects). See generally Michael
Mineiro, Assessing the Risks: Tort Liability and Risk Management in the Event of a
Commercial Human Space Flight Vehicle Accident, 74 J. AIR L. & COM. 371 (2009);
DEMPSEY, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL AIR LAW, supra note 71, at 757–58 (also discuss-
ing differences in personal injury liability for passengers).
347 Stephen D. Krasner, Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as In-
tervening Variables, in INTERNATIONAL REGIMES 1, 1–5 (Stephen D. Krasner ed.,
1983).
348 Id. at 5 (“If the principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures of
a regime become less coherent, or if actual practice is increasingly inconsistent
with principles, norms, rules, and procedures, then a regime has weakened.”).
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surability based on the common security interest illustrative of
the line between air and space.
4. The Common Metric: Security
Freedom of movement (through free use and exploration)
and sovereignty can be looked at as opposing values and may
always be such in many contexts.349 But the outer space experi-
ence demonstrates that there may be a common motivation be-
hind the divergent airspace and outer space regimes: state
security. The sovereignty and state craft rules within the regimes
are the means by which states have reached (or sought to reach)
the common end of security (actual or perceived). From this
common motivation, security, one can better derive the division
point. This sub-section examines the evidence of a state interest
in the law of each regime.
In general, it must be recalled that air and space law are
merely forms of international law, just with air and space appli-
cation.350 And a foundation of international law is the interest of
states in their own security. This is enshrined in the preamble of
the U.N. Charter’s “international peace and security” mecha-
nism, as well as the broad practice of states.351 The security inter-
est is borne out more specifically in the underpinnings of both
the airspace and outer space regimes.
a. The Security Interest in Airspace Law
While the seeds of security may be sewn through globalization
and interconnectedness, security through firm boundaries in
their airspace has also been a consistent concern for states. De-
spite the debate over possible freedom of the air (absolute or
349 See, e.g., Gunnar Beck, Legitimation Crisis, Reifying Human Rights and the
Norm-Creating Power of the Factual: Reply to “Reifying Law: Let them be Lions”, 26 PENN.
STATE INT’L L. REV. 565, 599 (2008) (“Judicial trade-offs between incommensura-
ble values thus remain unconstrained by rational choice because it cannot be
demonstrated that the loss of liberty required by some measures is either greater
or more limited than the correlative gains in security. No one can say how much
security is enough and how many ‘x’ units of liberty should be sacrificed for ‘y’
gains in security.”).
350 See Jakhu & Freeland, supra note 144, at 461 (“International space law
neither possesses an identity independent of general international law, nor does
it come into being outside the law-making processes established by the latter.
Therefore, the sources of international space law are principally the same as
those of general international law.”); BROWNLIE, supra note 97, at 255; Ramey,
supra note 22, at 66.
351 U.N. Charter pmbl.
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qualified), the unflappable status of territorial sovereignty took
over airspace law early in the age of aviation. And “[t]he main
reason for this was one of security.”352 One author, writing in
1933, lamented the post-World War I context in which the Paris
Convention was created, noting that, “[t]he influence of war
mentality is specially evident in the text of the Convention.”353
He proposed a modified regime that escaped this security con-
text, as the perceived over-focus on sovereignty precluded inter-
national harmonization of air rules. However, the strict
sovereignty regime of the Chicago Convention showed that
states disagreed with this position. As Lachs stated:
With the advent of aircraft, States became anxious to protect
themselves against whatever threat to their security these new fly-
ing objects might entail. This is clearly reflected in the principles
and rules of aerial navigation. A State’s rights over the air above
its territory, as indicated earlier, were reasserted. How jealously
they have been guarded and applied is illustrated by the practice
of the last half-century.354
Cooper wrote The Right to Fly in the wake of World War II,
“[f]acing as we do a future that contains atomic bombs, rocket
missiles of unknown range, jet-propelled fighters of incredible
speed and fire power, and enormous transports capable of carry-
ing large numbers of air-borne troops and military equip-
ment.”355 He opined:
Air power is today the most dynamic force in the life of nations.
Properly used, it can be the means to better understanding
352 SPACE ACTIVITIES AND EMERGING INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 73, at 162.
353 FRANCESCO COSENTINI, INTERNATIONAL CODE OF AVIATION 4 (1933). He ad-
ditionally noted that:
The giving of an exact account of the scope, spirit and tendencies
of the orientation to be accorded air law has been prevented, on
the one hand, by the persistency of a certain war mentality that has
sometimes influenced the legislators and the “High Contracting
Parties” in the period immediately after the war [World War I]—a
period that marked the greatest development of air law; and on the
other hand, by the scientific tendency to analogize air law to mari-
time law, and to give to all the juridical acts and facts connected
therewith the same solutions that have been adopted for maritime
navigation and trade.
Id. at 3–4. So air law resembles the law of the sea, with its fixed zones, but main-
tains the security interest with its bar on state vehicle passage and automatic
rights of overflight.
354 LACHS, supra note 64, at 55.
355 COOPER, THE RIGHT TO FLY, supra note 65, at 2 (advocating the demilitariza-
tion of Germany and Japan—particularly their skies and air forces).
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among the peoples of the world. Improperly used, it can be a
threat to the general security, even in time of peace. If war comes
again, air power can transport the armed forces and missiles
fated to destroy our civilization.356
So the interest in state security pervaded the development of
the airspace regime, due in no small part to concerns over ma-
jor wars.
An attempt to balance free movement and openness with se-
curity is reflected in the preamble of the Chicago Convention. It
states that international civil aviation’s “abuse can become a
threat to the general security; and . . . it is desirable to avoid
friction and to promote cooperation between nations and peo-
ples upon which the peace of the world depends.”357 The poten-
tial for “friction” as a threat to general security has been
evidenced by numerous plane shoot-downs, both civil and mili-
tary (and civil mistaken for military), over the course of aviation
history.358 This friction is even more present in the current age
of terrorism, unpredictability, and weapons of mass destruc-
tion.359 While the details of these matters are beyond the scope
of this work, they demonstrate a prudential reason for states to
assert maximum control over airspace.360
b. The Security Interest in Outer Space Law
Terrestrial security was an equally important concern for the
development of outer space law. It can be said that cooperation
among powers (particularly the United States and the Soviet
Union) can lead to peaceful outcomes. So states finding com-
mon interests in the regulation of outer space was an important
step toward systemic predictability and stability, and hence
356 Id. at 1.
357 Convention on International Civil Aviation, supra note 49, pmbl.
358 See generally Donahue, supra note 45, at 54; see also Sections III.B.3 and
III.B.4 supra.
359 See THE WHITE HOUSE (GEORGE W. BUSH), supra note 27, at 15 (“The
United States will not use force in all cases to preempt emerging threats, nor
should nations use preemption as a pretext for aggression. Yet in an age where
the enemies of civilization openly and actively seek the world’s most destructive
technologies, the United States cannot remain idle while dangers gather.”); Mur-
phy, supra note 22; Yoo, supra note 26.
360 But see Reinhardt, supra note 4, at 129–30 (arguing that a 12 nautical mile
security zone would be comparable to land and air buffers and adequate for state
security).
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peace and security.361 The mechanisms of the creation of outer
space law through the COPUOS362 and the substance of some of
the law363 reflect an interest in security through cooperation.
However, the outer space regime more directly relates to state
security interests through the prohibitions it imposes on poten-
tial aggression in or from outer space.
The historical context for the creation of outer space law is
important in this regard. The Declaration of Legal Principles
came less than twenty years after the close of World War II and
in the middle of the Cold War—with its accompanying nuclear
arms race, fears of the “domino theory” of communist spread,
and anti-communist proxy wars.364 Even before the Cuban Mis-
sile Crisis of 1962, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev openly
noted his country’s capacity to strike into the U.S. heartland,
and “according to the Soviet newspaper Red Star, by 1970 the
main weapon in the [Soviet Union’s] aerospace arsenal [would]
361 See CARL CHRISTOL, SPACE LAW: PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE 62 (1991); see
also Roald Sagdeev & Susan Eisenhower, United States-Soviet Space Cooperation Dur-
ing the Cold War, NASA, http://www.nasa.gov/50th/50th_magazine/coldWarCo
Op.html [https://perma.cc/KWW9-Z3NJ] (highlighting attempts at space coop-
eration, from the beginning of the space age); U.S.-Soviet Space Cooperation, U.S.
DEP’T OF STATE OFF. OF THE HISTORIAN, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocu
ments/frus1961-63v25/ch12 [https://perma.cc/5TSN-H6ES] (containing
archives of official documents related to US-Soviet cooperation). Of course, co-
operation can have a more tactical application as well; for instance, the United
States viewed outer space cooperation with Western Europe as a mechanism to
strengthen ties amongst the anti-Soviet powers. See Doc. 375. Memorandum From the
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Tyler) to Secretary of State Rusk,
in 25 FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1961–1963, ORGANIZATION OF
FOREIGN POLICY; INFORMATION POLICY; UNITED NATIONS; SCIENTIFIC MATTERS
(1962), https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v25/d375
[https://perma.cc/8HJZ-WKLT].
362 See, e.g., Doc. 104. Telegram 703 From the Mission to the United Nations to the
Department of State, March 6, 1975, 2344Z, in E-3 FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE
UNITED STATES, 1969–1976, DOCUMENTS ON GLOBAL ISSUES, 1973–1976, para. 1,
http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve03/d104 [https://
perma.cc/KV7A-JL89]. The remainder of the Telegram shows the desire for close
integration of United States and Soviet positions on delimitation in opposition to
potential smaller-state proposals; this put (at least for one issue) the Cold War
split in the world on a different axis than the typical United States versus Soviet
split. Id.
363 See, e.g., Outer Space Treaty, supra note 60, pmbl., arts. I, III, IX–XI (laud-
ing, encouraging, and promoting international cooperation).
364 See Freeland, supra note 22, at 94 (“Many of the fundamental principles that
formed the basis of the Outer Space Treaty were concluded at a time when the
world was in the midst of uncertainty and mistrust, largely as a result of the pre-
vailing geopolitical environment of the Cold War.”).
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be a nuclear-armed satellite.”365 Of course, the threat was not
one-sided; as one writer noted in 1962: “For some time now U.S.
military planners have been freely discussing the possibility of
using the Moon as an early-warning station and, eventually as a
bombardment site.”366 And the United States was working to-
wards the Dyna-Soar X-20 spaceplane, which was intended to
have numerous applications, to include use as a hypersonic
bomber.367 In this context, states (in particular the United States
and the Soviet Union) came to shape outer space law into a re-
gime to secure their perceived security benefits (or advantages)
and mitigate perceived security disadvantages.
In the United States, Soviet Union weapons (terrestrial and
space-based) were perceived as a major threat. Thus, the United
States had interest in curbing their development and deploy-
ment.368 One way to do this was to create prohibitions on the
employment of space weapons through the “peaceful purposes”
language found throughout outer space law and the limitations
on weaponization found in the Outer Space Treaty. In particu-
lar, Article IV states:
States Parties to the Treaty undertake not to place in orbit
around the [E]arth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any
other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, install such weapons
on celestial bodies, or station such weapons in outer space in any
other manner.
The Moon and other celestial bodies shall be used by all States
Parties to the Treaty exclusively for peaceful purposes. The estab-
lishment of military bases, installations and fortifications, the test-
ing of any type of weapons and the conduct of military
manoeuvres on celestial bodies shall be forbidden. The use of
military personnel for scientific research or for any other peace-
ful purposes shall not be prohibited. The use of any equipment
or facility necessary for peaceful exploration of the Moon and
other celestial bodies shall also not be prohibited.369
Also, beginning in the Eisenhower administration and contin-
uing onward, the United States showed great interest in recon-
naissance and transparency mechanisms as a means for security
365 Golovine, supra note 55, at v (Preface to the American Edition).
366 Id. at 106.
367 See HOUCHIN, supra note 3.
368 See Doc. 103. Memorandum for President Kennedy, in 8 FOREIGN RELATIONS OF
THE UNITED STATES, 1961–1963, NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY (undated), https://
history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v08/d103 [https://perma.cc/
HC23-MD35].
369 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 60, art. IV.
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and arms control.370 Eisenhower championed an “Open Skies”
program, wherein both the United States and Soviet Union (by
mutual agreement) would allow overflight and reconnaissance
to ensure compliance with arms control (particularly nuclear)
agreements.371 The “open” nature of the skies was very narrowly
tailored to this specific purpose, but it would include overflight
by any craft—in air or, as the capability developed, in outer
space. While this program did not come to fruition at the time,
the United States maintained interest in reconnaissance over-
flight (sometimes with poor results, as demonstrated by the 1956
balloon incident and the 1960 U-2 shoot-down). This led to a
focus on outer space as a vehicle for reconnaissance, maximiz-
ing a perceived strategic advantage: “The most urgent and im-
mediate use of space systems for military purposes is for
surveillance and target reconnaissance over the land masses of
the world with particular emphasis on the Sino-Soviet bloc of
nations.”372 In lauding the possibility that Sputnik had paved the
way for an assertion of a free passage regime for satellites, one
U.S. adviser stated, “[w]e believe that we can get a great deal
more information out of free use of orbital space than they
can.”373
So at least from the U.S. perspective, the Outer Space Treaty
was a useful tool—it precluded the primary Soviet threat (orbi-
370 See Doc. 356. Report by the Ad Hoc Committee on Space to President-Elect Kennedy,
in 25 FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1961–1963, ORGANIZATION OF
FOREIGN POLICY; INFORMATION POLICY; UNITED NATIONS; SCIENTIFIC MATTERS
(1961), https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v25/d356 [
https://perma.cc/MJN5-DJGB] (“There are important and unique uses of space
for national security and in support of our treaty alliances throughout the world.
There are also important uses of space systems for arms-control purposes.”).
371 See Vladlen Vereshchetin, International Control and the Concept of “Open Skies,”
in FROM COEXISTENCE TO COOPERATION: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ORGANIZATION
IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA 31, 31–34 (Edward McWhinney et al., eds., 1991);
John Noble, The Open Skies Treaty Initiative: Prospects for an Agreement and Precedent,
in FROM COEXISTENCE TO COOPERATION: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ORGANIZATION
IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA 44, 44 (Edward McWhinney et al., eds., 1991) (trac-
ing the history of “open skies” verification back to the Eisenhower administra-
tion). Subsequent to the Cold War, the United States and other states did enter
into an Open Skies agreement, which remains in force today as a transparency
and confidence building tool. See Treaty On Open Skies (OS), U.S. DEPT. OF STATE,
http://www.state.gov/t/avc/cca/os/index.htm [https://perma.cc/76GT-KQ26];
see also Treaty on Open Skies, Mar. 24, 1992, S. Treaty Doc. No. 102-37 (entered
into force on Jan. 1, 2002).
372 Doc. 356., supra note 370.
373 Doc. 347., supra note 238, para. 5.
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tal bombs) and allowed the perceived U.S. advantage (surveil-
lance and communications capacity).374
Security was also an explicit interest of the Soviet Union in the
early space era. In 1963, McMahon surveyed recent Soviet posi-
tions on delimitation, finding “national security” as a primary
interest.375 For instance, in 1959, the Soviet author Osnitskaya
stated that “all proposals whose adoption would restrict the sov-
ereignty rights of a state to safeguard its own security must be
rejected.”376 The Soviet Union’s initial mechanism to achieve
this security was an effective control theory of sovereignty,
largely with no limits. However, after Sputnik, they required a
policy that would provide perceived security but still allow the
flight of Sputnik, a point of great state pride. Thus, the policy
evolved into “deference to the realization that State security can
only be guaranteed an international agreement prohibiting cer-
tain activities in space, wherever they occur, and not by an un-
limited extension of State sovereignty.”377 This fits with
Wassenbergh’s assertion that it is law, and not effective control,
that secures sovereignty.378 Conversely, it is the law (and not a
lack of capacity) that can ensure security interests in a zone such
as outer space where rival powers all have the capacity to assert
force (or effective control). In this vein, the Soviets supported
satellite overflight but objected (initially) to the use of satellites
for reconnaissance in international fora.379
For all states, according to Lachs:
The value and interest of the frontier are linked in their turn
with the basic motivation by which States have been guided in
their claims to sovereignty over the area bordering with outer
space. There can be little doubt that this has been, and remains,
national security.
. . .
374 See Doc. 365. Memorandum of Conversation, in 25 FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE
UNITED STATES, 1961–1963, ORGANIZATION OF FOREIGN POLICY; INFORMATION POL-
ICY; UNITED NATIONS; SCIENTIFIC MATTERS (1961), https://history.state.gov/his-
toricaldocuments/frus1961-63v25/d365 [https://perma.cc/LED6-4C3Z] (While
noting a Soviet advantage in rockets for manned flight, “Dr. Dryden [of NASA]
stated that the United States clearly leads the Soviet Union with respect to scien-
tific research in outer space and particularly in development of meteorological
and communications satellites.”).
375 McMahon, supra note 205, at 346–47.
376 Id. at 346.
377 Id. at 347.
378 WASSENBERGH, supra note 220, at 152 (“Sovereignty can no longer be based
on the effective power of a State, but ‘only’ on law.”); see Section IV.B.2 supra.
379 See Section IV.B.3 supra.
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Now, new objects have made their appearance in space. Though
much further away, circling in their orbits or shooting upwards
and coming down, do they constitute a new factor affecting the
security of the States below? The developments during the last
few years offer an unequivocal reply. The issue of security has not
only retained its decisive importance: it has acquired an even
greater emphasis.380
Cooper also explicitly cited a desire to ensure state security in
his early proposal for a 300-mile sovereignty zone with a transit
passage regime for non-military vehicles: “These solutions would
aid future peaceful use of rockets and satellites and would seem
to provide reasonable security for the subjacent state.”381 Over-
all, security was an essential element of the development of
outer space law.
5. Application of the Security Metric: Orbit is the Division Point
If the law of airspace and outer space must be divided, and
they can be assessed or valuated along a single metric of secur-
ity, the question becomes: where did states find the tipping
point at which national security is better served by territorial sov-
ereignty than by freedom of movement? Or, conversely, where
does freedom of movement trump assertions of sovereignty in
securing a state? Similarly, the question of where the change oc-
curs between the advantages and disadvantages of distinction
between state and civilian craft comes into play. If there is a
common intersection for these points of departure, that means
the security metric suggests a line of demarcation. Here, that
line is at orbit.
The bulk of this chapter and its prior sections have been de-
voted to establishing states’ interest in sovereignty—a mecha-
nism for state security—and their inclination to maximize
territorial sovereignty. So, as a starting point, the security inter-
est suggests that the line between air and space should be at a
high altitude. However, examination of the Outer Space
Treaty’s peaceful uses and de-weaponization of space provisions,
the state interest in transparency, and the practical aspects of
380 LACHS, supra note 64, at 55. Lachs further noted that this security interest
drives states’ “desire[s] to take into account the nature of any activity carried out
in the new dimension, to consider it on its merits, to judge it by its objectives and
the consequences it produces within the areas of the sovereign rights of States.”
Id. This further accentuates the importance of the broadest airspace regime for
states, to maximize this interest in examining threats on a case-by-case basis.
381 COOPER, Legal Problems, supra note 231, at 276.
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the use of force provide further guidance on where the line
should fall.
a. Peaceful Uses and De-Weaponization
Before even the first satellite launch, “in January 1957, Ambas-
sador John Cabot Lodge, addressing the U.N. General Assembly
on behalf of the United States, expressed the hope of his gov-
ernment that ‘future developments in outer space would be de-
voted exclusively to peaceful and scientific purposes.’”382
Peaceful uses strongly supports the idea that security was at in-
terest—if one outlaws war or military activity in space, certainly
there is a strong suggestion that peace will prevail; and where
there is peace there should be security. But the issue of exactly
what “peaceful uses” of outer space means is still unclear. Gener-
ally, there are two schools of thought on the matter—it can ei-
ther mean non-military or it can mean non-aggressive (while still
allowing military activity).383
If space must be entirely non-militarized (and de-
weaponized), it is more difficult to derive a line of demarcation
between air and space from a security perspective. Essentially,
space would be an extension of the airspace prohibition on state
vehicles, though more like a Paris Convention construct
wherein state craft were further divided into military and non-
military craft (with more flight allowances for non-military).384
However, space has always been considered in a context of
military activities.385 From the beginning of outer space applica-
tions, the U.S. policy was that military does not mean non-peace-
ful (instead, the focus was on non-aggression).386 Further, the
military use of outer space is shown through state practice as
382 Ivan Vlasic, The Legal Aspects of Peaceful and Non-Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, in
PEACEFUL AND NON-PEACEFUL USES OF SPACE: PROBLEMS OF DEFINITION FOR THE
PREVENTION OF AN ARMS RACE, supra note 219, at 37, 38.
383 See id. at 37; Bourbonnie`re & Lee, Legality of the Deployment, supra note 22, at
877, 889; Freeland, supra note 22, at 95.
384 See Section III.A supra; see also Paris Convention, supra note 65, arts. 30–31.
385 See Freeland, supra note 22, at 83 (“With the benefit of hindsight, it is now
clear that space has been utilized for military activities almost from the time of
the very infancy of space activities.”); Doc. 479., supra note 242 (assessing both the
United States and the Soviet projections for the military applications of space);
see also PEACEFUL AND NON-PEACEFUL USES OF SPACE: PROBLEMS OF DEFINITION FOR
THE PREVENTION OF AN ARMS RACE, supra note 219; see generally TERRILL, JR., supra
note 341.
386 Paul Nitze et al., Doc. 421. Report by the Committee on Satellite Reconnaissance
Policy, in 25 FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1961–1963, ORGANIZA-
TION OF FOREIGN POLICY; INFORMATION POLICY; UNITED NATIONS; SCIENTIFIC MAT-
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well. As noted previously, the first astronauts and craft in space
were all part of the military.387 Article IV of the Outer Space
Treaty explicitly contemplated military members in space
(though participating in space use and exploration for peaceful
purposes).388 Also, the prohibitions on weapons in Article IV are
very specific and do not generally outlaw the use or stationing of
weapons in space. This state practice and the text of the Treaty
led Vlasic to conclude:
Given the ambiguity of the term “peaceful” as used in the [Outer
Space Treaty], as well as the overt and covert practice of the two
state actors in outer space, the conclusion is inescapable that all
military uses of space other than those prohibited by treaty
were—since the beginning of space exploration and are still to-
day—lawful as long as they do not violate any of the principles
and rules of general international law (e.g., uses that represent
the threat or employment of force).389
As military uses of space are generally permissible, this creates
a distinction from the airspace where state and military opera-
tions are strictly prohibited, absent permission, over sovereign
territory. It must be assumed that there need be no particular
rules governing military actions or weaponization in foreign air-
space—they are generally precluded anyway, or when allowed it
is either in a time of conflict where sovereignty is not respected
by the parties or under the strict agreement of involved states
(presumably with specific allowances).390 But the specific preclu-
sions of military activities in outer space are telling of the reach
TERS (undated), https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v25/
d421 [https://perma.cc/DD8T-PBVP].
387 See Section III.B.3 supra.
388 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 60, art. IV, para. 2 (“The use of military
personnel for scientific research or for any other peaceful purposes shall not be
prohibited.”).
389 Vlasic, supra note 382, at 45; see also Bourbonnie`re & Lee, Legality of the
Deployment, supra note 22, at 888; U.K. MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, supra note 63, at 2-3.
But see Jakhu, supra note 147, at 99 (arguing that military uses and weapons in
space constitute a threat to security, and therefore are broadly prohibited).
390 See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., DIRECTIVE NO. 4500.54E, FOREIGN CLEARANCE
PROGRAM para. 4.a (2009) (“[Department of Defense] aircraft shall obtain air-
craft diplomatic clearance to overfly the territory of, or land in, a foreign country
from that foreign country’s government.”). Absent stricter guidance, in general
state craft must operate with “due regard” for civilian craft. Convention on Inter-
national Civil Aviation, supra note 49, art. 3(d); see also Bourbonnie`re & Haeck,
supra note 115, at 926–31 (discussing the application of the due regard stan-
dard); U.S. Air Force Instruction 11-202, vol. 3, General Flight Rules para. 1.4
(Nov. 7, 2014) (generally establishing the ICAO rules as the baseline guidance
for Air Force operations, with the “due regard” standard as the exception).
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of the outer space regime. That is, outer space law can only pre-
clude activities that occur in outer space—so to read the extent
of its prohibitions is to read the extent of the law.
Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty contains spatially broad
prohibitions against outer space weaponization.391 It precludes
military maneuvers on the Moon, and bans bases, installations,
fortifications, military maneuvers, and weapons testing on all ce-
lestial bodies.392 Vlasic also compiled other outer space military
and weapons prohibitions under international law and none
provided greater particularity as to their applicable location.393
While these cement that the Moon and other celestial bodies
indeed fall within outer space, they do no illuminate the air-
space and outer space line.
The one clause that does, however, requires states “not to
place in orbit around the Earth any objects carrying nuclear
weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction.”394
This clause further precludes stationing such weapons “in outer
space in any other manner.” This latter blanket prohibition
would have covered orbital weapons, but the Outer Space Treaty
draws particular attention to “orbit around the Earth” with the
former clause’s explicit mention of it.
As the lowest altitude of space applications explicitly named
in the Outer Space Treaty or in arms control for space gener-
ally, orbit appears as the limit to which states feel compelled to
ban strategic level security-threatening weapons of mass destruc-
tion. Given the automatic preclusion of such weapons in sover-
eign airspace, this suggests that the shift in state security needs
occurs at orbit.
b. Transparency
As discussed in the previous section, one of the primary meth-
ods for ensuring terrestrial peace was through transparency.
This allows states to monitor each other’s actions as well as en-
sure compliance with disarmament agreements such as the 1963
Partial Test Ban Treaty.395 At the dawn of the space age, United
391 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 60, art. IV.
392 Id. art. IV, para. 2.
393 Vlasic, supra note 382, at 47–48.
394 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 60, art. IV, para. 1.
395 See Vlasic, supra note 382, at 51 (discussing monitoring and verification of
outer space uses); see also Bhupendra Jasani, Dep’t of War Studies, King’s College
London, Presentation in Montreal: Commercial Systems for Military (Mar. 16–17,
2015) (on file with author) (addressing space applications for monitoring both
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States’ efforts to overfly the Soviet Union for remote sensing and
aerial photography had failed below orbit. But, based largely on
the Soviet interest in securing legal flight paths for Sputnik and
its progeny, the United States was able to secure overflight rights
and the use of remote sensing satellites. So while the freedom of
overflight—a mechanism for security (particularly for the
United States, which perceived its capacity in this regard as an
advantage)—was denied in airspace, it is allowed in outer space.
And the line in the use of this mechanism is orbit.
c. Practical Use of Force Considerations
Practical considerations in the application of force also sug-
gest that orbit is a dividing line in state security interests. The
concept of effective control has been discussed throughout this
work. While it is no longer the driving force behind assertions of
sovereignty rights (as the potential for effective control extends
beyond what is accepted as the outer space cap on state sover-
eignty), it still informs where states can feel most secure with the
greatest ease. Assuming states are rational actors and would per-
form a cost-benefit analysis prior to employing force in gray
space, both the costs and benefits pivot at orbit. As to cost, while
some states can project power into outer space, many more can
assert control up to or near orbit through more conventional
weapons and means. Even compared to suborbital or high-alti-
tude applications, outer space activities are difficult and expen-
sive.396 The likely perceived benefit also shifts at orbit, whether
taken from a generalized pragmatic perspective or a “necessity”
under the jus ad bellum view. While both United States’ and Chi-
nese ASAT tests suggest that there is some perceived benefit to
super-orbital strikes, it is limited. As discussed above, objects in
orbit are inherently passive.397 They may be conducting opera-
space and terrestrial activities as a means of verification and confidence building
in support of terrestrial peace agreements and arms control).
396 See KLEIMAN ET AL., supra note 73, at 51 (“achieving orbital space flight is
many times more energy-intensive, and therefore much more difficult and ex-
pensive, than achieving suborbital spaceflight.”); Pelton, Geosynchronous, supra
note 10, at 12 (comparing the lower costs of atmospheric applications versus orbi-
tal satellites).
397 See Sections IV.C.3.a and IV.C.3.b supra (discussing “innocent” and continu-
ous passage of satellites versus offensive and conscious incursions below orbit).
Of course, vehicles may be able to engage in controlled flight in a pattern to
simulate orbit, notwithstanding the extraordinarily high fuel costs when com-
pared to passively operating in orbit. See Section III.B.1 supra. As future technolo-
gies develop, simulated orbital paths may become a more reasonable and,
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tions to which a state may object, but they typically do so in a
regularized, circular, inert, and generally inoffensive manner.
Aerospace vehicles operating below orbit, however, are engaged
in controlled flight. This is far more offensive, purposeful, and
likely more threatening to a subjacent state—making the secur-
ity interest much greater in addressing such vehicles with
force.398 So, from a practical standpoint, it makes sense to assert
sovereignty only as far as it can efficiently be enforced. Beyond
that (beyond orbit), it makes more sense to create a legal re-
gime that ensures peace.
Jus in bello considerations also help draw a line at orbit for
targeting reasons, though this is a more modern development.
In particular, the creation of orbital debris is a major concern in
the use of force against objects in orbit.399 If a craft is targeted
below orbit, there will certainly be debris created from its de-
struction. But that is substantively no different than an attack on
an airplane in airspace or even a vehicle on the ground. And the
analysis for such attacks falls squarely in the current regime for
the laws of war.400 The law of armed conflict, particularly the
principles of distinction and proportionality, must be examined
to ensure the propriety of the selected target; but the effects are
likely to be nominal.
In orbit, however, the debris will persist for an extended dura-
tion.401 Due to the nature of satellites in orbit, they will have
great difficulty avoiding any debris in outer space—exacerbating
therefore, common phenomenon. But to the degree that such vehicles could
even be distinguished from actually-orbiting craft, their use would still likely be
assessed like any other vehicle. As discussed further below, the concept of “orbit”
can be thought of as both a place and a function; for such future orbit-simulating
craft, perhaps states would lean toward the notion of natural orbit as a zone of
operation (a place) in forming a line. See Section IV.E infra.
398 See Section III.B.4 supra.
399 See, e.g., Bourbonnie`re & Lee, Jus ad Bellum, supra note 22, at 188 (“On this
point, while ASAT weapons are not by their own nature indiscriminate, for an
extraordinarily high degree of precision is required to destroy a satellite in orbit,
yet it has been argued that the extensive field of space debris that results from the
collision of a kinetic ASAT weapon and a satellite would render kinetic ASAT
weapons indiscriminate and thus illegal.”).
400 See, e.g., W. Hays Parks, Air War and the Law of War, 32 A.F.L. REV. 1, 178
(1990).
401 See SPACE SECURITY INDEX 2011, supra note 20, at 27 (noting that “[s]pace
debris, which predominantly consists of objects generated by human activity in
space, represents a growing and indiscriminate threat to all spacecraft” and
describing major debris-causing events in recent history); see also Space Sus-
tainability, SECURE WORLD FOUND., http://swfound.org/our-focus/space-sustaina
bility/ [https://perma.cc/FM3U-5VWV].
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the collateral damage caused by the attack. Further, the debris
will continue to destroy or otherwise affect all satellites with
which it comes into contact; the persistent debris cannot dis-
criminate between lawful or unlawful targets. So the collateral
effects of the use of force in orbit and beyond can be dispropor-
tionate to a similar strike below orbit. When states assess the po-
tential for the use of force to ensure security, this fact
significantly limits a state’s ability to act (with force). When the
ability to act (as a matter of self-help) is curtailed, it follows that
states should seek alternative means to ensure their security
such as a regime of free use and exploration for peaceful pur-
poses. So orbit and its inherent limitations on the legal use of
force help for a line between the regimes.
6. Conclusion
Consider the airspace and outer space regimes, though oppo-
site in two key matters for the use of force, to be two sides of the
same coin. When the coin is flipped in the air, and it rotates
with great speed along its axis, and the edges are almost a blur;
it even appears as though it is a small ball or spherical object.
But it is not—when it falls, that coin is either heads or tails; it is
one or the other. So too is the case with airspace and outer
space; gray space is merely the illusion of some other zone when
the coin is flipped.
Seeking out the unifying theme underlying the development
of air and space law reveals that state interests in security are
persistent and essential in both regimes. The seemingly gray
area between what is clearly air law and what is clearly outer
space law can really be read as one side or the other of a line.
And the division point in the security interest, and hence the
regimes, is at orbit.
E. DRAWING CONCLUSIONS FROM THESE MODES OF ANALYSIS
There can be no doubt that the freedom of action of states in
outer space or on celestial bodies is neither unlimited, absolute,
nor unqualified, but is determined by the right and interest of
other states. It can therefore be exercised only to the extent to
which as indicated it does not conflict with those rights and
interests.402
402 LACHS, supra note 64, at 108.
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Lachs stated this in the context of safeguarding the rights of
less powerful or scientifically advanced states, and it has been
subsequently cited to bolster the depth of the Outer Space
Treaty’s Article IX due regard requirement403 and the general
necessity of furthering global public interests (particularly
peaceful uses, cooperation, and equality) in outer space.404
The assertion is equally true if Lachs’s “freedom of action of
States” is also considered to include free movement through
space without regard to terrestrial notions of sovereignty or limi-
tations on the flight of state craft. Here, his second sentence is
key—freedom of movement and action in outer space exists
“only to the extent to which as indicated it does not conflict with
those rights and interests [of other states].” Such rights and in-
terests would include territorial sovereignty and security.405
States have spoken over time on these matters. This section
has demonstrated that they assert their interests in sovereignty,
generally, as high as possible. Such assertions are legally capped
only by the start of the outer space regime. And as discussed in
Chapter III, that regime can only be confidently said to reach as
low as artificial satellite orbit of Earth.
The other interest is security; on this matter, states have spo-
ken as well. With security in mind, states again drew limits on
activity in space—to enhance their perceived security. And,
again, the lowest reach of this is captured in Article IV of the
Outer Space Treaty, which precludes weapons of mass destruc-
tion in orbit.
As both of these analyses point to orbit as the line of demarca-
tion, it is worth addressing what “orbit” means in greater detail.
Much like aerospace or near space, orbit can be viewed in spa-
403 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 60, art. IX (“In the exploration and use of
outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, States Parties to the
Treaty shall be guided by the principle of cooperation and mutual assistance and
shall conduct all their activities in outer space, including the Moon and other
celestial bodies, with due regard to the corresponding interests of all other States
Parties to the Treaty.”).
404 Jakhu, supra note 147, at 47.
405 Evidence of the legitimacy of a state’s interest in its national security is
found throughout international law, but it certainly is found in the right of self-
defense (be it under customary or conventional international law) or as articu-
lated by the ICJ in the Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion. See Green, supra note
32, at 52; Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion,
1996 I.C.J. Rep. 226, 263, para. 96 (July 8) (even in the grave context of using
nuclear weapons, “the Court cannot lose sight of the fundamental right of every
State to survival, and thus its right to resort to self-defence, in accordance with
Article 51 of the Charter when its survival is at stake.”).
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tial or functional terms. It is spatial in that it refers to a generally
fixed location. As discussed in Chapter III, the exact height of
the LEO is not settled among scientists (or legal thinkers). How-
ever, the general estimates range from 96 to 150 kilometers (60
to 93 miles) for the lowest orbiting satellite. Also, though, and
apart from the exact geographic line, orbit can be viewed as an
activity or a function. When a craft orbits Earth, it is engaging in
a particular, and unique, form of operation; it cannot be dupli-
cated (with thrust or other powered flight) for any extended pe-
riod of time. This is what makes orbit so desirable to those
looking to take advantage of its attributes (and particularly
those of GEO, which also allows for persistence over a desired
location). So orbit is not just a place; it is an end or a function in
itself (albeit an intermediary one, toward a final goal of commu-
nications, scientific experimentation, remote sensing, or a host
of other applications).
While orbit may be critiqued as an imprecise line of demarca-
tion,406 it is not a fatal flaw. States may have to accept some de-
gree of arbitrariness in how this line is drawn. But that is no
different than the assessment of a state’s baseline in the law of
the sea, or even where the edges of free speech or other civil
liberties lie in other legal analyses. If one embraces the conserva-
tive approach to the law advocated here, states should view sov-
ereignty as extending upward as far as it is not clearly
contradicted; the dispute over the proper altitude of orbit, then
(if a state desires to put a number on it), should be construed as
150 kilometers—the lowest known orbit, as found in the U.K.
Military Space Primer. However, even if there is still a range of
state positions (potentially down to 96 kilometers), it will be a
much more limited one; the debate has at least been narrowed
to a degree that aerospace activities (particularly suborbital ap-
plications) should have an understanding of where they fit in a
state sovereignty analysis. And, from this narrowing of the issue,
perhaps a fixed and settled resolution can be worked out among
states. It is far easier to decide on a line at 100 kilometers (or
some other number) when the starting point is a range of 96 to
150 kilometers and not 25 to 36,000 kilometers.
V. CONCLUSION
There is an answer to the delimitation debate in the lex lata:
sovereignty, and therefore the airspace regime, extends as high
406 See Oduntan, supra note 139, at 80.
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as possible until it is clearly capped. That cap comes with the
lowest definitive reach of the outer space regime: orbit. Overall,
where there is doubt as to state sovereignty, it should be pre-
sumed that such sovereignty exists. As put by the Canadian band
Rush, “If you choose not to decide, you still have made a
choice.”407 In not deciding clearly that the outer space regime
reaches into aerospace and leaving that zone as a gray area,
states have effectively elected the default: airspace sovereignty.
This work has pulled airspace and outer space apart to assess
them independently, to include their nature and their accompa-
nying legal regimes. Then it attempted to put them back to-
gether to demonstrate that a broader view—through the
particular lens of the potential for the use of force against aero-
space vehicles—can help demonstrate how the regimes fit to-
gether. The resulting conclusion is that the line of demarcation
between air and space is at orbit.
This is not a normative prescription for what regime is best
for aerospace; it is merely an argument for what is. Therefore, it
does not prejudice any arguments for creating a different line,
or even a unique sui generis aerospace zone. It is also not meant
to suggest that there are not difficulties with the present regula-
tion of the zone, particularly the potential inapplicability of
ICAO rules to aerospace vehicles (particularly state vehicles).408
The conclusion here should generally be regarded as a spa-
tialist position on delimitation. But spatial and functional lines
are blurred in both orbit and in aerospace, so this is not a dis-
tinction dealt with in great detail here. In this author’s view,
though, a line in space provides the greatest degree of clarity.
Function ties into uses and intended uses of a craft or activity;
intentions can be naturally blurry, purposefully obfuscated, or
simply a matter of opinion and debate in world politics. Spatial
altitude may have some difficulties in calculation, but it is much
more fixed and reliable; both the aerospace vehicle and the sub-
jacent state can know where the vehicle is relative to a line. In
the context of the potential use of force, clear and mutually un-
derstood lines are beneficial. Thus, considering the need for
clarity and giving deference to an expansive read of state sover-
eignty, it is manifest that a fixed line is the appropriate method.
If an operator deciding whether to fire on an aerospace vehicle
407 RUSH, Freewill, on PERMANENT WAVES (Anthem 1980).
408 See generally THE NEED FOR AN INTEGRATED REGULATORY REGIME FOR AVIA-
TION AND SPACE, supra note 79.
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has to guess whether sovereignty applies, the craft is operating
in an area of no consensus. If a mission planner is contemplat-
ing a flight path through an area that may (legitimately) be con-
sidered sovereign, this similarly is an area of no consensus. And
without consensus, the cautious planner defers to the baseline.
If in genuine doubt, the craft should be construed as being in
sovereign territory. The functional approach leaves doubt, so it
is a lesser approach in the context employed here.
Finally, just because these aerospace vehicles and usages are
relatively new does not mean they are without precedent. For
instance, consider submarines—they introduced new concerns
for the application of force in the law of the sea but were eventu-
ally fit into the existing self-defense and security rubric.409 While
the law of the sea cannot be directly imported into outer space
law, it demonstrates that new capabilities that blur old lines and
have the potential to transcend boundaries can be integrated
into an ordered regime. Submarines were free to operate in
their unique fashion—underwater and out of sight—on the
high seas. But when this capability interfaced with state concerns
of sovereignty near their coasts, states essentially negated the
unique attributes of a submarine in favor of deference to the
territorial sovereignty of the littoral state.410
Here, too, aerospace vehicles present a unique new problem
for the assertion of sovereignty. But just because there is a new
threat to territorial integrity does not mean that such sover-
eignty is (or will be) diminished. Certainly, a convention or
treaty could resolve the issue. Perhaps a formal passage regime
for aerospace vehicles could be created by states. But it is also
possible that, like with the submarine and airplanes, states will
favor their sovereignty over free use of a new(er) application.
And until that happens states must operate under the extant law
and its present line, created by the disposition of states towards
sovereignty and checked only by their interest in allowing free-
dom of motion in orbit and beyond.
409 See Walker, supra note 51, at 345–47; Wolff von Heinegg, The Law of Armed
Conflict at Sea, in THE HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, supra
note 22, at 475, 535–36 (noting the early efforts of some states to outlaw subma-
rine warfare entirely, before submarines became part of the law of the sea).
410 See Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone art. 14(6),
Apr. 29, 1958, 516 U.N.T.S. 205 (entered into force on Sept. 10, 1964) (requiring
submarines to surface and show their flag during innocent passage in territorial
seas); UNCLOS, supra note 59, art. 20 (echoing the Convention on the Territo-
rial Sea and the Contiguous Zone’s Article 14(6)).
